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Abstract. 1
Abstract
Traditional psychological explanations of crowd theory have decontextualised events
and obscured the fact that crowd incidents are typically inter group encounters. This
has led to research being rooted in the crowd whilst ignoring the other parties who
may be present - including the police - and how events develop as function of the
interaction between the two. The studies reported in this thesis attempted to provide
insights into the decision making of senior public order officers of the Metropolitan
Police utilising a variety of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Four main
studies are reported. In the first study (of police training) a grounded theory analysis
revealed that the police have a fear of the crowd which is seen in a concern with
provoking violence by being too harsh or permitting violence by being too lenient. The
balance of harshness and leniency is informed by accountability considerations arising
from internal and external sources and the phase of violence the officers perceived
themselves to be in. In the second study, the relationship of accountability and phase
was manipulated in a controlled experimental setting providing supportive evidence for
the grounded theory model. The third was a series of pilot participant observation
studies which looked at the policing of the Muslim festivals ofEid al Fitr and the Sikh
festivals ofVaisakhi. These studies raised practical issues and was used in designing
the fourth study which looked at the 'in vivo' processes of decision making during the
biggest public order event in London of 1999. This confirmed and extended the focus
on the importance of accountability concerns in senior officer decision making; firstly
by showing them to be more complex than was originally thought, secondly by
showing how those in different positions within the police had different accountability
concerns, and thirdly by showing that such different concerns could lead to conflict
between different sections of the police. The implications of this research and the
foundations of future research are also discussed.
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Chapter 1.
The origins and evolution of Crowd Psychology.
"While all our ancient beliefs are tottering and disappearing, while the old
pillars of society are collapsing one by one, the power of crowds is the only force
which is threatened by nothing and whose prestige will only be magnified. The
age we are about to enter will truly be the ERA OF CROWDS" (Le Bon, 1895,
translated, 1947, pl5, emphasis in original).
1.1 Classic psychological theories of the crowd.
1.1.1. Gustave Le Bon
Gustave Le Bon's book, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, (1895),
arrived at an opportune moment in European and especially French history (Reicher,
1987). The social and political upheavals in Republican France both inspired the crowd
theorists of the day and provided an audience for their explanations of crowd
psychology. This perceived threat to the social and political order was brought into
focus as a result of the social and economic changes of increased urbanisation and
industrialisation - as these two processes heralded the disruption of traditional modes of
social and interpersonal relations (Apfelbaum & Mcguire, 1986). The separation of
workers and owners promoted the replacement of interpersonal relations with
'anonymous' relationships between proletariat and bourgeoisie (Marx & Engels, 1973).
This physical separation produced not only an ideological partition but also a mass that
was unknown and unknowable (Giner, 1976, Reddy, 1977). Le Bon had a desire to
ascribe a cause to what was perceived as the threat posed to the social order
represented by the growth of the socialist and syndicalist crowds and their occupation
of the streets (Barrows, 1981).
The challenge to the new discipline of crowd psychology lay in accounting for
two processes: who would or would not join in any particular crowd and what
behaviours would or would not be supported, or, as Reicher has put more succinctly,
the limits of crowd participation and action (Reicher, 1982, 1984).
The answer supplied by Le Bon to these challenges was contained in his
argument: "whoever he the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike be their
mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they
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have been transformed into a crowdputs them in possession ofa sort ofcollective
mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in
which each individual of them wouldfeel, think, and act were he in a state of
isolation" (Le Bon 1947, p.57 emphasis added).
In other words, by the mere fact of becoming part of a crowd, people would be
'transformed' in the sense of having homogeneity of thought which would supercede
individual differences. The transformation and fusion of individuals into a 'common or
collective mind' and emotion was conceptualised as being brought about by anonymity,
contagion and suggestibility.
On anonymity Le Bon wrote: "the individualformingpart ofa crowd acquires,
solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows
him to yield to instincts, which, had he been alone, he wouldperforce have kept under
restraint. He will be less disposed to check himself, from the crowd being anonymous
and in consequence irresponsible, the sentiment ofresponsibility which always
controls individuals disappears entirely" (p.33).
As regards contagion, Le Bon noted that it "is a phenomenon ofwhich it is
easy to establish the presence, but which it is not easy to explain. It must be classed
among those phenomena ofa hypnotic order, which we shortly study. In a crowd every
sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual
readily sacrifices hispersonal interest to the collective interest. This is an aptitude
very contrary to his nature, and ofwhich man is scarcely capable except when he
makespart ofa crowd" (p.33-34).
On the effects of suggestibility he wrote: "a third cause, andperhaps the most
important, determines in the individuals ofa crowd special characteristics which are
quite contrary at times to those presented by the isolated individual. I allude to that
suggestibility of which, moreover, the contagion mentioned above is neither more nor
less than an effect" (p.34).
It is worth pausing to emphasise the psychological change envisaged by Le Bon.
He claims that anyone who happens to find themselves in a mass of people, irrespective
of his or her own beliefs or characteristics, would be susceptible to becoming
anonymous and 'submerged' in the larger organism (the crowd) and losing their sense
of individual responsibility. In losing that which renders them distinctive all crowd
members become psychologically alike and sovereign individual differences in
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conscious behaviour disappear. The loosening of individual responsibility and the rise of
atavistic impulses through the process of contagion is a consequence of the process of
suggestibility which refers to the domination of the racial or collective unconscious - in
which individuals regress both intellectually and culturally (Le Bon, 1947). As a
consequence of this primitive collective unconscious the behaviour of crowds is
pathologised as mindless, irrational and led him to the negative conclusion that they
"are onlypowerfulfor destruction " (p. 19).
It will be remembered that the new discipline of crowd psychology had to
explain the limits of crowd participation and action (Reicher, 1982, 1984). For Le Bon
the mere presence of people in crowds would result in the homogeneity of thought and
action that was absent in people who were socially isolated. The inference was that
action is uniformly 'mindless' and destructive. Le Bon then went on to describe how
these actions could be controlled by the 'power' and 'prestige' of an orator's rhetoric
addressing it by a process similar to hypnotic suggestion (Le Bon, 1947). This is made
clear in his observation that "an individual immersedfor some length of time in a
crowd in action soon finds himself - either in consequence of the magnetic influence
given out by the crowd, orfrom some other cause ofwhich we are ignorant - in a
special state which much resembles the state offascination in which the hypnotised
individualfinds himself in the hands of the hypnoliser" (p. 31).
In other words, for Le Bon, the theoretical repercussions in locating and fixing
rationality in the conscious social isolate, was that he could point to the instability of all
individuals regardless of intellect in the crowd. There are two important points to be
made about this. First, he was able to provide ambiguous limits to the crowd
phenomenon and blur the distinction between group and crowd psychology. This
extrapolation can be seen in his attempts to ascribe 'group mind' to groups as diverse
as juries and parliamentary assemblies. Second, in dealing with the perceived threat
posed to the French Republic by the rise in the socialist and syndicalist crowds of the
time he could decontextualise their experience by excluding, a prioiri, social and
political aspects of the phenomena (Apfelbaum & Mcguire, 1986).
However, Le Bon's analysis involves a glaring omission. Whilst focusing the
spotlight on the emergent socialist and syndicalist crowds in France, and the
psychological transformation of their members, he says nothing about the role of the
police or the other agents of social control.
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The social and political disruption which provided the antecedent conditions for
the birth of crowd psychology were to intensify over the next decades (Geary, 1981). In
these circumstances, the research into crowd psychology was to grow and Le Bon's
concepts were to play a fundamental part in shaping this process. That is not to say that
everyone agreed with him. Perhaps his biggest challenge came in the form of a
theoretical attack, which disputed his notion of a collective consciousness, and replaced
it with an explanation fixed in the individual pathological personalities of the people
composing the crowd (Allport, F, 1924). These positions may be regarded as being
"diametrically opposed to each other" (Reicher, 1984, p.2). In other words, for Le
Bon, individuality is overwhelmed or extinguished in a crowd, while for Allport
individuality is accentuated.
The polarisation between 'group mind' and 'individualistic' explanations of
crowd or collective behaviour stimulated a polemical debate between the two sides.
The first is that which is exemplified in the writings of Le Bon and the 'group mind'
crowd theorists. The second exemplified by the counter arguments of Allport and the
'individualistic' challengers. Such a simple classification cannot accommodate all the
research into crowd psychology. Two examples in particular stand out. The first
corresponds to the work of Turner and Killian (1972), who provide a clear break with
the notion of the homogeneity of crowd action, by stressing the heterogeneity of action
structured by the emergence of social norms. The second represents a more recent
attempt to contextualise the social, normative and intergroup nature of the crowd
experience within the framework of social identity and self-categorisation theory
(Reicher, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1996, 1997). Their relative positions will be
examined after analysing in more detail the challenge provided by Allportian approaches
to crowd psychology to the position of the 'group mind' theorists exemplified by Le
Ron.
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1.1.2. Floyd Allnort
Allport's counterblast to the 'group mind' tradition focused on amplifying the
'group fallacy' he associated with it. He suggested that the notion of a metaphysical
'crowd consciousness', separate from the consciousness of individuals, was ludicrous
and meaningless, or as he himself noted a mere 'babble of tongues' (Allport, 1933). In
other words, Allport specifically rejected the notion that people in the crowd suffer a
loss of personal consciousness which is replaced by the rise of a common or collective
consciousness. Instead he saw the common emotion proposed by Le Bon to be passed
to others in the process of contagion and suggestibility to be but the effects of arousal
due to the presence of others upon individual response tendencies (Allport, 1924).
The aims of his own 1924 text were to destroy the worst excesses of the
'group mind' position and are stated clearly at the beginning of his book. He wrote:
"the standpoint of this book may be concisely stated asfollows. There is no
psychology ofgroups, which is not essentially, and entirely a psychology of
individuals. Socialpsychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the
psychology of the individual; it is a part of the psychology of the individual, whose
behaviour it studies in relation to that sector ofhis environment comprised by his
fellows Within his organism are provided all the mechanisms by which social
behaviour is explained" (1924, p.4, emphasis in original).
Allport's own notion of individuality was based on a social instinct approach.
In common with other behaviourists, he saw individuals differing in character traits,
due to different conditioning profiles. However, for Allport, such individual
differences, are ultimately dependent upon six basic, 'pre-potent', reflexes, which are
present in all neonates. These are starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling,
hunger reactions, sensitive zone reactions and, finally, sex reactions (Allport, F,
1924).
In accounting for behaviour in collectivities, Allport conceived that this was
simply the aggregation of the individuals involved. He writes: "collective
consciousness and behaviour are simply the aggregation of those states and
reactions of individuals which, owing to similarities ofconstitution, training and
common stimulations, are possessed ofa similar character" (p. 6).
However, Allport did propose a difference between individual and collective
behaviour, which is a result of heightened emotional excitement, and which results
Chapter 1. Psychological review of crowds. 7
from the mutual inter-stimulation of crowd members . This process, which he labelled
'social facilitation', was conceived to work in the following way. First, when a large
number of people are packed tightly into a small physical space, those people who
initially stimulated their neighbours observe an intensified response in others. Second,
this heightened response is reflected back to the 'initiators' who are again restimulated
to even greater heights, "by a kind ofcircular 'reverberation' until an unprecedented
violence of response is developed" (p.301). The consequence being that the strength
of excitement is a geometric function of the number of individuals present.
It should be stressed that such excitement serves to alter only the degree, not
the kind of response, in Allport's own words "nothing new or different was added by
the crowd situation except an intensification ofafeeling already present, and the
possibility ofconcerted action " (p.295).
It is worth pausing to think about the significance of Allport's observation. He
was proposing that, it was not as Le Bon had conceived, a 'crowd consciousness',
which had stormed the Bastille, but rather the individual citizen whose 'pre potent'
responses had been liberated. This led Allport to conclude that "the individual behaves
as he would alone, only more so" (Allport, 1924, p.295). This quotation is often all
Allport is remembered for today and is frequently cited by people following in the
Allportian tradition. It is however crucial to draw a distinction between how Allport has
been represented by those following in this tradition and what he actually said happened
to people in the crowd. These will be discussed in turn.
For many, 'the individual behaving in the crowd', was taken as indicating that as
a result of arousal in the crowd, specific response tendencies of individuals become
more clearly defined. As a consequence, the homogeneity of crowd action must be put
down to the fact that they are composed of similar sorts of people. Therefore, in
accounting for crowd behaviour, which is mindless or violent, you need to look for
people who possess these attributes. However, it has proved notoriously difficult in
uncovering these common psychological attributes of crowd members. For example, a
comprehensive review of over 288 crowd incidents in America failed to reveal any
aspect of crowd participation being linked to personality characteristics of crowd
members (Mc Phail, 1991).
Allport's own account of crowd action is rather different. It will be remembered
that he conceptualised a person's behaviour as a set of specific response tendencies
Chapter 1. Psychological review of crowds. 8
built upon six fundamental 'prepotent' reflexes. To recall, they are: starting and
withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reactions, sensitive zone reactions and,
finally, sex reactions. Therefore, when he talks about the crowd revealing the nature of
the individual, he is talking, literally about a common human nature. Put another way, in
applying the criteria of the limits of crowd participation and action, Allport was
explicitly locating these within the individual.
To be more specific, Allport saw crowd behaviour as based upon the
'struggling' reflex, which occurs when another of the basic drives, sex, is thwarted. He
writes: "it is always a struggle ofsome sort against limitation, oppression, and
opposition to the free satisfaction oforiginal or derived drives" (p.294). On most
occasions the desire to remove anything which conflicts with such 'original or derived
drives' will be constrained by learnt responses. For example, people learn that is wrong
to steal and that they would be punished if they did so, thus the 'struggle response' is
socialised.
For Allport, the effect of the crowd was as follows. First, the socialised
inhibition to action, which kept behaviours in check in individuals, would be greatly
attenuated in the crowd. Second, due to the interstimulation of crowd members the
focus of individual attention would narrow due to the presence of others in the
immediate vicinity. It will be recalled that the strength of this interstimulation, was he
thought, driven by the excitement spiralling up by 'circular reverberation' and was a
geometric function of the number of individuals present. Lastly, once the actions of
crowd members are seen to break through the socialised inhibition of others it would be
replaced by an 'egoistic (or unsocialised) drive' and led Allport to prophesise that the
urge "to kill or destroy now spends itself in unimpededfury" (p. 312).
In sum, Allport saw human behaviour to be based on underlying biological
instincts, which are normally socialised. However, in the crowd this learnt edifice
breaks down and the socialised inhibition to action is replaced by unsocialised atavistic
behaviour.
In common with other theorists already reviewed, Allport used examples of
actual crowd events in support of his claims. However, he substituted the
Revolutionary crowds of France for industrial conflict between mine owners and miners
in the Southern United States of America, at Williamson County Illinois, in the early
1920's (Reicher, in preparation).
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Allport gives a graphic account ofwhat actions a crowd will undertake by
underlying the precipating blocking of the food and family pre potent tendencies and
the resultant 'social facilitation' of the strikers leading to the brutal murder of nineteen
of the 'strikebreaking' or 'scab' workers. He writes: "in a comparatively recent strike
ofcoal miners in aMiddle-Western state a mob ofarmed strikers raided the
company'sproperty and seizedforty offifty imported, non-union workmen. The
intention was to force them to march ahead of their column exposing them to ridicule
and abuse through the streets of the mining settlement. Before they had gone veryfar,
however, the shouts of rage from the strikers became so violent that those marching at
the head advised the 'scabs' to flyfor their lives. This they did, taking to the fields and
woods on either side of the road. One of the strikersfired a shot, and immediately the
column broke, pursuing the fugitives in all directions and shooting them down without
mercy" (p.310).
Let us pause and consider Allport's example. The strike breaking non-union
workers were threatening the strikers 'prepotent' demands for food, sex and love
interests in the family. The desire to crush them pre-existed the crowd, and was
inhibited. However, the first gunshot signalled social approval for doing so and hence
the massacre occurred. Put another way, Allport was predicting that given a sufficiently
powerful stimulus to release the 'pre potent tendencies', a crowd would go as far as
murder, and he characterised the incident at Williamson County as a typical incident in
illustrating the murderous potential of crowds in general.
The historian Brecher (1972) provides a more detailed analysis of the
Williamson County incident. His findings reveal that this incident came about after a
long and protracted dispute between the mine owners and striking miners. The years
between 1919 and 1922 saw almost continuous conflict within the American coalfields.
This conflict had involved mine owners using a variety of defence forces, including
private individuals, armed police and Federal troops. Similarly, striking miners had
armed themselves to deal with the threat posed by such armed forces. The ferocity of
the resulting violence can be exemplified in an incident in 1921 when an open battle
raged between several thousand troops who used machine guns and aircraft to quell the
miners (Brecher, 1972).
Against this background of general unrest a national strike was called by the
United Mine Workers in 1922. Some weeks later the Southern Illinois Coal Company
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reopened the mines in Williamson County and employed strikebreakers from outside
the state who were under the protection of armed guards. Attempts by the striking
miners to have a dialogue with the 'strikebreakers' resulted in machine guns being fired
and two strikers killed. Some time later, a striker, standing half a mile away, was shot
and killed. In response over a thousand striking miners converged on Williamson
County with arms and attempted to march on the mine. They were initially met by
resistance from the mine guards using machine guns, but they surrendered, as the mine
was about to be overrun. At the mine, the mine superintendent was executed, but the
guards and 'strikebreakers' were led back toward the town. A short distance from the
town the armed strikers were met by a crowd who had not been involved in the
conflict. As they did so, they instructed the 'prisoners' to run and began to shoot, killing
19 of them (Brecher, 1972).
The evidence from Brecher shows that it is not the typical crowd incident
Allport would have us believe. More precisely, it arose after the culmination of a long
and protracted dispute in which the striking miners had been the subject of violence
from the mineowners and 'strikebreakers' which had resulted in the deaths of striking
miners. As such the incident can only be understood in relation to the ideological
definitions of the striking miners, which provided the legitimacy of their actions, in the
form of retaliation for the previous behaviour of the 'strikebreakers'. Thus, rather than
Allport's explanation in terms of the 'prepotent' tendencies of the striking miners being
released and 'reverberating' into murder, this incident can only be understood by taking
account of the socially constructed nature of their actions, which evolved as the conflict
between ingroup (striking miners) and outgroup ('strikebreakers') developed over time
(Reicher, 1996, 1997).
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1.1.3. Summary group mind and individualistic approaches
In summary, the 'group mind' and 'individualistic' approaches to crowd
behaviour have argued that one only needs to look at the crowd in and of itself to
explain collective behaviour. To be more specific, it will be remembered from the
introduction, that for Le Bon individuality is lost in the crowd, whilst for followers in
the Allportian tradition, individuality is accentuated. Although, as I have argued, such
followers have misrepresented the complexity of Allporfs crowd psychology, as they
took Allporf s general group psychology and presented it as his crowd psychology,
which it will be recalled is different to what he says.
To recap, Allport actually said that individuals behaviour is shaped by learnt
responses. In groups individuals would respond in terms of their idiosyncratic
tendencies which would be heightened. In the crowd so much energy would be in the
system that the whole edifice would break down, exposing the underlying individual
unsocialised reflexes.
Nonetheless, Allport is more important for the 'individualistic' tradition he
provoked than for what he himself said. Thus both the Le Bonian and the Allportian
tradition share a key underlying assumption, namely that individuality is the sole basis
of behavioural control and that, while social conditions may affect the way in which
individuality operates, they do not constitute our sense ofwho and what we are. That
is, there is no social basis ofbehavioural control.
The legacy resulting from the identity dichotomy which has arisen between the
traditions of'individualism' and 'group mind' has had two important consequences.
First, crowds have been removed from their social and ideological contexts (Apfelbaum
& Mcguire, 1986, Graumann & Moscovici, 1986; Reddy, 1977). Second, these
theoretical perspectives have encouraged the belief that all crowds are inherently, or if
not, potentially dangeious (StoLL & Reicher, 1998). Efforts to resocialise and
depathologise the crowd experience can be identified in the work of Turner and Killian
(1972) and Reicher (1982, 1984, 1987, 1996 & 1997), who provide a distinct break
with the categorisation system of'group mind' and 'individualistic' approaches of
crowd psychology. These theoretical positions will be discussed in turn overleaf.
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1.2 Normative theories of crowd action
1.2.1. Emergent Norm Theory: Turner and Killian.
Turner and Killian (1972 & 1987) need to be considered for two reasons as
differing from previous theorists. First, they develop the insight ofRobert Park who
saw crowds in relation to the general question of the social order (McPhail, 1991).
Second, they reject the proposal of all the other theorists previously reviewed, that
crowds produce homogeneity of thought and action (McPhail, 1991). Instead they
argued that the crowd could only be understood in relation to the heterogeneity of such
thought and action. The impact of these theoretical insights will be discussed in turn
below.
In order to contextualise the social insights of Turner and Killian's model, it is
necessary to take a quick detour to briefly outline the work ofRobert Park. The
theoretical debt owed to Park is acknowledged by Turner & Killian in the preface to
their influential 'Collective Behaviour'. They write: "the ideas in this book reflect most
directly the tradition established by Robert E. Park andErnest W. Burgess and
subsequently extended by Herbert Blumer" (Turner & Killian, 1972, p, x.). Park was
interested generally in the way that the social structure comes to be broken down
reformed and changed (McPhail, 1991). Rather than seeing crowd actions as asocial
and destructive - as Le Bon had - Park sees them as a 'social impulse' and as the well
from which new forms of social institution will spring (McPhail, 1991).
The development of a 'social impulse' - a prerequisite for crowd action - arises
as a consequence of the development of a new social interest which cannot be
expressed in terms of existing channels of communication in the social structure. In the
crowd, these impulses are constructed in an initial 'milling' period through what Park
labelled the 'circular reaction' (McPhail, 1991). Put another way, Park suggested that
far from being the desocialised and pathologised entities of previous theorists, crowds
create and change the nature of their social world.
The insights provided by Park provided Turner and Killian with a platform to
merge "symbolic interractionism with psychological research on the formation of
group norms" (Reicher, in preparation). Essentially, Turner and Killian reject the
notion that crowd action is pathological, rather they see it as normative, albeit that
these norms arise in collective situations. Or, put slightly differently, Turner and Killian
propose that crowd behaviour is structured by the emergence of social norms, hence
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'emergent norm theory'.
For Turner & Killian, crowd or collective behaviour often takes place in the
context ofuncertainty so that "redefining the situation, making sense ofconfusion, is a
central activity" (1987, p.26). In order to make sense of that confusion they propose
that an initial period of'milling' in the crowd takes place. In this phase, prior to crowd
action, people engage in both physical and verbal milling, which involves
communicating with others and asking questions about the situation. Turner & Killian
propose that while this phase is going on that particular individuals or 'keynoters' are
more prominent than others in influencing action. The actions of these individuals
provides a method of replacing individual ambivalence about actions with certainty
expressed through the 'keynoters' activities.
In other words, emergent norm theory "restores the link between the self
understandings of the subject and actions in the crowd" (Reicher, in preparation). In
doing so it restores the sociality of such understanding so conspicuously ignored by
other theorists previously reviewed. However, there remains a problem. It explains this
sociality in relation to the micro social actions of individual crowd members. This
decontextualises the relationships between individual crowd members and wider or
macro apects of sociality (Reicher, in preparation). Efforts to recontextualise this
relationship, whilst at the same time explaining how norms are constrained in the
crowd, have been attempted within the theoretical framework of Self-Categorisation
Theory (SCT)/Social Identity Theory (SIT).
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1.2.2.Sc!f-Categorisation Theory (SCT)/Social identity Theory (SIT)
The main argument of Self Categorisation Theory (SCT), is that identity cannot
be conceptualised in single terms, but rather as a complex construction (Reicher, 1984,
1987; Stott & Reicher, 1998, Tajfel, 1978, Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). More specifically, self-categorisations exist at different
levels of abstraction, which relate to the nature of the self. First, identity can operate at
the individual level, where people define themselves on an interpersonal level of
comparison with others. Second, individuals belong to various social groups, and
therefore define themselves in relation to other groups. Third, at the 'superordinate'
level, individuals can define themselves in terms of humanity as a whole. At different
times identities will be salient at different levels. Thus it can be seen that individuals do
not possess a single identity, but rather define themselves at several levels, the salience
ofwhich differ according to the social context.
Group behaviour depends upon categorisations and self-categorisations
deployed by individuals. The mechanism by which this occurs involves a process in
which a social identification or a cognitive act of self stereotyping occurs, as individuals
define themselves as belonging to specific social categories. In defining oneself as a
member of a specific social category, individuals come to act in terms of the norms and
values associated with the category (Reicher, 1982, 1984, 1987, Tajfel, 1978, Turner,
1982). Or, to put it slightly differently, in defining oneself as a member of a social
category, individuals accept the norms and values associated with the category
membership and this is used to guide behaviour.
Within this theoretical setting the challenge to the traditional notion of identity
can be reconceptualised as follows. Instead of the shift between identity accentuation
(Allport) and submergence (Le Bon), individuals shift from individual to social identity,
and at the same time behavioural control moves from the individual to a shared
understanding of cultural norms defined in terms of the relevant social identity (Hogg &
Abrams, 1988, Reicher, 1984, 1987; Tajfel, 1978, Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher & Wetherell, 1987).
As crowds exist in ambiguous situations and often have no leaders, the obvious
question is how do the norms of the crowd occur? The answer is found in the 'inductive
process' where people infer norms from the actions of others believed to be prototypical
members of the category (Turner, 1982). However, the process of'induction' is
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constrained by a process of'referent informational influence' (Turner, 1982). This was
conceptualised as working in three ways. First, individuals categorise themselves as
members of a social category. Second, they learn the stereotypical norms associated
with that category. Lastly, they assimilate these ingroup norms and regulate behaviour
with reference to the salience of the category membership (Turner, 1982).
Put another way, people might infer norms from the acts of others, but only to
the extent that these can be seen as reflecting the larger social identity within the
specific social context. In this way the micro - social processes of norm creation is
constrained by larger scale factors. Using a social identity approach Reicher (1982,
1984) has developed a model of how norms are created and how they guide behaviour
in the crowd.
The model developed by Reicher arose after he investigated the circumstances
of the St Paul's riot in Bristol in 1980 (Reicher, 1982, 1984). The specific details of the
riot are not important but suffice to note the damage caused between 3.30pm and
11.00pm resulted in sixty police officers injured and twenty-one police vehicles
destroyed (Reicher, 1982, 1984). However, even if there was violence, the violence
was not indiscriminate or without limits. This is made clear in Reicher's observation
that "aspolice cars were burnt and officers stoned\ cars flowed through the area,
people walked home, families did their shopping, neighbours watched and chatted
about the events" (1984, p. 10).
The St Paul's analysis also provided evidence that crowd actions 'consonant'
with the social identity of the crowd generalised, whilst crowd actions 'dissonant' with
the 'St Pauls' conception of'community' did not (Reicher, 1982, 1984). In the words
ofReicher: "the attributes of this concept are clearly reflected in the crowd's
behaviour. The geographical basis is translated into the decision ofcrowdmembers
not to move beyond St Pauls. The opposition to the police is seen in the selection of
police officers and vehicles as the sole targets ofcollective violence. The notion of
control is reflected in the way in whichparticipants took over the area once the police
had left directing the traffic through... and advising not to go down certain roads and
checking obvious strangers in the area" (Reicher, 1984, p. 18).
In will be recalled from the section on Turner and Killian, that their formulation,
whilst concentrating on the norm creation process, was not able to deal with how those
norms would be limited. Reicher's formulation is different. More specifically, the norm
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creation under the framework of SCT/SIT also allows the limits of these norms to be
explained. Put another way instead of the destructive and uncontrolled nature of the
crowd's targets articulated by Le Bon, the insights of a crowd psychology based on
SCT/SIT provide a basis for defining the limits of crowd participation and action, by
predicting behaviour generalising in terms of the shared conception of the St Paul's
identity. In this particular case the geographical limits of St Pauls marked the
boundaries of this crowd's action which was directed at selected targets in this area
(Reicher, 1982, 1984).
This opens up an important topic, namely the role of the outgroup in crowd
action. The St Paul's study infers the role of the outgroup by highlighting the selection
ofbuildings and targets for the crowd. However, we need to understand the intergroup
dynamics within the crowd and to explain how social identity can change through
crowd action. These points have been addressed by a further study, which has
elaborated the social identity model of the crowd (ESIM), and which will be discussed
below, after outlining the methodological limitations of the St Paul's study.
There are three main weaknesses to the St Pauls study. First, whilst providing
an in depth insight of crowd members' perceptions of the riot, this analysis was
conducted after the event, and thus provided a post hoc context for residents to allocate
blame and justify individual actions (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell,
1987). Second, these limitations were further compounded by an inability - due to
access refusals by the police - to obtain their versions of the events. Thirdly, the study
shows evidence of change in the St Pauls identity as a result of the crowd event.
However, it does not explain that change and indeed if one argues simply that collective
behaviour reflects social identity it is hard to see how collective behaviour can produce
new social identities. It is to address this issue that an elaborated social identity model
(ESIM) of the crowd was developed.
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1.2.3. Elaborated Social Identity Model of the crowd (ESIM)
More recent studies have sought to understand how change happens and
crucially how people act collectively relative to their social position and how their
social position changes relative to others. In other words, how is it you start in one set
of social relations and find yourself in a new set? The answer is to be found in the
intergroup nature of the crowd and other groups present during crowd events
particularly through crowd - police interactions (Drury & Reicher, in press, Reicher,
1982, 1984, & 1996, Stott & Reicher, 1998). Analysis of action therefore needs to
include how details are framed by intergroup relations, only by analysing the
development of intergroup interactions is it possible to understand crowd behaviour in
particular, and group processes more generally.
ESIM is based on a conception of social identity as a model of social relations.
Crowds do not always produce change in the nature of social identity. When they do it
is because social identity has changed in response to the shift in social relations, as a
result of intergroup behaviour. This dynamic was explored in an analysis which looked
at the circumstances surrounding the events leading up to the so-called 'Battle of
Westminster' - the 1988 National Union of Students demonstration to protest against
the removal of student grants (Reicher, 1996). For the students they initially entered the
demonstration as simple non-conformists expressing rights as protesters, including the
desire to lobby Parliament in opposition to the cuts. At the beginning of the
demonstration the police were seen as 'neutral' defenders of the democratic right to
protest. The social identity of the students was defined in relation to their immediate
social relations as protesters from differing campuses, and initially, crowd members
distanced themselves from demonstrators perceived to be 'extreme' in behaviour. This
is captured by one ofReicher's participants who noted: "what happened was, sort of
left wingpeople - some people had decided, hadgot to the front of the blockade under
the bridge that had been shut off, and they came back and they were chanting 'storm
the bridge, storm the bridge" (p. 126).
In the case of the police, they perceived the right to lobby parliament to be
illegitimate, as it was sitting, and they therefore believed that the sessional order (a
requirement that when parliament is in session business is not disturbed within one mile
of the Palace ofWestminster) had to be enforced (Waddington, P, 1994). The crowd
was seen as dangerous and oppositional and therefore a threat to the social order.
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Moreover, the police had the power to impose their understandings of their social
relations with the crowd by utilising indiscriminate tactical options (horses sent in to the
crowd). As a result, the students shared a common experience and the police actions
united a previous heterogeneous group into a psychologically homogeneous one
(Reicher, 1996). Moreover, their social relation to the police was fundamentally
altered, and hence crowd members own identity was fundamentally altered. The police
were no longer neutral they were an opposition. Students thereby came to see
themselves as uniformly oppositional. All students, including those previously seen as
'radicals' came to be seen as fellow in-group members.
Consequently, support for behaviour exhibited by all sections of the crowd was
now perceived to be legitimate (Reicher, 1996). This is expressed succinctly by one of
Reicher's participants who now noted: "asyou are in a crowd like that people get
isolated very quickly so that all the people with you are students and basically they are
all the same and the reason whyyou were there was to go and oppose the
government'splans andyou acted as a collective body and that was seen throughout
in the way people chipped in to help each other" (p. 127).
In other words, in explaining the dynamic of identity change it is necessary to
stress the perceived denial of liberal rights to 'lobby' parliament, which threatened the
social position of the protesters. How students reacted in their self-understanding is
crucial in understanding change in crowd behaviour. The dynamics of the self changed
in relation to the intergroup encounter, which changed the way in which this crowd
reacted. Thus crowd events can only be understood in terms of the dynamics between
police and crowds as they develop over time (Reicher, 1996).
These conclusions have now been confirmed by several further studies (Drury &
Reicher, in press, Stott & Reicher, 1998). However, the great weakness of these studies
is that they are not genuinely intergroup. They infer the position of the police from what
crowd members say, but do not look directly at the police perspective, let alone explain
the basis for police action.
The one exception is a study by Stott & Reicher (1998) which gives valuable
insights into the role of the police in the intergroup context. This was an interview
study with junior officers (constables and sergeants), which showed that police issues at
these levels are important in crowd events. These officers see crowds as heterogeneous,
with a small minority of troublemakers capable of influencing the majority, and thus all
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crowds are seen as possibly dangerous, and when conflict occurs, all crowd members
are homogeneously dangerous (Stott & Reicher, 1998).
In other words, the Stott and Reicher (1998) study provides evidence that
police perceptions and actions may play a part in creating homogeneous and
oppositional crowds out of disparate groupings. However, there are methodological
limitations to this study. To be more explicit, this was a post hoc interview study with
junior officers (constables and sergeants), who were not in involved in the riot in
question, therefore the results must be treated with caution. Or, put slightly differently,
while the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) of crowds demands an intergroup
analysis in theory, it has not delivered on that in practice.
1.3. Chapter Summary
Classic psychological models of the crowd have desocialised the nature of
crowd events. Recent models socialise crowd events, and point to the importance of the
intergroup dynamics as to how crowds behave, and also to explain change. This implies
that analysis of both crowd and police is crucial, but as we have seen, recent work does
not analyse the police. This is a surprising absence. Let us now turn from psychology to
other disciplines, sociology, history and police studies, to see if there is anything to fill
this gap.
More specifically, let us investigate whether there is any evidence which bears
on how indiscriminate the police are in their treatment of crowds, and if they are
indiscriminate, why this should be so. These issues will be explored in chapter 2
overleaf.
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Chapter 2.
Historical, sociological and police studies review of public
order policing.
2.1 Introduction.
It will be recalled from chapter 1, that I concluded that having looked at crowd
behaviour in a social context, that the intergroup level of analysis, including the
position of the police, was crucial. To be more explicit, I have a hunch that if the police
treat the crowd in an indiscriminate way, as dangerous, they will provoke violence.
However, is there evidence that the police do act indiscriminately, and if so, why?
In order to address this question I will first look in other disciplines to see if the
answer can be found in sociology, history and police studies. The vast literature on the
police role in riots in these disciplines makes a review reduction strategy sensible.
Accordingly, I will look at general trends in both American and British rioting in the
20th century. In the second part of the chapter I will narrow the focus and examine
practical issues of how crowd policing has evolved, the history and also current
organisation and tactics, in order to facilitate my studies of the police role in the United
Kingdom context, as this thesis concentrates on this area.
2.2 Historical overview.
2.2.1. 20th Century American urban disorders
A taxonomy of the American urban riots over the last century has proposed
two distinct phases (Waddington, 1992). First, the period 1900 - 1943, which
Waddington characterises as involving 'community' and 'commodity' riots. Second,
the period post 1943 to date, which he characterises as conflict between black people
and the agents of social control. This review will look at general trends within the two
periods identified by Waddington and look in more detail at specific riots of 1919 in
Washington, D.C. and the Watts riot in 1965.
In the period 1900 - 1920 an escalating number of the estimated 10 million
black people living in America, began to migrate from the southern states stimulated by
the twin attacks to the cotton industry of crop pests and the development of artificial
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fabrics (Feagin & Hahn, 1973, Waddington, 1992). The push of natural disaster and
competition from synthetic fabrics was met with the pull to the North American towns
and cities as industries required labour to replace the dearth ofwhite immigrants being
granted access to America from continental Europe to take up employment in
'unskilled' industries (Feagin & Hahn, 1973).
Most ofwhat Waddington has termed 'community riots' in the period 1900 to
1943, involved interracial conflicts between "white aggressors and black victims"
(Waddington, 1992, p. 57). In particular, the four years between 1915-1919 saw
twenty two major riots and "resultedfrom perceived challenges to the status quo (in
terms ofjobs, housing andpoliticalpower) accompanying large migration "
(Waddington, 1992, p. 57).
Of the twenty-two riots in this period, seven occurred in the summer of 1919,
at Charleston, South Carolina; Longview, Texas; Philips County, Arkansas;
Washington, D.C; Chicago Illinois; Knoxville, Tennessee and Omaha, Nebraska
(Feagin & Hahn, 1973). In Washington, D.C., a doubling of the black population since
1910 had put pressure on local amenities, which was compounded by the white
population's refusal to allow blacks to make use of a whites only beach (Feagin &
Hahn, 1973). The riot in 1919 occurred after a young black man was drowned whilst
trying to use the beach and "a police officer refused to arrest the white man held
responsible, and chose instead, to arrest the black complainants. The blacks attacked
the arrestingpolice officers, provoking a massive white backlash " (Waddington,
1992, p.57).
Put another way, whilst many of the American riots of this period reflected
differential inequality in terms of power and access to resources for blacks in a white
American dominated society, the role of the police and military in reinforcing these
inequalities has to be taken into account. In fact, in reviewing the 'ghetto' revolts in
America in the period 1900 - 1920, Feagin and Hahn (1973) write: "governmental
agents, particularly coercive agents, have seldom been absentfrom violent clashes,
either in the triggering ofviolence, in the channelling ofviolence, or as involved
intimately in issues ofpower and influence lying behind or emerging out ofgroup
violence " (p.80).
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The 1935 Harlem riot was quite different from the riots prior to 1920. There
was little interracial conflict, rather "the focus of the violence was generally on white
owned businesses andpolicemen" (Feagin & Hahn, 1973, p. 89). At this time, lack of
political representation for blacks to air grievances, was exacerbated by the police
actions of shooting and killing a black youth who had been suspected of shoplifting.
Feagin and Hahn comment that the resultant police actions to repress the crowd
resulted in "looting, the attacks on white owned stores and was aprecursor to the
ghetto riots of the 1960 's" (p.90). This pattern was repeated eight years later by a
further riot in Harlem, following the shooting of a black soldier intervening on behalf
of a black woman being beaten by white police officers. Police efforts to restore order
again resulted in the escalation of conflict (Feagin & Hahn, 1973).
Put another way, the two riots in Harlem, in 1935 and 1943, were signs of the
power of collective violence as a strategy to alter the power inequalities felt by many
black Americans at this time. This warning to America, about the dormant power of
the ghettos, was not heeded as the 1960's saw rioting return on an unprecedented scale
in towns and cities across America.
One of the worst of these incidents was the Watts riot of 1965, which followed
the arrest by police of a young black man for drunk driving (Waddington, 1992). On
hearing of the young mans arrest, local people, including the young mans mother and
brother, went to the scene and a confrontation between the arresting officers and the
family resulted in one of the officers hitting the arrested man and his brother with a
police baton (Waddington, 1992). Whilst the police were leading the brothers away
from the scene an officer was spat upon and according to eyewitnesses at the scene,
the police went back to the crowd and "dragged ayoung woman in a barber's smock,
which resembled a maternity dress, from the crowd and threw her into apolice car.
Upon seeing this, the crowd became an outragedmob. Someone threw a bottle at the
departingpolice vehicles and then a stream ofrocks, bottles, bricks and other missiles
burstfrom the mob. The Watts riot had begun" (Sears & Mc Conahay, 1973, p.5,
quoted in Waddington, 1992, p.61).
Initially, the police withdrew from the scene of the rioting. However, the
following day they returned in a show of force, as outlined in their own contingency
plans, and met with considerable opposition from a large crowd. This strategy
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inadvertently had the opposite effect as the crowd resisted police attempts to reimpose
order and soon afterwards "a large portion ofLos Angeles was in flames and
thousands ofpeople were in open revolt against the agents of law and order "
(Waddington, 1992, p.61). Only with the introduction of the National Guard was the
violence brought under control after six days of rioting, which had resulted in the
deaths of thirty-four people and with over a thousand injured (Waddington, 1992).
The political response to the Watts riot was seen in the establishment of the Mc
Cone inquiry to examine the causes of the disturbance. Whilst this inquiry, on the face
of it, was looking at the structural inequalities prevalent in Watts in particular, and in
America in general, it has been suggested that the agenda was hijacked by selecting an
inquiry chairmen, who was a former head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
(Feagin & Hahn, 1973).
The apparent political inaction to the widespread ghetto riots in the 1960's and
the perceived bias in the Mc Cone commission's findings did nothing to halt the rioting
in the ghettos ofmany American towns and cities. The scale of these further riots
prompted President Lyndon Johnson to create the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders (NACCD), chaired by Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois (Feagin &
Hahn, 1973, Waddington, 1992).
It is worth pausing to consider the impact ofwhat became known as the Kerner
commission and report, as it had influences into the British report into the riot in
Brixton in 1981, conducted by Lord Scarman, and which will be discussed under the
review of the British riots in the second part of this chapter (Scarman, 1981).
The Kerner commission was ostensibly different from the earlier Mc Cone
inquiry (Feagin & Hahn, 1973). Initially, having the support ofPresident Johnston in
seeking answers to the large number of disturbances throughout America, the report
findings were diluted by attempts to discredit the inquiry team by removing staff,
support and funding (Feagin & Hahn, 1973). Despite these attempts, the analysis
concluded that the influence ofwhite racist policies, which had led to segregation and
the development of'ghetto' in many American towns and cities, was a major
contributory factor (Feagin & Hahn, 1973). These conditions were compounded by a
sense of powerlessness ofmany black Americans, who could collectively make their
voice heard through violence (Feagin & Hahn, 1973). The final constituent to many of
Chapter 2. Historical, sociological and police studies review. 24
these 1960's riots was police behaviour, which was seen as racist, and symbolising the
power ofwhites in general (Feagin & Hahn, 1973).
The political significance of this report has often been overlooked. The need for
funding for the Armed forces in Vietnam, motivated politicians supporting the
continued involvement in the war, to prepare a strategy of disruption (Feagin & Hahn,
1973). This was achieved by the sacking of 120 report staff members, whilst at the
same time ordering a veto on the employment of social scientists and research staff
active in the anti Vietnam war effort, and as a last resort, a "secretplan of
Commissioner Charles (Tex) Thornton to torpedo the reportjust before launching"
was made (Feagin & Hahn, 1973, p.216). The success of the political disruption can be
measured in the fact that the billions of dollars required to address the fundamental
inequalities signposted by Kerner were reassigned for the war effort in Vietnam
(Feagin & Hahn, 1973).
Kerner's second point about the behaviour of the police also fell on deaf ears.
In fact in parallel with the increase in military expenditure in Vietnam, the immediate
response of the police and other agencies throughout America was to increase
expenditure on acquiring more repressive measures of crowd control (Feagin & Hahn,
1973).
This extra money spent by the agents of social control was utilised to provide a
forum for the development and sharing of information about riot control procedures
and training. As an example, a course set up in the summer of 1967 was described as
one "which included training in crowd or mob behaviour, in weapons and security
control, in riotformations, in riot control agents andmunitions, in anti sniping and
anti looting measures, in intelligence planning, and in the detention and arrest of
rioters" (Feagin & Hahn, 1973, p.229).
The national and local co-operation between the agents of social control to
control rioters was matched by politicians at these levels passing more punitive
legislation to identify, prosecute and incarcerate suspected rioters (Feagin & Hahn,
1973). Whilst this political response made it easier to control the movement of people
across state boundaries and repress crowds gathering to protest, it did nothing to
address the fundamental inequalities within American society. This denial of collective
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voice was to surface again in the 1980's as the ghetto riots returned with a vengeance
to the American scene, this time in Miami in 1980.
The Miami riot in 1980 was provoked by the acquittal of five police officers
accused of the manslaughter of a black insurance salesman (Waddington, 1992). This
riot had echoes of the ghetto riots of the 1960's with one commentator noting that "as
in the 1960 's, there was a great deal of looting andproperty destruction, some 100
million dollars of it. But, in addition, there were brutal killings: three young whites
draggedfrom a car and stomped to death, a Cuban man pulledfrom a car and
mutilated, an elderly Cuban burned alive. In all, eighteen people died. The Miami riot
had elements ofboth the 1960's riots and the anti black riots of the earlierpart of the
century, except that the ethnic identity of the offender was reversed" (Horowitz, 1983,
p.70, quoted in Waddington, p.70).
The acquittal of the police officers for killing a young black man was seen to be
the final straw in a catalogue of police transgressions against the black people in Miami
(Waddington, 1992). This coupled with a large influx of Cuban workers competing for
jobs with local blacks in the leisure industry, just prior to the acquittal, provided the
antecedent conditions of this riot (Waddington, 1992).
Throughout the 1980's and 1990's disturbances were to occur in South Florida
Washington DC, and Los Angeles (Waddington, 1992). In Los Angeles the rioting
again followed a similar pattern. A motorist Rodney King was videod being beaten by
several white officers. The resulting video was broadcast on national and international
television, before a trial in which the officers were acquitted of the assault. The
widespread destruction of property, deaths and injuries to people resulted in a second
trial in which the officers were convicted of the assault and imprisoned.
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2.2.2. Summary of American urban rioting in the twentieth century
It will be recalled that Waddington (1992) proposed that the history of
American rioting could be split into two distinct periods. The early phase 1900 to 1943
was characterised by "inter racial conflict between whites and blacks, involving
competition over employment and housing opportunities" (Waddington, 1992, p.72).
The second phase from the mid 1960's to date characterised by conflict "involving
blackpeople and the agents ofsocial control" (Waddington, 1992, p.72).
Such a clear-cut distinction may be inappropriate. What is striking about both
periods is that such a clear dichotomy hides the fact that even in the early phase of
American urban rioting the police were involved, albeit that the police were not the
direct targets, they were seen to be on the side of the white Americans. In addition to
their involvement, it would seem that they are a problem by treating crowds as
inherently violent, and thus legitimising brutal repression.
However, the review of the American riot control literature leaves two
questions unanswered. First, what is it about police behaviour that influences crowds?
Second, why do they behave the way they do? We will now turn to the British riot
literature to see if there are any answers.
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2.2.3. 20th Century British urban disorders
Just as my review on 20th century American riots concentrated on urban rioting,
due to the vast literature on the subject, so the vast literature on British rioting in the
20th century makes it sensible to concentrate the analysis on the urban riots occurring
within this historical period. Waddington (1992) has proposed that British riots, like
American riots, in the 20th century, can be categorised into two periods. First, the
period between 1900 and 1962 which he classifies as involving interracial conflict.
Second, the period between 1970 to date, where violence has been between black
people and the police (Waddington, 1992). This review will look at general trends
within the two periods identified by Waddington and look in more detail at the specific
riots of 1962, in Dudley West Midlands, and the Brixton riot of 1981.
In the same way that migratory patterns in America, were an important
explanatory variable to the subsequent riots, it has been suggested that migratory
patterns in Britain also need to be considered in the same vein when seeking to explain
the riots that occurred throughout the towns and cities of Britain in the 20th century
(Waddington, 1992).
In the late 19th century the need for cheap labour aboard steamships encouraged
the migration of "West Indian's, Arabs, Somalis, Indians and Chinese responding to
capital's needfor cheap, exploitable labour" (Waddington, 1992, p.75). The low
levels of pay and the political segregation by whites ensured that these early 'Brits'
"created immigrant colonies in the poorer housing areas ofmajor British seaports
(e.g. London, Cardiff South Shields, Liverpool and Glasgow" (Waddington, 1992,
p.74).
The decision by many ex servicemen from the West Indies etc. to settle in
Britain after the two world wars of the 20th century meant, that by the end of the
second world war, in 1945, approximately 10,000 blacks were resident in Britain
(Waddington, 1992). The period of post war recovery and prosperity encouraged a
large expansion in the numbers of black African Caribbeans seeking a new life in
Britain. These new Britons were recruited to jobs "rejected by white workers; health,
transport, textiles, clothing andfoundry work and in newer industries motor car
manufacture and chemicalprocessing" (Waddington, 1992, p.75).
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The patterns ofmigration therefore centred on the locations of the available
work and thus the British immigrants settled in the South East, the Midlands or the
major ports ofGlasgow Liverpool and Bristol (Waddington, 1992).
The first twenty years of the 20th century, in the United Kingdom, marked a
period which was to see the accelerating rise in the organisation ofworking class
protest as "strike activity reached unprecedented heights and the trade union
movement came to embrace ever larger numbers of industrial workers" Geary (1981,
p . 90). The arrival of immigrants was seen by many white trade unionists as a threat to
the power they wielded against employers, who could employ non union labour to
break strikes. These were the circumstances in which the 1911 anti Chinese riot took
place in Cardiff fuelled by "whites... disapproving of relationships between Chinese
men andwhite women. Rumours were deliberately spread by the trade union that
Chinese were doping white children and using them as unpaid labour. Tensions rose
and spilled over into conflict. Members of the Chinese community were assaulted and
their laundries set ablaze" (Waddington, 1992, p.75).
The fear engendered by interracial sexual activity was also said to have been a
component part in the British seaport riots of Limehouse, Liverpool, Newport, Cardiff,
Tyneside and Glasgow in 1919 (Waddington, 1992). He writes that: "the media and
the police responded unsympathetically, accusing the blacks of bringing the violence
on themselves and with the police arresting more blacks than whites, supposedlyfor
their own safety" (p.76).
The interracial conflicts seen in the first thirty years of the 20th century were to
see a change of emphasis in the 1930's. This was brought about by the rise of Lascism
in mainland Europe which stimulated a British offshoot in the form of Oswald Mosley
and the British Union of Fascists (Townshend, 1993). The focus of the collective
hatred of the white 'Black shirts' was seen in large-scale marches throughout the East
End of London to protest about the perceived Jewish domination of the local economy
(Townshend, 1993).
The scale of the resulting violence between Fascists and anti Fascists in London
prompted the politicians to reach for the statute book and create the first formalised
laws to prevent and restrict the gathering of crowds (Townshend, 1993). As well as
providing the background for the first Public Order Act passed in 1936, to limit and
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impose restrictions on people congregating in public, it formalised the previous
common law offences of riot and rout making it easier for the police to prosecute
offenders (Townshend, 1993).
Further interracial conflict was to surface again in Britain, in the late 1940's. As
an example, the 1948 Liverpool riot was provoked by attempts by the National Union
of Seaman, to prevent the employment ofblack immigrants. Three nights of rioting
followed a fight outside a blacks only club. On the third night the police attempted to
regain control of the club and eyewitnesses testified that as they did so they were met
by, "a volley ofhundreds ofbottles and stones thrownfrom the windows which halted
their advance for a time. But when the defenders ran out ofammunition the police
burst their way in, breaking down doors, hitting out right and left with truncheons and
throwingpeople down stairs" (Fryer, 1984, p.369 quoted in Waddington, p.76).
Although the 1950's saw similar patterns of protest with interracial clashes in
Nottingham and London in 1958, Waddington cites the West Midland riot in Dudley,
in 1962, as providing the last example of his 'interracial' riot categorisation in the
period 1900 - 1962. Here he notes that: "here rioting occupiedfour nights, but
largely involved crowds ofwhite, working - class men confrontingpolice officers who
were preventing them from attacking small black enclaves in the area" (p. 77).
The second period identified by Waddington has run from 1970 to the present
date. He classifies this period as one in which the focus moved from 'interracial'
conflict to one involving black people and the police. It has been suggested that the
antecedent conditions to these clashes can be traced to the increased surveillance of
illegal immigrants (with the passing of the Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968 and 1971)
and the economic downturn, which effected young blacks disproportionately in the
search for jobs (Benyon, 1984).
Against this background, disorder on a large scale broke out at the 1976 and
1977 Notting Hill Carnivals, commentators have noted that "on both occasions, the
formidable police presence was regarded as oppressive by blacks who reacted to
arrests they perceived as wrongful by smashing the windows of vehicles and throwing
missiles at the police" (Waddington, 1992 p.79).
Four years later, in April 1980, the first of the inner city riots occurred in the
St. Pauls area ofBristol (see chapter 1), and followed a police raid on the 'Black and
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White Cafe'looking for illegal drink and drugs (Reicher, 1982, 1984). This was
followed almost a year later in the Brixton riot in London and more widespread
disorder throughout Britain. This heralded the return of public disorder to the political
agenda and resulted in the Scarman inquiry focused on seeking the causes of the
Brixton unrest alone (Fielding, 1991, Northam, 1988, Scarman, 1981).
It will be recalled from the review of the American urban riot literature that the
Watts riot was important to stimulating a political response in the form of setting up of
the Kerner commission of inquiry and report into the causes of the widespread rioting
throughout America. Similarly, the Brixton riot in April 1981, was important in British
urban rioting as it led to the setting up of the Scarman inquiry. However, what was
different in the British case was that the focus was narrowly prescriptive. In fact it
sought the causes of the Brixton disturbances alone. The circumstances of the riot and
the impact of the Scarman report in allocating blame for the riot will be discussed in
turn.
On Friday the 10th April 1981, conflict arose between police and local black
people. This was alleged to have started when "apolice officer patrolling the Brixton
area saw a blackyouth running across the street towards him, evidently being chased
by two or three other youths. The constable PC StephenMargiotta, was uncertain
what was happening but sensing that an offence may have been committed, grabbed
hold of the youth, 19 year oldMichael Bailey, and managed to overpower him "
(Waddington, 1992, p.81).
Having confirmed that Bailey was badly bleeding from a knife wound, the
police were forced into allowing him to go by the actions of other black youths who
had been drawn to the area (Scarman, 1981). The injured youth then made his way to a
nearby flat where a mini cab was called to convey him to hospital. Alerted by the
concern of the first officer to stop this youth (PC Stephen Margiotta) a police van
stopped the mini cab and a police officer rendered first aid, whilst at the same time
alerting the ambulance authorities (Scarman, 1981).
At this stage a crowd of about forty youths surrounded the police officer and
injured youth. According to witnesses: "the crowd was unresponsive to police
explanations. They (the police) hailed down apassing car and whiskedBailey away.
The youths were pursued in turn, by officers responding to a callfor assistance. This
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resulted in a skirmish in which some fortypolice officers, including two dog handlers
and several in riot gear, were confronted by one hundred blackyouths. Four vehicles
were damaged, sixpeople were arrested and sixpolice officers injured" (Waddington,
1992, p.81).
Further skirmishes, between the police and local black and white people, were
to occur on the following Saturday and Sunday. On the Saturday, from about 4pm,
looting of shops and burning of buildings spread throughout Brixton. On the Sunday
minor confrontations were reported between the police and local black and white
people.
It is worth pausing to consider the extent of the Brixton riot, "in total, 145
buildings were damaged, 207 vehicles were damaged or destroyed, 450people were
reported injured and 354 arrests were made. It had been necessary to deploy 7,300
officers to put down the riots" (Waddington, 1992, p. 82).
Scarman's overall analysis of the riots was captured in his finding that "the
disorders were communal disturbances arisingfrom a complex political, social and
economic situation, which is not special to Brixton. There was a strong racial element
in the disorders, but they were not a race riot. The riots were essentially an outburst
ofanger and resentment byyoung blackpeople against the police " (Benyon, 1984,
p.234).
Put another way, having looked at the background factors effecting this inner
city area, Scarman concluded that severe unemployment combined with poor housing
stock provided the antecedent circumstances of structural inequality felt by many black
people. Additionally, the lack of political representation to articulate black concerns
and grievances compounded the sense of hopelessness ofmany of the young black
unemployed residents ofBrixton. These factors were further exacerbated by anger at
police brutality in enforcing stop and search laws on young blacks prior to the riots,
and the resistance ofmany black and white Brixton residents to the police efforts to
restore order following the incident with the injured youth.
Scarman's conclusions about the deterioration of police black relations went
unheeded. Further outbreaks of disorder were then seen later in 1981 in Merseyside,
(Toxteth) Manchester (Moss side) and Birmingham (Handsworth) (Benyon, 1984). A
common theme of commentators seeking the causes of the unrest was the behaviour of
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police before hand and attempts to repress the crowds in all three cases resulted in
severe violence and damage to buildings (Benyon, 1984).
Rioting returned to the political agenda four years later. In 1985 Handsworth
was to see a return to the front pages of the newspapers as the "riot was sparked off
when a young blackyouth became involved in an argument with apolice officer over
aparking ticket. A crowd developed andmore police arrived. A black woman was
allegedly assaulted by one of the officers and, within 3 hours, forty buildings were
burning down" (Waddington, 1992, p.91).
Later the same year rioting was to return to London when Cynthia Jarrett died
whilst police were searching her home on the Broadwater Farm estate in North
London, following the arrest of her son on suspicion of stealing a car (Waddington,
1992). Prior to the death, police had "implemented a stop - and - search operation at
the entrance to the estate. The local blackpopulation had complained of its arbitrary
nature and made allegations ofabusive and rough treatment by police officers "
(Waddington, 1992, p91).
The riot following the death ofMrs. Jarrett started at about 7pm that same
evening. In the violence that followed a community constable (Keith Blakelock) was
murdered and several other officers badly injured by firearms and knife wounds. The
rioting continued for several days and resulted in large parts of the estate being
damaged (Waddington, 1992).
The political response to these renewed disorders was seen in the passing of the
second public order act of 1986, fifty years after the introduction of the first
(Townshend, 1993). This new legislation strengthened the laws contained in the first
Public Order Act, by making it easier to prosecute suspected offenders for the offence
of riot and related public order act offences.
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2.2.4. Summary ofBritish urban rioting in the twentieth century
In my review of the American case, I concluded that a division into two phases,
the earlier pitting black against white, and the latter pitting black against the police,
was too simple. The police are always an ingredient. The same can be said of Britain.
Thus, the historical literature from both America and Britain shows and
confirms that police behaviour is crucial in understanding crowd events in two ways.
First, that they are always involved whether directly or indirectly. Second, there is
some evidence of brutality and indiscriminate action by police when they intervene
against crowds.
However, whilst confirming my suppositions of the need to look at the police
by describing their role in crowd behaviour, it does not explain that behaviour. Put
slightly differently, the historical literature on urban rioting suggests that police
behaviour may have provoked riots, we therefore need to provide a psychological
explanation to the remaining question of, what it is about police behaviour that
influences the dynamics between the police and the crowd?
We therefore need to understand police action and how it affects crowds. In
order to do so we need to look at how the police treat crowds: what strategies and
tactics do they use? How are they organised? My review will concentrate on the
evolution of public order training and tactics, riot technology and intelligence gathering
in the United Kingdom, or rather, in England and Wales in the second part of the
chapter overleaf.
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2.3 The evolution of United Kingdom public order training, tactics, and
intelligence systems.
2.3.1. Police public order training and tactics.
The lack of public order training available to the police was quickly remedied
following the outbreak of the mainly inner city riots of the 1980's. The most tangible
symbol of these disorders for the Metropolitan Police today is the nine-acre training
site, used by the police for training in public order/disorder tactics, and which is
situated at Hounslow, west London. This training facility colloquially referred to as
'riot city' is a mock up of a town in which the police train for the 'Armageddon'
scenario - bricks and petrol bombs (at the rate of 3,000 milk bottles per month) being
thrown by instructors and officers in plain clothes at officers in flame retardant
overalls, helmets and shields (Townshend, 1993). The covert circumstances in which
this para military training facility and tactics arrived on mainland Britain will be charted
below.
Concern following the disorders in 1981 prompted the Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) to invite the Royal Hong Kong Police to address an
emergency meeting in response to the outbreaks of public disorder throughout 1981
(Northam, 1988). The officer sent by the Royal Hong Kong Police addressed Chief
Constables, Deputy Chief Constables and Assistant Chief Constables and the
Metropolitan Commissioner and his deputies at their conference (Northam, 1988). This
presentation, according to observers included, "the distillation ofBritish Colonial
policing aspractised in the most important remaining outpost of the empire "
(Northam, 1988, p.39).
The debate that followed this presentation resulted in ACPO deciding to set up
a working party to "review British riot control tactics in the light ofexperience of
other countries and come up with a programme ofaction " (Northam, 1988, p. 40).
After two years, the result of this extensive research was prepared for distribution by
ACPO under the title "Public Order Manual of Tactical Options and Related Matters"
(Northam, 1988). This was presented to members ofACPO with a series of training
measures for officers of all ranks by another working party chaired by the then
Metropolitan Assistant Commissioner, and later Chief Constable ofWest Mercia,
Geoffrey Dear. It will be remembered, that West Mercia was later to be the scene of
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the Handsworth riots in Birmingham in 1985, in which two people died, and CS agent
was used for the first time in mainland Britain by the police (Northam, 1988).
The resultant manual contained "a total of238 tactics andmanoeuvres set out
in its thirty sections, arranged in order ofescalatingforce, from normalpolicing up
toplastic bullets, CS gas and live firearms. ACPO hadproduced its nationalmanual
ofpublic order tacticsfor the eighties" (Northam, 1988, p.42, emphasis in original).
The manual was, and still is, restricted to officers of ACPO rank - Assistant Chief
Constable (in London Commander) rank or above (Northam, 1988).
A flavour of the contents of this manual may be gauged by the following
chapter headings: Section seven, control ofPublic/Private transport, Section eight,
Protected vehicles, Section nine, Police Support Units, Section Ten, Saturation
policing, Section eleven, Stand-off/regroup, Section twelve, Artificial lighting, Section
thirteen, Cordons, Section fourteen, Checkpoints/interceptor tactics and motorway
disruption, Section 15, Barriers, Section sixteen, Barricade removal, Section
seventeen, Controlled sound levels and Section eighteen, Shield tactics (Northam,
1988).
The new document written for ACPO arrived at a timely juncture. In 1984, the
National Union ofMineworkers (NUM) - led by Arthur Scargill - had begun to picket
the Orgreave coking plant in South Yorkshire as the dispute with the National Coal
Board (NCB) intensified. The Conservative government of the time, led by Margaret
Thatcher, was anxious to avoid any repetition of the defeat for the police inflicted by
the miners at the Saltley coking plant a decade earlier. In essence, although the strike
was an industrial dispute between the two parties - employees (NUM) and the
employers (NCB) - indirectly it was challenging the Conservative government of the
day. Fresh from the victory secured in the South Atlantic against the Argentine forces,
in the Falklands battle for sovereignty, Margaret Thatcher was keen to "defeat the
enemywithin" (Northam, 1988, p.52).
The chance to defeat the miners came with the specific incident of the Battle of
Orgreave on 18th June 1984. Different analysts have supplied conflicting accounts of
what happened on that particular day. What is not in dispute is the coming together of
two cultures based on masculine identities and the resulting serious violence, which
resulted in both sides suffering severe casualties. Orgreave was, and still is, significant
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for the resulting furore surrounding the first use by the ACPO officers in charge on that
day of tactics advocated in the lengthy Public Order manual (Northam, 1988). In the
subsequent trial of miners arrested for riot - the ACPO officer in charge at Orgreave
(Tony Clement, Assistant Chief Constable of South Yorkshire) was forced to reveal the
existence of this previously secret document and to divulge some of its contents
(Northam, 1988). Only the direct intervention of Tony Benn MP via the speaker of the
House ofCommons, resulted in this document being placed in the House ofCommons
Library (Northam, 1988).
The significance of the above parliamentary intervention was twofold. First, it
challenged the ACPO and Home Office secrecy surrounding the introduction of these
tactics to British policing, and the apparent by - passing of the local accountability
structures of police authorities (Northam, 1988). Second, it revealed the inter and intra
group differences between senior officers of ACPO, middle ranking officers of the
Superintendents Association and junior officers of the Police Federation. These
differences became apparent in the comments in the Police Federation magazine that
"neither the Superintendents Association nor the Police Federation had been
vouchsafed a sight of its contents" (quoted in Northam, 1988, p.60).
The ensuing debate between all three professional associations revealed deep
schisms within the police, as chief officers argued over whether the remaining contents
should remain secret from their own officers. Cross cultural studies ofAmerican riot
control procedures have highlighted the contrast between this manual's secrecy and the
openness surrounding the one compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
which is a public document and readily available on request to the State Department
(Northam, 1988).
The miners strike was also important as it revealed the extent to which the
police service of forty-three different regions was able to be co-ordinated throughout
England and Wales in a policy of'mutual aid'. The need for such aid between forces
was recognised early and formalised within the Police Act of 1890 (Fielding, 1991).
More recently, the method by which this aid was provisioned and co-ordinated has
been through the use of the National Reporting Centre (NRC), now known as the
Mutual Aid Co-ordinating Centre (MACC) at New Scotland Yard (Fielding, 1991).
The decision to open the NRC rests with the President of ACPO in consultation with
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colleagues in the ACPO Public Order sub committee (Northam, 1988). Previous
researchers (Fielding, 1991) have highlighted several problems associated with using
the NRC, especially during the 1984-5 miners strike. These will be discussed in turn.
First, and perhaps most seriously, the NRC represents a challenge to the
tripartite system of police accountability enshrined in the Police Act, 1964 (Alderson,
1979). The use of the National Reporting Centre (NRC) affected the statutory
description of the three arms of police accountability, local authority, ChiefConstable
and Home Office by ignoring the first and prioritising the latter two (Northam, 1988).
The perceived loss of local control of the police allowed Government Ministers, in the
guise of the Home Secretary, to influence Chief Constables through the Inspectorate of
Constabulary (Northam, 1988).
Second, the denial of local democratic control over the various Chief officers
enabled the new NRC to mobilise Police Support Units (PSU's) for deployment
throughout England and Wales. The export of officers to Constabularies with
coalmines led to police involved in areas where they were not locally accountable to
their respective communities (Northam, 1988). The development of the Police Support
Unit system and the impact on the intra and inter group relations of the police will be
discussed in turn below.
The histories of the Police Support Units (PSU's) have been shrouded in
controversy. The first PSU's in London were formed by the Metropolitan Police in
1965 and were known as the Special Patrol Group (SPG) (Northam, 1988). Many
forces throughout Britain had their own versions and titles for these groups perhaps
the 'Commando Squad' ofLancashire being the most notable (Northam, 1988). These
units or groups deploy junior officers in squads of one inspector; three sergeants and
twenty-one constables who are carried in three police vans. The potential pitfalls of
groups of officers working together for some time was captured early on by Alderson
(1979) who writes: "operations in numbers embolden police who as individuals
exhibit exemplary control but in concert might tend towards excessive aggression,
thereby inflicting undue damage on persons to the detriment of the goals ofpolice
activity, perhaps in both the short and long term. It isfor this reason that special
groups shouldfrom time to time be disbanded and reformedwith fresh personnel so
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that the conditioning created by recourse to power andforce is not habituated"
(p.25).
The prophecy ofAlderson appeared to have been realised when several
members of the SPG were suspected of involvement in the murder ofBlair Peach -
although no one was charged - during a demonstration in Southall, west London in
1979 (Fielding, 1991). The infamy and controversy of the SPG resulted in their being
replaced in 1987 by a larger mobile reserve of officers (800 officers) known as the
Territorial Support Group (TSG), which is still in existence today, but in smaller
numbers, approximately 500 officers (Metropolitan Police, 1999). The advice of
Alderson in defining limits of service appears to have been adhered to, as service on
this group is now set at a maximum of four years (Metropolitan Police, 1999).
The move by the British police to a more military or para - military style in
dealing with the disorders in the early 1980's owed much to the introduction to the
existing PSU's of training and tactics developed in Hong Kong to control 'illegal' entry
by Chinese citizens to the former colony (Northam, 1988). These methods - based on
the riot suppression units of the former Royal Hong Kong police - require the
application of a paramilitary structure of control, with decision - making subordinated
to the senior officer in command (Fielding, 1991, Northam, 1988, Waddington, 1994).
Structural analyses of the consequences of collective rather than individual decision
making, have highlighted two areas of concern: first, the inter and intra group tension
caused by the duality of the police command system of discipline and hierarchy;
second, the impact ofmilitary or paramilitary tactics of control.
In illuminating the inter or intra group structure and relations of the police it is
clear that they are not a homogeneous group. The duality of the police command
system of discipline and hierarchy operating within the three StaffAssociations, the
Police Federation (which represents Constables, Sergeants, Inspectors and Chief
Inspectors), the Superintendents' Association (which represents Superintendents) and
the Association of ChiefPolice Officers (which represents Assistant Chief Constables,
Deputy Chief Constables and Chief Constables and in London Commanders, Assistant
Commissioners and the Commissioner), provides the framework for considerable
differences between officers.
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These differences can be seen to operate at a number of levels. The command
relationships within the internal structure of the police differs from other disciplined
'armed' services due to the autonomy of the office of constable (Alderson, 1979).
Previous research has suggested that the police may be alone amongst organisations in
the fact that the visibility of the lowest level of the police - constables and hence their
accountability - may be obscured during ordinary patrol duty because of the wide
discretionary application of statutory powers given to the office they hold (Alderson,
1979). In contrast, in utilising junior officers in a public order role, the reliance on para
or quasi-military tactical deployments requires individual discretion to be subordinated
to the collective decisions of public order commanders (Townshend, 1993). This in
turn places all officers, regardless of rank, in a different relationship, one that is quite
distinct from the normal roles ofjunior and senior officers, and relies on leadership
rather than supervision for its success (Townshend, 1993, Waddington, 1987, 1994).
Officers at the PSU or serial level (constables, sergeants and inspectors) bear
the physical and psychological brunt of crowd duties, which are rated perceptually, to
be the most stressful of all police duties they are called upon to perform (Crowe &
Stradling, 1993). It would not be surprising therefore, if in dealing with crowds, junior
officers concentrated on the proximal nature of violence and criminal behaviour,
defined in terms of individual and police unit safety, to the exclusion of strategic
considerations (Stott & Reicher, 1998).
The setting up of'mutual aid' between forces during the miner's strike required
the police service to institute a common training package for public order policing
(Stott & Reicher, 1998). To recap, the training 'imported' from the former Hong
Kong police emphasises the aggressive application of colonial tactics (Northam, 1988,
Waddington, 1994). The training received by this level of officers (Constable, Sergeant
and Inspector) concentrates mainly on the tactics described above in the ACPO manual
and is based on nationally agreed standards (Stott & Reicher, 1998). The control of
these junior public order officers is maintained by a senior officer command system
which is based on three levels, gold, silver and bronze and which will be discussed in
turn overleaf.
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2.3.2. The senior police command structure of goia, siiver ana bronze
The control ofPolice Support Units (PSU's) or public order serials is achieved
through what seems externally to be an impressive organisational hierarchical structure
at the following three levels, gold, silver and bronze (Metropolitan Police, 1999,
Waddington, 1994). The role of gold, the officer setting the strategy for any public
order event, is crucial in understanding the police command structure of discipline and
hierarchy. He or she is responsible for formulating the strategy, which can be changed
as the event unfolds if necessary. The strategy of the police revolve around the
concepts ofmaintaining the peace, minimising disruption to the community in which
the event is scheduled to pass, and dealing with any infractions of the law that may be
committed (Waddington, 1994).
Once the strategy has been set, the police appoint the silver or ground
commander and she or he is responsible for co-ordinating the tactics for policing that
particular event in support of the strategy. The delineation of the roles and
responsibilities of gold and silver may be seen in relation to decision making. Thus gold
makes decisions in 'slow time', away from what is happening on the ground, and silver
makes them in 'fast time', on the ground as they unfold (Waddington, 1994).
To support silver, in the immediate decision making and deployment of serials,
a number of bronze commanders will be appointed who have geographical
responsibility for specified areas or sectors. These commanders deploy officers at the
Police Support Unit or serial level to deal with specific incidents. On a large-scale
event this command system may be further subdivided, and sub-sector bronzes used to
deal specifically with problems on smaller areas of the sector (Metropolitan Police,
1999, Waddington, 1994).
In addition to the mechanics of the police tactics described in the public order
manual and carried out in training at 'riot city', the selection and training of senior
officers (Chief Inspector and above) to be employed on 'live' events is controlled by
utilising a variety of different strategies (Waddington, 1994). Firstly, by restricting the
selection of senior officers to join the public order 'cadre' of advanced senior-trained
officers; secondly, by controlling public order operations by detailing the roles and
responsibilities of officers deployed on events in terms of an operation order for the
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incident; thirdly, by planning for contingencies; lastly, by controlling who can authorise
particular tactical actions. These will be discussed in turn.
The first method employed by senior officers for 'on the job training', and the
one in which senior officers at the 'gold' and 'silver' levels prefer, is by inexperienced
senior officers being shadowed by more experienced colleagues (Waddington, 1994).
Although, these inexperienced senior officers often have extensive public order
experience at more junior levels (Constable, Sergeant and Inspector), on promotion to
Chief Inspector, these officers receive advanced training in the deployment of serials at
'riot city' in the tactics outlined above. They are then given the opportunity to
experience sector command by acting, for example, as a sub bronze in the first
instance, and reporting to a more experienced bronze. To recap, the bronze
commanders are responsible for the deployment ofPSU's or serials for a specific
geographical location. The sub bronze is therefore only responsible for a geographical
part of the sector. In this way the responsibility and impact of decisions made by the
less experienced officer are minimised.
The second method of'on the job' training can arise when an inexperienced
senior officer is put in charge of a police station where there is a high likelihood of
public order events i.e. at police stations responsible for football grounds. These
inexperienced senior officers can be provided with experienced junior support staff to
assist them in running specific events. These officers can be prevented from exposure
to larger more problematical events, which often occur in central London, by not being
selected by silver as a bronze commander.
The desire to work for and with experienced as opposed to inexperienced
public order senior officers can also be seen to work in the reverse direction. Bronze
and sub bronze commanders have identified personality characteristics that they desire
in silver commanders. Specifically, bronze commanders seek officers who are "brave
and up front" (Waddington, 1994, p. 134). However, there are limits to this bravery
and visibility. The possibility of silver commanders becoming too involved in the role
of the bronzes, and the breakdown of the command structure, has been highlighted by
an internal investigation following the Trafalgar Square riot (Metcalfe, 1991). This
report discussed in detail the breakdown of the command structure between silver and
bronzes and the confusion that followed was captured by the reports author, who
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wrote: "in an orderly demonstration, line command responsibilities present no
difficulties. However, when disorder breaks out immediate decisions are necessary to
prevent escalation of trouble and officers naturally look to their senior colleagues to
take such decisions, particularly if they are in the vicinity. Some senior officersfelt
inhibited by the presence ofmore senior colleagues. It is crucialfor those involved at
the more senior level of command that they know what is required of them and the
level ofdecision making within their authority" (Metcalfe, 1991, p. 13).
The third method of on the job training involves the subtle use of the pre event
threat assessment provided by Special Branch (SB) and the Intelligence Co-ordinator
(controlling the Forward Intelligence Teams - FIT's) which determines the extent of
the contingency planning (Waddington, 1994, Metropolitan Police, 1999). This
process colloquially known as the 'What If's?' provides a method of exploring such
contingencies in a safe environment. On many events the contingencies may be
anticipated and "the resultingmantra which often includes, disorder at the rally sit
down on route and disorder on route" (Waddington, 1994, p. 136), has been observed
to lack flexibility and to be rigidly applied to all events. However, the rehearsal of
police tactics to deal with contingencies provides another means of ensuring, that come
the event, senior officers at more junior levels, understand what the preferred and
agreed action should be.
The last method of intra group control of senior officers revolves around
deciding, prior to the event, the 'protocols' for deploying the various tactical options
available. More specifically, by removing from the bronze commander (s) the ability to
authorise officers to wear protective equipment, the structure of the command system
is preserved with silver and gold. The circumstances surrounding the introduction of
such equipment, both overt and covert, to the British police will be discussed in turn
overleaf.
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2.3.3. Police riot technology
The 1976 and 1977 Notting Hill carnivals resulted in an increase to the police
in injuries, prompting the police to introduce Perspex riot shields (Waddington, 1992).
Following the riots of the early 1980's improvements were made to these shields and
officers were supplied with flame retardant overalls affectionately known as
'babygros', visored and radio receiving helmets, boots and leg guards (Waddington,
1992). The provision of shields both long and short has practical implications for
deployment. The tactics for using the long shields are slow, due to the requirement for
the PSU to regroup when turning corners at junctions, and officers carrying long
shields are vulnerable to attack from behind (Waddington, 1987).
The tangible signs of the defensive capability of the police, during the 1980's,
were augmented by the provision of offensive equipment in the form of'baton' rounds
colloquially known as rubber bullets and CS agent. The police also acquired armoured
landrovers and tested the feasibility of using water cannon before rejecting it as being
of little practical benefit (Northam, 1988, Waddington, 1992).
The outward signs of police technology have been matched by the adoption of
more sophisticated information gathering equipment which has enabled the surveillance
of crowds to become increasingly more covert (Waddington, 1992). The continuing
use of video cameras to provide information about crowd members has been matched
by the investment in 'command and control' systems of increasing complexity.
The 'Special Operations' room at New Scotland Yard known affectionately by
the acronym GT is able to process video data from static and movable cameras. This
flexibility is enhanced by the provision of 'Heli - teli' pictures from the police
helicopter. This technology provides the ability to cover any demonstration in whatever
part ofLondon - 24 hours a day (Metropolitan Police, 1999). To cope with the
increasing complex information sources, the control room at Scotland Yard has
systems, which are able to isolate relevant particular information, 'command channels'
for gold, silver and bronze and the working channels for the serials. Despite this
outward sign of sophistication the reliance on such systems can pose potential
difficulties during crowd disorder.
The potential loss of control of the police command system due to
'communication' problems during the 'chaos' of disorder has been highlighted by
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several internal debrief reports into both the Trafalgar Square riots (1990) and more
recently the disorder in Park Lane (1994) respectively (Metcalfe, 1991, Kendrick,
1994). Metcalfe (1991), in reviewing the police response to Trafalgar Square incident,
commented on the fact that: "several minutes ofradio transmission were lost due to
severe interference and the signal quality was generallypoor. Defective radios and
the limited life ofbatteries exacerbated the problem. Because of these difficulties,
control was not always up to date on the deployment ofpersonnel. As disorder spread
across the West End, the control room was swampedwith hundreds ofmessagesfrom
the Central Command Complex at New Scotland Yard andfrom surrounding stations "
(p. 14).
Put another way, the Metropolitan Police control room facility is able to control
all the radio communications during a public order event through trained computer
operators. This is normally where the gold commander will sit during an event and will
be supplied with information concerning the event from a variety of sources. The
development of both covert and overt sources of information in the field of public
order policing will be discussed in turn.
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2.3.4. Police information
Intelligence services throughout the world have operated a series of'agents'
spies and police informers to alert them to the potential threat from domestic social
movements (Townshend, 1993). In Britain, the Special Branch (SB), originally set up
in 1870's, is mandated to keep information on social groups who may be a threat to
the state in terms of subversive activity (Townshend, 1993). The secrecy surrounding
the way Special Branch operates, and the lack of accountability of this area of the
police, was illuminated by the general finding of the former ChiefConstable ofDevon
and Cornwall, John Alderson, that Special Branch intelligence files contained mainly
rumour and gossip. In fact, investigations by previous researchers have highlighted the
fact that Special Branch, in supplying information for public order operations, "was
notable for its absence " (Waddington, 1994, p. 105).
Other sources of information available for public order policing have developed
from the Divisional Information and Intelligence Officers (DIIO's) system, set up in the
1980's by the Metropolitan Police throughout London to monitor 'tension indicators'
following the riots in Brixton. Initially, these indicators included the rise and fall of
incidents involving the physical and verbal abuse of officers as well as monitoring the
increase of complaints against police and the perceived reduction in public co¬
operation (Metropolitan Police, 1999, Waddington, 1994). The collated information
was then supplied to the Central Information Unit for monitoring located within the
Public Order Branch based at New Scotland Yard (Metropolitan Police, 1999,
Waddington, 1994).
The purpose of the monitoring system outlined above was to identify 'symbolic
locations', or areas in London, considered to be susceptible to outbreaks of rioting.
Following the Broadwater Farm riot of 1987 - and the murder of Constable Keith
Blakelock - the police identified eleven such 'symbolic' sites around London.
(Waddington, 1994). This system has been refined over the intervening years with
police stations in London collecting information which is considered to be indicative of
a change in public support for the police, and providing it for collation and evaluation
to the Public Order Branch, to make decisions about the allocation of resources for
particular public order events (Waddington, 1994).
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The increased use of surveillance technology by the police, has allowed for the
creation of a more 'live' time system of collecting information about people in crowds,
with the provision of the Forward Intelligence Teams (FIT's). These teams of
Constables and Sergeants led by an Inspector can be deployed at public order events to
gather information, about known or suspected 'targets', which can then be supplied to
the gold and silver commander to decide whether action should be taken immediately
or later on. This 'live' time information can be then used to gauge the need for any
increase or decrease in the number of police resources deployed on the event in
question (Metropolitan Police, 1999).
2.3.5. Summary of British public order policing
It will be recalled that in reviewing the American riots two distinct phases
emerged. First, an early phase between 1900 to 1943 involving 'interracial' conflict.
Second, a later phase from the mid 1960's to date, involving the agents of social
control and black Americans. This simple dichotomy was challenged as it failed to
account for the fact that the police are always involved in these incidents, albeit in the
early phase, they were seen to be representing white American power and domination.
Crucially, it will be recalled that in both these periods reviewed, there was evidence
that the police were indiscriminate and brutal in repressing these crowds.
When I looked at the United Kingdom we saw a similar pattern emerging. To
be more explicit, this also showed that the police are important in understanding crowd
events, but does not explain that role or how they act. In order to do so I looked in
detail at the police, which showed the structure, hierarchy, technology and role of
police intelligence in crowd events.
We can conclude that the police have responded to the perceived threat caused
by crowds in the last twenty years by an increased militarisation of their structure and
the adoption of tactics and technology reflecting this military drift. The danger of
utilising such tactics which are practically indiscriminate, without being psychologically
informed, is a lack of flexibility in their blunt application against different crowds.
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2.3. Defining the question and thesis aims
In conclusion, the predominant themes of the literature on the police from the
historical, sociological and police studies perspectives have concentrated on the
practicalities and politics of an institution with a complex structure and levels of
accountability. These analyses are descriptive and say little at the psychological level
concerning the processes, which affect the treatment of crowds. Combining the
sociological, historical, police studies and psychological research into the police in the
past, produces the following dilemma. On the one hand, psychology has failed to
consider the role of police in crowds. On the other hand, previous
historical/sociological structural analyses have looked at the police, but failed to
address either the psychological antecedents of their actions or their psychological
consequences, especially for how crowds act.
The aim of this thesis, then, is to begin to remedy this omission by investigating
the psychological factors governing police decisions and actions within the structural
aspects of the police at the strategic (gold), and tactical (silver and bronze) command
level during the policing of crowd events. Only by analysing the development of
intergroup interactions is it possible to understand crowd behaviour in particular and
group processes more generally. These studies are clearly of theoretical and practical
importance in their own right. However, it is also a necessary step towards developing
a fully interactive model of the collective process.
In other words, we need to explain how police make decisions as a precursor to
explaining how this affects crowds, but recall from chapter 1, that treating crowds as
all dangerous, and treating all in the crowd as dangerous, could be problematic.
Therefore, I will look particularly for factors, which might lead to indiscriminate tactics
of repression to all crowds and all members of a crowd.
This is therefore exploratory research and I will adopt a methodological
strategy that starts offwith exploratory methods. To be more specific, in order to ask
the right questions about the nature of this phenomenon to generate hypotheses, I
utilised a mix ofmethodologies which saw me go from the field, to the lab, and back to
the field.
The field studies made use of a qualitative technique of participant observation
which was then subject to systematic analysis using Grounded Theory. This process of
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hypothesis generation was then subject to testing in a controlled experimental setting.
The last part of the research strategy involved moving back into the field, this time for
a 'live' event, to test the generalisability of the results in making decisions during an
actual event.
The methodological strategy was designed to provide a triangulated approach
to the research process so that by combining methods, both between methods and
researchers, the strengths and weaknesses of all the techniques could be combined
(Denzin, 1970). Chapter three overleaf, outlines and discusses the methodological
strategy, and outlines both the qualitative and quantitative methods utilised to achieve
it.
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Chapter Three. Methodological strategy.
3.1. Introduction
As I have stressed in the previous chapters, issues of theoretical myopia, of
disciplinary bias and practical problems of access mean that there is precious little to
guide us in a psychological study of crowd policing.
The lack of data in this area makes it particularly pertinent to follow Blumer's
advice to "respect the nature of the empirical world and organise a methodological
stance to reflect that respect" (1969, p.60). Accordingly, the methodological strategy
for the thesis has been one of focusing on both hypothesis generation as well as
hypothesis testing. In order to achieve this combination between hypothesis generation
and hypothesis testing, I utilised a variety of different methods of data collection and
analysis including participant observation, grounded theory techniques and
experimental studies, thereby providing a 'triangulated' approach to the research
design (Denzin, 1970).
The term coined by Denzin derives from a loose comparison with navigation.
To locate oneself in space it is better to have two points of reference, as opposed to a
single one; as the exact position on a map can be calculated, rather than just the
information that they you are on a single line. If the analogy is taken back to the social
research setting, relying on a single piece of data could lead to undetected error which
renders the analysis incorrect (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). However, if in using
multiple data sources, the same conclusions can be drawn, it gives greater weight to
them as it has arisen by mixing the errors to be found in all research methods
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). In other words, it is better to combine research
methods to overcome the inherent weaknesses that all techniques have in order to
minimise these effects.
Another notion of 'triangulation' refers to within method, using different
observers as well as combining methods. In the case of this thesis this technique was
utilised in the participant observation studies of Eid (the festival marking the end of
Ramadan, see chapter 6)), and Vaisakhi (the festival commemorating the birth of the
Sikh nation, see chapter 6) and the 'Carnival against Capitalism' (see chapter 7).
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The strength and weaknesses of participant observation and Grounded Theory,
as methods of data collection and analysis will be discussed in turn overleaf.
3.1.1. Participant observation techniques
So what do we mean when we talk about ethnography or participant
observation? For the purpose of the thesis I am using it as a descriptive term to outline
"one social research method, albeit an unusual one, drawing as it does on a wide
range of sources of information" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p.2). More
specifically, Hammersley and Atkinson suggest that the "ethnographer participates
overtly or covertly, in peoples daily lives for an extended period of time, watching
what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions, in fact collecting whatever
data are available to throw light on the issues with which he or she is concerned"
(p.2).
In looking at the definition of ethnography a number of obvious issues arise.
First, once the subject of study has been identified, how does the researcher go about
gaining access to the required population. Second, what counts as data, how is it
recorded and in what form. Third, what are the practicalities of conducting research
using this method and specifically the constraints on gaining data from senior police
officers arising in the context of policing public order events. These will be discussed in
turn.
First, the issue of gaining access in ethnography is one that "is often acute in
initial negotiations to enter a setting and during the first days in the field', though
the problem persists, to one degree or another, throughout the data collection
process" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p.54). In other words the issue of gaining
access to conduct the required research is a problem at all stages of the research
process. Once the initial negotiations with those able to grant access to the
organisation, or 'gate keepers', has been obtained, the researcher still faces the very
real problem of how to continue to negotiate access to field settings, which may be
sensitive in nature. The potential consequences to the research design foundering due
to access problems is succinctly captured by Barbera - Stein (1979) who noted
respectively that the research she was conducting in day care centres was blocked on
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several occasions. She wrote: "the access negotiations can be construed as involving
multiple views of what is profane and open to investigation and what is sacred or
taboo and closed to investigation unless the appropriate respectful stance or distance
is assumed" (Barbera Stein (1979) p 15, quoted in Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983,
P 15).
Initially, the access negotiations to the Metropolitan Police focused on the need
for the research to be conducted with senior public order trained officers in a variety of
contexts. First, the researcher wanted to gain access to the training of senior officers
and the ways in which strategy and tactics were formulated and enforced. This required
the researcher to be given access to training courses and materials involving simulation
studies and confidential sources of information concerning the gathering of information
on suspects, and the decisions surrounding the use of specialist weapons and tactics
(the use of horses, baton rounds, firearms and CS agent).
Second, whilst the use of training studies provided an environment in which the
decisions of officers concerning these sensitive decisions could be recorded in an open
forum and debated by the participants, it did not recreate the immediacy of a 'live'
situation. The next access negotiation therefore involved being given a free reign to
select public order events which could look at the decision making process in 'live'
events. This threw up considerations regarding access to situations in which, for
practical policing reasons, and security considerations, the researcher was excluded
from situations. For instance, one study in which I was following a senior officer
through his policing of two events on the same day, the 1997 Vaisakhi festival and
Coca Cola Cup Final, had to be suspended because of a perceived terrorist threat (see
chapter 6).
The access granted to senior police officers posed other practical problems. In
utilising participant observation techniques in this particular population, it could not be
certain that they would explain and articulate the reasons for their decisions, because of
their fear that their words could be used against them in a public inquiry should major
problems arise. This was a problem encountered while observing the Vaisakhi
celebrations on the 6th April 1997 (see chapter 6). In the heat of the event the reasons
for different decisions were not articulated. The lessons from this event were
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incorporated into the research design for 'Carnival against Capitalism' to avoid similar
problems arising (see chapter 7).
3.1.2. Field relations
The relations of researcher to people in the field can be problematic. To a
certain extent this can be dependent upon the knowledge that individuals have about
social research. This point is made clear by Hammersley & Atkinson (1983) in their
observation that: "anthropologists are frequently suspected, initially at least, of being
government spies, tax inspectors, police informers" (p.77). Impression management
therefore becomes an important consideration in the researchers repertoire of skills.
The issue ofwhat to wear and how to wear it is captured by an example
provided by Hammersley and Atkinson. They write of the first meeting with an
important 'gatekeeper' of a hospital where it was proposed to conduct research with
one of the authors. The appearance of one of the authors was described as someone
who: "was dressed extremely casually (as having extremely long hair). He had
absolutely no intention ofgoing onto the hospital wards looking like that. But the
gatekeeper was taken aback by his informal appearance, and started to get coldfeet
about the research altogether. It took a subsequent meeting, after a hair cut and the
donning ofa lounge suit, to convince him otherwise " (p. 80).
The dress code proposed by these researchers is a useful point for social
researchers to consider. In fact, in dealing with the initial negotiations with senior
police officers in uniform, the use of a collar and tie with a jacket and trousers
provided a useful way of conducting successful access talks. It also proved valuable in
the field where again the use of a collar or tie provided the necessary distance between
the researcher and participants. In case the reader is wondering, the advice ofAtkinson
as regards hair length was not necessary in my case due to natural causes.
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3.1.3. Field roles
Having negotiated access to the organisation and setting to be studied, the next
major hurdle for the researcher is to identify the process by which he/she can make
sense of a particular social setting. Or, put slightly differently, how is it that a 'novice'
to the area of study, is able to "get to know the ropes and become old hands"
(Hammersley & Atkinson, p88/89).
In previous social research into different cultures, the passage to becoming an
'old hand' has often been described as involving a 'culture clash' of the Westerner and
the 'exotic' nature of the culture being investigated. In researching the police this can
be translated into a problem of uncovering the organisational facts and rules, and
seeing the method in which they are expressed both officially and unofficially. Due in
part to my previous experience as a senior police officer, the problem can be further
refined into translating what had been 'second nature' to me and recording
comprehensively the way in which these social facts and rules operate in this highly
disciplined and structured group. This tendency has been described as losing the
'marginality' of the researcher or 'going native', and can be a serious impediment to the
ability to retain critical and analytical perspective (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983).
The method I chose to overcome this was to design a comprehensive system of
recording as much as possible in terms of describing settings, and the intra and inter
group rivalries that became apparent when public order police officers were being
trained or policing 'live' events. To be more explicit, this included the use of 'primary'
sources of documentation, in the form of comprehensive field notes and a field journal,
as well as 'secondary' sources, in the form ofmaterial gleaned from police sources.
The primary sources of documentation included field notes, and journals. For
the field notes these were recorded in notebooks, supplemented by audio recordings.
These notes consisted of descriptions of social processes and their context in relation
to senior public order officers during training, interviews and 'live' events.
Whilst on the one hand seeming self evident, the process ofwriting field notes,
like all intellectual scholarship, requires continual refinement (Hammersley & Atkinson,
1983). At its most basic level it challenges the field worker to ask him or herself "what
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to write down, how to write it down and when to write it down " (Hammersley &
Atkinson, 1983, p. 146).
In line with the general research strategy of inclusiveness, a decision was made
to record as much as possible in the field notes. This included recording the times,
places and the officers present before recording interactions in as much detail as
possible. As the field note taking process was refined, the use ofmore condensed
recording in the form of single words or phrases, or even the dress of a person was
enough to trigger a set of images, that could be used to recreate the observed scene
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983).
To the sceptical reader, it may seem remarkable to claim that the use of a single
word or description of dress could provide much material in the form of data. Perhaps
an example from my own field notes could illustrate this point. In the training
observation (see chapter 4), after the first day, when all the officers attended 'riot city'
in uniform, a dress code was decided for the rest of the week. This was agreed by all,
that they would wear plain clothes for the remaining four days. On the remaining four
days of the course all the participants, bar one, wore plain clothes. The one dress
'dissenter' wore uniform all week with the insignia of the rank that he was 'acting up'
for. This was the subject ofmany debates during the week, by the rest of the group,
who interpreted it as a deliberate mechanism to display a visible difference from them.
In the training inputs for the rest of the week this officer was seen by the other
participants to be 'dominating proceedings', and lively exchanges took place, when this
officer offered his analysis and rationale for justifying actions. In the final group
exercise, which was video recorded, transcribed and analysed, he again attended the
group exercise in uniform and attempted to dominate the discussions. The other
officers were again hostile to his attempts to hijack the 'group exercise' and met these
with group resistance.
After this exercise finished subsequent discussions in the canteen were centred
on this officers display of authority throughout the week and his insistence that he be
addressed as 'sir', rather than by on first name terms, as all the other officers had
agreed.
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The above example illustrates the next problem identified by Hammersley and
Atkinson, namely how to write things down. Again, using the example above, the
initial classroom discussion and agreement on the 'dress code' was recorded in the
field notes as 'dress - plain clothes, apart from participant 'A', who insists on wearing
uniform'. At the next tea break, the field notes were expanded, as was their quite open
discussions about the significance of the decision to wear uniform and be addressed in
terms of the rank of office, rather than by name. In this period, conversations were
recorded contemporaneously indicating the source and the general outline of what was
said and by whom.
The third problem raised in writing notes is addressing the question of at what
stage are they written. The advice from previous researchers is that if possible they
"should he written during the actualparticipant observation " (Hammersley &
Atkinson, 1983, p. 146). On many occasions, due to the social nature of the research
setting and the social position of the researcher, as a guest, it has been acknowledged
that this may not always be possible. In my case the field notes were written overtly at
the time in a field notebook. As soon as possible afterwards they were expanded during
refreshment breaks. This system was augmented, normally on the tube home, with
audio notes of the day into a tape recorder and a field journal was completed in the
evening, outlining the main themes emerging. At the conclusion of the field
interventions all the field notes, journals and audio and video recorded material
collected was transcribed.
The primary sources of data outlined above were complimented by secondary
sources. To be more explicit, for the training study (see chapter 4), background
reading materials and manuals were supplemented by written inputs from the various
training 'experts'. In the case of the 'live' participant observation ofEid and Vaisakhi
(see chapter 6), the police strategy briefing papers for these events were obtained, as
well as intelligence assessments from Special Branch and the local units. The
Intelligence Time Line report was also obtained for the Vaisakhi event of the 13 th April
1997 (see chapter 6). In the final intervention (see chapter 7), police briefings were
attended and notes recorded as well as conducting in depth interviews with the
Metropolitan police gold and silver commanders. On the day field notes, both written
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and audio, were recorded from the observation of the police gold commander and the
intelligence co-ordinating unit. All these notes were later transcribed.
Having transcribed the vast quantities of data collected, the next step was to
identify an analytical method, which would allow me to deal with the process by which
I could generate hypotheses. A suitable analytic method appeared to be offered in the
form of'Grounded Theory' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
3.2. Grounded Theory
In the 1960's two sociologists, Glaser and Strauss (1967), developed a
Grounded Theory methodology " that was derived from data systematically gathered
and analysed through the research process" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.4).
Essentially, the three elements of data collection, analysis and theory construction are
seen to stand in close relationship to each other (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). To be more
explicit, Strauss and Corbin (1998) have described this process as follows: "the
researcher begins with an area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the
data. Theories derivedfrom data are more likely to resemble the reality than is theory
derived by putting together concepts based on experience or solely through
speculation ... Grounded Theories, because they are drawn from data, are likely to
offer insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide to action"
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12).
The method in which the theory emerges can be broken down into three main
areas, open coding of the data, axial coding and the emergence or grounding of the
theory or model. These will be discussed in turn below and follow the guidelines for
the presentation of Grounded Theory analysis by both Miles and Huberman (1994) and
Strauss and Corbin (1998). Following these guidelines this presentational structure will
be used for the purposes of illustrating the data in chapter 4 (participant observation of
police training) and chapter 7 (participant observation of the policing of the riot in the
City of London).
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3.2.1. Open coding
Having gathered the data and transcribed it, the researcher is able to begin to
code the data in an open format. To be more explicit, the text is examined on a line by
line basis and descriptions of the text are recorded on record cards, which can be
stored in written or computer format. The descriptions recorded 'use words to convey
a mental image ofan event, a piece ofscenery, a scene, an experience, an emotion, or
a sensation; the account relatedfrom the perspective of the person doing the
depicting" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 15).
One of the first steps in theory building is taking the open codings or
descriptions and conceptualising them in more abstract ways. More specifically, a
concept is a labelled phenomenon, which represents "an event, object or action
/interaction that a researcher identifies as being significant in the data. The purpose
behind namingphenomena is to enable researchers to group similar events,
happenings and objects under a common heading or classification " (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998, p. 103).
Put another way, data are broken down into discrete incidents, objects or
behaviours and given a name or label that represents or stands for them. This name
may be invoked by the analyst due to the circumstances in which it arises, or they
maybe the actual words spoken by the participants themselves (Glaser & Strauss,
1967). These latter concepts are often referred to as 'in vivo' codes or concepts
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). If another incident, event or behaviour shares a common
characteristic with a pre existing concept, it is given the same name and cross-
referenced on the concept card indicating the source.
3.2.2. Axial coding
The function of axial coding is to begin to reassemble the data that were
generated in the open coding. In this process, categories are related to their
subcategories and is termed axial because coding occurs around the axis of a category
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In doing so the relationships between different categories
can be explored and leads to more selective coding and the emergence of the theory or
model.
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3.2.3. Selective coding
It will be recalled from above that in the open coding phase, categories and
their properties and dimensions were coded, to look at how they differed. In axial
coding categories and their subcategories were linked. In the final phase of more
selective coding, the major categories are integrated to ''form a larger theoretical
scheme" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 143). After the concept cards were generated by
hand, in chapter 4 and on the computer, chapter 7, a process of more focused or
selective coding concentrated on selective core categories. Links between the
categories were identified in a process involving constant comparison between the
categories until they became 'saturated' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In this more
abstract selective coding, theoretical accounts of public order policing emerged in an
inductive method and are therefore 'grounded' in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
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3.3. Layout of the thesis
The studies presented in the thesis are as follows. First, the analysis of a
training exercise involving senior police officers who had to plan the policing of an anti
Fascist march. This study had the advantage of being able to follow the decision
making process in this environment in detail, as officers articulated the reasons and
factors underlying their decisions. These decisions were made under pressure. The
exercise was video-recorded, transcribed, and analysed using Grounded Theory
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This study has the obvious disadvantage of not being 'real',
but did provide an environment for hypothesis generation. This analysis revealed two
factors effecting police decision making in this environment, accountability
considerations and the phase of the training exercise the officers perceived themselves
to be in.
Second, an experimental study, which took the elements of the hypothesis
generation in study 1, the training study (accountability and phase) and used them to
test these in an experimental study to provide quantitative evidence bearing on this
relationship.
Third, a set of interviews with forty-five senior public order trained or 'cadre'
officers (representing over 90% of all the senior commanders on the 'active list' for
command in Central London. For reasons of space and length these are not included in
the thesis. Flowever, extracts from the interviews are occasionally used for illustrative
purposes.
Fourthly, a series of participant observation studies. Initially, these followed the
policing arrangements for the Muslim religious festival of Eid (marking the end of the
Ramadan fast) and the Sikh festivals of Vaisakhi (marking the birth of the Sikh nation).
The lessons from these studies were then utilised to design a final study (chapter 7),
following the Metropolitan police commander in charge of the 'Carnival against
Capitalism', which resulted in some of the worst scenes of violence in London since the
'Poll Tax' riots of the early 1990's.
The implications of this research are discussed in Chapter eight. The research
will have obvious theoretical and practical applications. Theoretically, in explicating
the intergroup dynamics of crowd action, which is necessary in formulating a dynamic
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model of the collective process. Practically, in terms of both the training of public
order officers and the development of operational procedures. The implications of this
research and the foundations of future research are also discussed. The studies are
separated, and are in order, beginning with the training study in chapter 4 overleaf.
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Chapter 4.
A Study of police decision making in a public order training exercise
"Police showed a capacity to strongly resist a ferocious attack on the 31 March, 1990
and there were many instances of bravery and courage. Even though the
performance of officers trained in dealing with public disorder and supporting units
was commendable, there is still scope for the development of a more co-ordinated
response to the level of violence experienced which could be addressed in training"
(Metcalfe, 1991, pl9).
4.1. Introduction
In this initial study, a deliberate decision was made to conduct a participant
observation study of senior police officers in a training environment to allow for the
generation of hypotheses. The big advantage of such an environment is that these officers are
presented with a series of hypothetical situations and scenarios in which they have to make
decisions and discuss in detail and in an open forum the reasons for them. We are perhaps
unlikely to see this detail during the 'chaos' of a real event involving public disorder, when
the police never know what is going to happen next, and when they hardly have the leisure
to discuss matters and explicate their reasons at length.
The training study selected, took a group of eight senior police officers (and two
members of the Scottish Prison Service, being trained by the Metropolitan police) and
followed the training course they were attending for a week. This course is designed to give
senior police officers an understanding ofwhat is required of them as bronze commanders in
a non-threatening situation. To recap, a bronze commander is responsible for a specified
geographical sector or sub sector of a particular public order event. All these officers were
experienced and of the rank of Chief Inspector or above, and would on successful
completion of the course, be responsible for acting as bronze commanders on public order
events throughout London.
The course was run over a period of five days between Monday 27th January to
Friday 31st January 1997, and was held at the Hounslow public order training centre ('riot
city' - see chapter 2) situated in west London. A longitudinal design was adopted for the
purposes of the study and in consequence data was collected prior to, (in the form of course
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background material), during and post training (participant observation studies outside of the
formal course setting). This data was collected by way ofwritten field notes, which were
augmented by audio and video tape recordings. For the purposes of this chapter, only the
data gathered during the training exercise, and which was subject to systematic analysis, will
be used in explicating the Grounded Theory model.
The course aims for the week, included allowing senior officers the opportunity to
experience sector or bronze command of public order events utilising live exercises and
computer simulation technology (Williams 1995). Additionally, officers received specialist
inputs from relevant experts in the planning of such events, including the guidance for the
deployment of shield-trained officers, horses and vehicle tactics against crowds.
All the officers were male and successfully completed the course. The age range of
the police participants on the course was 37-54 years, mean 44 years, and (standard
deviation (SD) 6 years). The participants range of length of service was 16-29 years, mean
22 years, and (SD) 5 years.
The culmination of the course on the Friday morning was the planning and policing
arrangements for a march and rally involving 5,000 anti Fascists. According to the scenario
provided to the participants, these protesters were demonstrating against the local British
National Party (BNP) candidate for the Hackney and Stoke Newington ward, and to express
their opposition to the police decision merely to caution him for an offence of threatening
behaviour. The exercise was run as a group problem over a period of about three and half-
hours, with written and verbal information being provided by two instructors. The eight
officers on the course (two members of the Scottish Prison Service - SPS) and myselfwere
sitting in a classroom with the two instructors for the duration of the exercise.
The scenario, which was provided to participants in the form ofwritten and verbal
information by the instructors, can be broken down into three distinct phases of the training
exercise.
First, there was a period as the demonstration formed and moved off prior to any
conflict with the police. Second, there were a series ofminor confrontations as the protest
march went past a local library which had held a meeting in which the local BNP candidate
had made racist comments against local people. Third, there were a series of conflictual
incidents arising from a threatened attack on the home of the candidate and the use of petrol
bombs and the alleged use of firearms. These will be discussed in turn overleaf.
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No overt conflict
Initially, following an overnight downpour, the agreed assembly point for the march,
had to be changed. The trainee officers had to achieve this, knowing that no organiser had
been identified. They therefore had to deal with strategies to inform the 5000 demonstrators
expected for the march.
The verbal information given to the officers by the instructors at this stage included
the new information that, on arrival at the end of the march route, a rally for the five
thousand demonstrators expected would be held.
Incipient conflict
Following the initial difficulties regarding the waterlogged assembly point, the
officers were then informed by the instructors that the march was going to move off. Having
done so, the march was then taken past a local library, a potential trouble spot. It will be
remembered that this location had been identified as a source of concern, as a meeting had
previously been held there involving the BNP candidate who had made racist comments
regarding local residents. As the march was taken past the library by the instructors, they
informed the trainees that placards, bricks and bottles were being thrown at unprotected
police serials (Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors) deployed outside the library. These
serials were not public order trained and did not have public order riot equipment to protect
themselves and their colleagues with. During these hypothetical scenarios the trainees were
also informed that damage was being caused to the fabric of the library and that the disorder
had been contained after the police sustained casualties.
Sustained overt conflict
The instructors then notified the trainees that the march had moved further along the
road past the library. At this point, the trainees were informed that the crowd had split into
two sections of approximately two thousand each, and they had to deal with a variety of
different scenarios as a sustained period of rioting broke out. This included having to deal
with petrol bombs and an attack on the home of the BNP candidate. At this time the
trainees had to decide the police responses to the violence in terms of the use of public order
riot trained officers and whether to use police horses to disperse the crowd.
In the last stage of the exercise the instructors informed the trainees that firearms had
been seen in possession of crowd members. They then had to explicate their reasons for
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seeking authority or not, for the deployment of specialist firearms teams and officers with
plastic bullets. The exercise then ended with considerations concerning the preservation of
the scene of the disorder for criminal inquiries.
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4.2. Analytic issues
4.2.1. Data collection
The purpose of this study was to look at the 'in vivo' processes concerning the
decisions during public order training as they took place. Practically, this involved sitting in
the classroom with the officers being trained during the week long course. The protocols for
recording the field notes were as follows. A small hands free tape recorder was used to
record data where practicable. Where this was not possible, due to officers not wishing to be
tape recorded, or for practical reasons such as interference with the exercise, these notes
were augmented by written field notes made in note books. Whether the notes were
recorded by audio or written means these notes were either spoken into the tape recorder or
written up as soon as practical and later transcribed.
For the training exercise at the end of the week these methods of data recording were
augmented by the use of a wide angled video recorder placed at the back of the classroom.
This was later transcribed. It will be recalled, from the introduction, that for the purposes of
this analysis only the data collected during the training exercise was the subject of systematic
analysis utilising a Grounded Theory approach.
4.2.2. Data analysis: Grounded Theory
The completed field notes and video recording were transcribed onto a word
processor yielding eighty pages of text (70,000 words).
In this section I am going to follow the guidelines set out in chapter three in
explicating a grounded theory analysis. It will be recalled that this included a number of
phases: open coding, axial coding and a process of selective coding in which a model of the
data emerges. I am going to present the results of this analysis in four parts. First, I will look
at the process of open coding and the generation of the concepts. Second, I will list the
resulting concepts and definitions. Third, I will show how the concepts fit together. Lastly,
and in more detail, I will use extracts from the text of the transcription to support this model.
Open coding
Following the transcription, the next stage in the process involved labelling the
material in order to provide a framework to build an indexing system for the data. More
specifically, the text was allocated consecutive page and line numbers before coding
conventions, broadly similar to Strauss and Corbin (1998), were utilised to organise the data.
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This process started in a fine grained analysis in which data concepts were coded, prior to
being transferred and stored onto concept cards, which were then labelled with a provisional
concept, date, source and topic. Figure 1 overleaf shows an example of a concept card
labelled 'troublemakers' and how this links to other concepts generated in this fine-grained
analysis.
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Figure 1: Example of Grounded Theory concept card 18: Troublemakers
Page 60. Paragraph 1 M (C Insp.) 48 POl 28
Need to isolate identified troublemakers or in police argot 'hard core' left from the rest of the
crowd.
Page 60. Paragraph 2 M (C Insp.) 48 POl 28
Minority of the crowd 'trouble' but able to influence the reasonable majority.
Page 61. Paragraph 3 M (C Insp.) 45 POl 25
Crowds can always potentially act together despite distinction of troublemakers from the
rest, due to the perceived nature of the common grievance against the police.
Cross-references: Links with Card 17 Intervention.
Card 23 Categorisations.
Card 31 Unlimited danger.
Card 36 Tactics.
Card 46 Models of the crowd.
Card 50 Hard core.
Card 57 Trouble.
In this period of open coding written on record cards, a total of fifty eight concept
cards emerged, as shown in table 1 overleaf. This table shows the detail, variation and
complexity of public order policing.
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Table 1: Concept Cards: Grounded Theory.
Concept Card Number Concept Card Number
Intergroup dynamics 1 Troublemakers 18
Intra group control 2 Danger 19
Decision making 3 Strategy 20
Surveillance 4 Casualties 21
Intra group structure 5 Management 22
Intelligence 6 Categorisations 23
Crowd organisation 7 Psychological
merging
24
Perceptions of danger 8 Quantity of missiles 25
Anonymity 9 Noise levels 26
Crowd context 10 Expectations 27
Types ofmissiles 11 Perceptions of safety 28
Assumptions 12 Contagion 29
Levels of violence 13 Suggestibility 30
Differentiation 14 Unlimited danger 31
Reflexivity 15 Junior Officers 32
Leadership 16 Senior Officers 33
Intervention 17 Tension 34
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Table 1: Concept Cards: Grounded Theory (continued)
Concept Card Number Concept Card Number
Conflict 35 Armageddon 47
Tactics 36 Protective equipment 48
Hierarchy 37 Escalation 49
'Worst case' 38 'Hard core' 50
Specialist weapons 39 De-escalation 51
Caring for officers 40 Criteria for danger 52
'Kitting up' 41 Symbolic locations 53
Spatial control 42 Normality 54
Leadership in crowd 43 Crowd dynamics 55
Temporal control 44 Allocation of blame 56
Communication 45 Trouble 57
Models of the crowd 46 Accountability 58
Axial coding or how the concept cards were grouped.
Following the process of open coding and the generation of the concept cards
outlined above, a process ofmore abstract or axial coding was used in order to put the data
together again by concentrating on selected core categories (see chapter 3). Links between
these categories were identified in a process involving constant comparison between the
categories until they became 'saturated' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
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Table 2 Concept Card groupings
Theories of the crowd Information
70
Crowd danger
Crowd organisation
Perceptions of danger
Anonymity
Crowd context
Leadership of crowd
Psychological merging
Differentiation
Categorisations
Perceptions of safety
Contagion
Suggestibility
Unlimited danger
Models of the crowd
Acceptance of damage
Types ofmissiles
Levels of violence
Casualties
Quantity ofmissiles
Protective equipment
Escalation
De-escalation
Criteria for danger
Leadership
Intelligence
Troublemakers
Communication
'Hard core'
Symbolic locations
Surveillance
Control
Spatial control
Intra group control
Intergroup dynamics
Intra group structure
Noise levels
Junior officers
Senior officers
Hierarchy
'Kitting up'
Temporal control
Normality
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Table 2 Concept Card groupings (continued)
Criteria for intervention
Intervention
Accountability
Caring for officers
Decision making
Reflexivity
Strategy
Management
Expectations
Tension
Conflict
Tactics
Allocation of blame
Trouble
Danger
Worst case
Specialist weapons
Assumptions
Armageddon
In this more abstract axial coding, theoretical accounts of public order policing
emerged in an inductive method and resulted in the grounded theory model of the training
exercise emerging, as shown in figure 2 overleaf.
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Figure 2. Grounded Theory model of Public order Policing
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4.3.Analvsis
In this section I will explicate the grounded theory model in four parts. First, I will
consider the police concern with the social order. Second, I will explicate the balance of
permitting or provoking violence and the factors, which affect this balance. Third, I will
explore the role of phase. Lastly, I will look in detail at the outcomes or consequences of
accountability.
To illustrate that this theory is 'grounded' in the data, selective quotation from the
police participants will be utilised (see appendix b for acronyms and abbreviations).
Anonymity is maintained by using coding conventions for rank, age, level of public order
training and length of service as follows.
(Cmdr.) 42 POA 20 years service = Commander aged 42, Advanced Public
Order trained, 20 years service.
(C Insp.) 49 POA 29 years service = Chief inspector aged 49, Advanced Public
Order trained, 29 years service.
4.3.1. Crowds seen as a concern for the social order
The police by their very nature have a concern with the social order, which leads
them to have a generic concern with crowds per se. This can be seen in the police
assumptions about crowds being dangerous in all contexts and is expressed implicitly in a
desire to dominate and control the crowd. It is clearly expressed by the following comment
by an officer (who was responding to a query by the instructors about the criteria for dealing
with the crowd).
1. (Cmdr.) POA 20 years service
"We dominate and control. "
The implicit concern with crowds as posing a concern for the social order, and thus
the need to dominate and control them is seen in the exercise, by the way in which the
trainees decided on a police strategy for the exercise that was based on 'hard' policing. In
the initial phase of the exercise, when the location of the start of the march was found to be
waterlogged, a discussion between the officers resulted in one of them suggesting that the
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crowd should be allowed to mill around the area. The remaining officers disagreed with this
as they felt it might compromise the message they wanted to send out to all the crowd
members that the police were out in force. Consider the following quotation which explicitly
reinforces the message about the use of a 'hard' policing strategy to the 'dissenter' and
rejects the suggestion that the crowd should be allowed to mill around.
2. (C Insp.) 49 POA 29
"We have a situation here where in ourplanning stages I think we were planning to
police this quite hard. The best description, what we are lookingfor is to send a
message at the assemblypoint in relation to that, bearing in mind that the assembly
pointfor everybody has basically gone out of the window andwe are all having now
to redeploy ourselves. From your argument about letting them mill aroundfor a
little, are we not actually deviatingfrom our proposed strategy which was topolice
them hard."
To reinforce this hard policing style, at the start when the march is waterlogged, the
trainees agreed to make use of tactics and technology which emphasises the superiority of
the police resources. To be more specific, they agreed to send police vans assigned to the
march to drive around the streets to send out a clear explicit message, to all the
demonstrators, that the police were out in force.
3. (C Insp.) 49 POA 29
"I would actually use the mobile reserve, pubs and side streets up Green Lanes, just
so that they can see that we 're out in force, and they can monitor and feedback
information, and it sends out a message when they see lots of carriers wandering up
and down Green Lanes. It sends a clear message from here if we are there in
strength."
The reason why the police are so focused on domination and control is that they see
the crowd to be inherently dangerous. Put another way, the police have a number of theories
of the crowd all ofwhich see the crowd as dangerous in all contexts. In a later section I will
examine these theories in more detail. I will look at the differences between them, how they
affect the way in which officers balance permission against repression in the treatment of the
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crowd, and how the usage of different theories depends on factors such as phase of the
event.
For now however, I simply want to show what these theories have in common. In
effect, officers vary between seeing the crowd as comprised of'bad' individuals - or at least
under the sway of such people - and seeing all individuals as becoming 'bad' in the crowd.
We have encountered these accounts before. In effect the former reflects the Allportian
tradition and the latter, the Le Bonian tradition (see chapter 1). This first extract overleaf, is
Allportian, in the sense of controlling troublesome individuals.
4. (Cmdr.) POA 20 years service
"No, they've got to be people that you have identified as key players, key
orchestrators and there's a history to them that forms the basisfor you suspecting the
breach of the peace by their presence or demonstration. "
The next extract uses a more Le Bonian account, by stressing how even those who
might initially seem peaceful remain liable to turn dangerous.
5. (C Insp.) 45 POA 25
"These people have got a grievance against the police as well remember, you've got
people who have turned up on a march that is against the BNP, they've also got a
grievance against the police, so whilst there are only 900 people in category A and B
the other 4,100, they 're not our best buddies and they will work to a common purpose
with the others, and if they see their other buddies getting nicked (arrested), getting
pushed by the police, they '11push back. "
However, irrespective of which account is used, what they have in common is a view
of the crowd as generically dangerous - as always having the potential for conflict - whatever
it may appear like on the surface.
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4.3.2. The balance of provoking and permitting violence
In the next two sections I will look at the balance of provoking and permitting
violence and how this balance is affected. There are two key factors. Firstly, and crucially,
the balance of provoking and permitting violence depends upon accountability concerns.
Secondly, in the different phases of the exercise there is a different sense of accountability,
which leads to a different balance of provoking and permitting violence. In this section I will
look at accountability concerns, and how they influence the balance of provoking and
permitting violence. In the next section I will consider how this balance is affected by the
phase of the exercise.
In maintaining control, the police are constrained by the need to avoid
provoking or permitting disorder. The police seek to maintain order or control by
acting in ways to avoid the loss of control or disorder. This is achieved by setting
specific objectives, which attempt to ensure that police action is seen not to provoke
or permit disorder, but this is not a private belief, these objectives must be seen to
happen, as the police are accountable both internally and externally.
Internal constraints arising in the police context can be seen at two levels. Firstly, in
maintaining the collective decision making required in public order policing, it is important to
provide leadership to junior officers. This is particularly so when junior officers are injured
and make a personal decision to don protective equipment, despite the reluctance of senior
colleagues to authorise the use of such equipment. The following comment, which was made
as officers discussed (whether riot gear should be issued as violence flared outside the
library) illustrates this clearly.
6. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"Officers who self kit, put the gear on (riot protection equipment), that they decide
themselves, say sod this I'm gonna go in there kitted up. When trouble starts, you've
lost control ofyour officers, that's what happened in Euro' 96, the lack of leadership
with the Sergeants and Inspectors and they just went in there, PCs (Constables) were
in there deciding what they were gonna wear and went in. So part ofyour briefing
initially should be that you have got to give clear directions that they cannot kit up
unless they are authorised to do so. Make it clear to the Sergeants and Inspectors that
they are leaders of the officers and they must lead them, not stand next to the PCs and
do what their PCs would do. "
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Secondly, it becomes important not to be seen to have over reacted by senior
colleagues and peers in the public order 'cadre'. The intergroup use of situated vocabularies
which in the normal sphere of policing merely signal that an officer requires assistance, but
becomes a management perception of a loss of control in the public order context, are
therefore to be avoided as they signal a loss of control by the police management team. In
any large scale disorder the police will be subject to internal investigation by a 'neutral'
senior officer, either from the Metropolitan police or an outside force if merited in terms of
serious complaints arising from the disorder (Metropolitan Police, 1999). Consider the
following quotation, which clearly illustrates this.
7. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"Can I just come in there. This is a pre-planned event. There is no such thing as
urgent assistance. Assistance may be required and the police under pressure but when
you start using the word urgent you get the blues and twos (blue lights and sirens
used on police vans) and you get them doing the wrong thing and you have lost
control. Sorry Steve, this is what happened at Park Lane where the sound of urgent
assistance led to the carriers going up and down Park Lane like a bloody yo-yo. If
that is the case, it is on tape the management have lost control. "
As well as internal constraint there is also external constraint. Officers are acutely
aware that their actions may come under the scrutiny of politicians, the media and of public
inquiries. Such external accountability concerns can be seen as the march is first re-routed in
the initial phase of the exercise, when there is no overt conflict, and the police employ
strategies to deflect any blame that might be levelled at them for the change of assembly
point. Consider the comment below, which seeks explicitly to place the blame for the re
routing of the march on any other organisation apart from the police.
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8. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"One of the things that you 've got to do is make sure that they all understand that it
is nothing to do with the police. Blame the Council, blame the cat, they are not happy
with the OldBill (Police) anyway and they '11 use that and assume it was us. "
In shifting any blame away from the police, junior officers can be used to provide
'misinformation' to crowd members they are walking beside, as the following quotation
illustrates.
9. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"You've got the street closed, but then you might as well in my mind, use the serials
that are gonna march with them to take this opportunity to try and build up a rapport,
in other words, be seen as non-threatening, to be helpful, to be guiding, spread the
rumour about who to blame. It's an opportunity there, to get around them with the
marching serials, build up a rapport arid then stay with them as we follow them into
Stoke Newington."
The theme of blame allocation continues as missiles are thrown at the library,
which causes damage to the fabric of the building, the police seize this as an
opportunity to represent the attack as a general assault on the local community. Now it
becomes important to convey their message to a wider audience. Trainees propose that
this is achieved by firstly contacting members of the consultative group, purportedly
representing the local 'community' and secondly, by using police press officers to
spread the message through the local media.
10. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"Not forgetting the warm and cuddly side of dealing with the community out there,
what they have actually done at the library is present you with a current and
subsequent opportunity, they've attacked the local community ifyou want to put it
that way, and ifyou've got your Area Press andPublicity Officers (APPO 's) out and
the local press there and you've got your Police Consultative Group (PCCG)
representatives out, you can spread that message. "
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The police are ultimately accountable through public scrutiny in the form of any
inquiries, which might be instituted after any event involving disorder. It is important that the
police are seen not to have lost control of the situation and therefore lay themselves open as
an organisation to such an accusation. The use of conversations on the 'secret' police
communication channels must therefore avoid any situated vocabulary that may convey such
an impression if it was required to be disclosed to such an inquiry. As the officers come
under attack outside the library, the trainees remained focused on external accountability in
framing vocabulary, which on the one hand indicates that police serials require assistance,
but on the other which does not convey the message that they lost control of the situation to
any subsequent enquiry. From the quotation below we can see how (as officers came under
severe attack at the junction past the library) the trainees remained focused on external
accountability in framing their response.
11. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"So tell your officers if they require assistance fine, they require assistance because
the serials are under pressure or whatever it is, but do not use urgent assistance
because you would have lost control if that happens and at any enquiry you will be
criticised because you had no control of the situation. "
It can be seen, then, that different accountability concerns lead to different emphases
on repression and permission of crowd action. Broadly speaking, internal accountability
leads to a focus on protecting officers and downplaying the consequences of police tactics
for crowds. It leads to a prioritisation of repression over permission. Conversely, external
accountability leads to a focus on not being seen to have provoked violence, to ensure that
the police cannot be blamed for conflict, and hence a relative prioritisation of permission
over repression. In the next section, I will reinforce this message by looking at how different
phases of the event affect the balance of repression and permission through the way in which
they impact on different accountability concerns.
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4.3.3. The role of Phase
Initially, when there is no signs of overt conflict, when the marchers have assembled,
the police must balance provoking and permitting violence because they are both
accountable internally for the safety of their own officers, and to external sources such as the
media, courts and public inquiry. In deciding upon whether to arrest a group of 40 'hard¬
core' troublemakers who are seen going towards the assembly area, the police have to
consider the logistics of doing so and any danger posed to their officers as the following
quotation makes explicit.
12 (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"Ifyou arrest them in these early stagesyou are going to wipe out several reserves
ofofficers because you are going to need two officers to each prisoner. Also you
may get some injuries to officers when they try to arrest these 40 hard core as they
may get helpfrom their mates in the crowd. "
However, the strategy of arresting these 40 hard-core troublemakers also has
implications in terms of external constraints on the police. More specifically, several of the
trainees debated whether arresting these people on suspicion of being about to commit a
Breach of the Peace would be a legitimate tactic which could be justified to both the
Metropolitan Police Solicitors department (who had to defend any civil action for damages
for wrongful arrest) and any subsequent criminal court proceedings.
13. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"That's an interesting concept. I wonder ifwe couldget away with it. I think our
intelligence about those individuals would have to be very strongfor us to justify,
lets say in the eyes ofsolicitors branch and any subsequent court proceedings,
where we would be held accountablefor these decisions. "
In what might be termed the incipient phase, when bricks and bottles are thrown at
the unprotected officers outside the library, the balance of accountability and hence of
permission and repression of crowds shifts. Officers are still aware that they could be held to
account for permitting violence, both by their own officers and by external agencies.
However, it is ambiguous to them as to whether they could be held to account for provoking
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violence. After all, to some extent the violence is already there. On the other hand they could
be seen to inflame a trivial situation. Nonetheless, overall, the relative balance between
repression and permission has shifted with comparatively more weight on the former than the
latter as compared to the first phase of the events. Tangibly this is seen in responding to
information about bricks and bottles being thrown at officers in ordinary uniform, by a group
of forty 'hard-core troublemakers' and agreeing on the need to arrest them but showing
uncertainty as to exactly where, how and when.
14. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"7 mean 40 is not a great deal at this stage, there are in excess of5,000 people on
this march. You might want to get those past the library as quickly as possible and
that would exacerbate the situation. It might be better to take them out (arrest and
deal with them) at a later stage at a place that is more convenient to us, because
here you have not got the resources and we may actually lose control. It might be
better to deal with them by gaining information and intelligence and then at some
later date dealing with them. "
In response to the instructors providing further verbal information regarding the fact
that these unprotected officers were being injured by bricks and bottles, senior officers again
seem unwilling to confront the 40 troublemakers identified within the crowd. They waver
between using repressive tactics and backing off from being seen to inflame the situation as
the following extract illustrates.
15. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"I would be wanting to ask at this stage for the reserve officers to be kitted up
(allowed to don protective riot gear) because you seem to be in escalating violence.
Your officers have already been injured andyou have to balance being seen to
protect them, with inflaming the whole crowd. It is a balancing act, you have to ask
for these officers to be kitted up while at the same time ensuring they are tucked
away around the corner so as not provoke the crowd. If they are kept out ofsight of
the crowdyou can always de-escalate by not using them with kit (protective riot
gear). "
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In the final phase, when the police are faced with petrol bombs and the alleged use of
firearms, the trainees are not concerned with provoking violence, as it has already happened,
but seek to avoid being held to account for permitting violence. To be more explicit, in
response to verbal information from the instructors that petrol bombs are being used against
officers, the police seek to avoid any suggestion that they permitted violence. The officers
quickly decide to debate the use of all possible options including the use of horses and
bringing the Designated Senior Officer (DSO) to the scene. In the following quote, the
officer is responsible for assessing whether situation with the crowd has reached such a level
as to require the DSO to be called to the scene, to assess whether the criteria for the use of
baton rounds and firearms to repress the crowd have been met, as the following quotation
makes explicit.
16. M (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
" They are now chuckingpetrol bombs at me.... Iwould consider whether the horses
were an option at this stage, if they were not because of the crowd dynamics,
because we have people trapped in burning buildings, I think I woidd be saying to
Silver (in charge of tactics) I want a DSO (Designated Senior Officer - responsible
for the deployment offirearms and baton round officers) here so we can depart and
leave him to make the decision about authorising the use ofspecialist weapons and
tactics (baton rounds andfirearms). "
Crucially, the change in the balance of provoking and permitting violence, as a result
of the changing phases, has implications for the balance of permission and repression of
crowds which are seen as the consequences or outcomes from accountability concerns, and
which brings me on to the next part of the analysis.
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4.3.4. The consequences or outcomes from accountability concerns
In the previous section I have shown the balance of provoking and permitting
violence, the phase of the exercise the officers believed themselves to be in, and its impact on
accountability concerns. As well as affecting judgements of officers in these ambiguous
circumstances, these concerns have real consequences in a number of areas.
Put another way, the antecedent concerns of the police, in the form of maintaining
order, affect the balance ofprovoking and permitting violence with the outcome that a series
of dilemmas emerge in relation to police interpretation and action. What constitutes a
dilemma and the ways in which they are resolved changes in relation to the different phases
of the exercise. I will explicate this relationship by exploring these dilemmas of interpretation
and action during the different phases of the exercise; when there is no overt conflict (at the
assembly), incipient conflict (missiles thrown outside the library), and where there is overt
sustained conflict (petrol bombs and the alleged use of firearms).
4.3.4.1. Information
Phase: No Overt Conflict
The dilemma involving information revolves around the fact that the police have
various sources of information, which give different indications of danger, Special Branch
(SB), Forward Intelligence Teams (FIT's) and what they see. Therefore what information do
they prioritise? This changes according to the phase.
In the initial phase, information regarding greater danger, in the form of Special
Branch (SB) assessments of potentially 900 troublemakers, are balanced by evidence of
lesser danger in the form of direct evidence supplied by the Forward Intelligence Teams
(FIT's) of only 40 'troublemakers'. Both of these estimates are out of a total of 5000
protesters. This can be seen in the comments of one trainee contemplating the evidence of
possible trouble.
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17. (C Insp.) 49 POA 29
"I mean 40 is not a great deal at this stage, there are in excess of 5000 people on
this march. You might want to get those40 past as quickly as possible, and that
would exacerbate the situation, then you would start talking about how we are gonna
take these people out at a later stage at a place that is maybe most suitable to us
because here, what you don 7 what to do is make a stand, because maybe you haven 7
got the resources and indeed actually lose it in a place that isn 7 really suitable for
us. So all the time you've been clocking information, intelligence, finding out,
getting evidence of these people, taking them past the library as quickly as possible
and then at some later date deal with them. "
Phase: Incipient Conflict
When conflict first occurs at the library, information from Special Branch (SB)
assessments (900 troublemakers) are now given more weight than the Forward Intelligence
Teams (FIT's, 40 troublemakers). The SB assessment is assumed to be right and the lesser
estimate now becomes merely one to discover the remaining 800 anonymous troublemakers.
18. (C Insp.) 45 POA 25
"What you have to do, you have to reflect back to your information from Special
Branch which gave you approximately 900 people who are wanting to have a fight
who are going to be there. You have already met about 50 or 60, you may well have a
hundred there, you know, don't know, but you've definitely met 50 or 60 so where 's
the other 800 and odd. "
Phase: Overt Sustained Conflict
In the final phase, when there is sustained conflict and the police are facing petrol
bombs and the alleged use of firearms, they can no longer be accused of provoking disorder,
they can however be held to account for permitting it. Thus only information suggesting
danger is taken seriously. This extends beyond the 900 troublemakers previously sought, to
all 5,000 crowd members, as the following quotation makes explicit.
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19. (C Tnsp.) 39 POA 20
"We have to treat all 5,000 members of the crowd as dangerous, and liable to join in
the violence against police. Therefore we have to be careful and disperse the whole
crowd (all 5,000), as quickly as we can to regain control of this."
In summary then, as phase and hence accountability concerns change, so the
emphasis on different forms of information changes. Progressively less emphasis is put
on information suggesting limited danger and progressively more on information,
which plays up the danger of the crowd.
4.3.4.2. Theories of the crowd
Phase: No Overt Conflict
It will be recalled from the discussion in section 4.3.1. above, that the police have a
view of the crowd as inherently violent and dangerous in all contexts. To be more explicit,
they see the crowd in terms of crowd models, which see them as 'mad' (Le Bon) or 'bad'
(Allport) whatever the context. I now want to look at how the balance between these
theories changes according to the phase of the exercise the officers believe themselves to be
in.
In fact, the Allportian and Le Bonian models can be seen as lying along a continuum.
At one extreme the crowd is seen as made up of a violent minority and a relatively safe
majority. At the other extreme the minority can be seen as able to infect the majority such
that, through contagion, all are dangerous. Where along this continuum do officers lie? This
again varies according to the phase.
In the initial phase, the police emphasise models of crowd behaviour which rely on
the assumption that crowds are presumed to be safe unless they are seen to be dangerous.
The police differentiate between the various groups contained within the crowd and
therefore minorities of troublemakers are identified within the majority of peaceful
demonstrators.
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20. (Cmdr.) POA 20 years sendee
"No, they've got to be people that you have identified as key players, key
orchestrators and there's a history to them that forms the basis for you suspecting a
Breach of the Peace by their presence or demonstration. "
Phase: Incipient Conflict
When the police are first involved in conflict outside the library, the police appear to
use a 'hybrid' model of the crowd in which the dangerous minorities are seen as capable of
infecting the majority of previous peaceful demonstrators. Thus the police are wary of using
tactical options which might 'inflame' the other crowd members.
21. (C Insp.) 54 POA 26
"Up to a thousandpeople who are trouble makers. We have only identifiedforty of
them. Ifwe go and arrest those, that coidd inflame the others and they could cause
trouble here orfurther on. "
Phase: Overt Sustained Conflict
As the event develops, and the fighting escalates, the police use models of the crowd,
which see the minority develop to a situation where all members are seen to be
homogeneously dangerous or anti police. This marks a fundamental shift in the theories of
the crowd and flies against the direct evidence supplied by the intelligence teams, and greatly
exaggerates the threat assessment previously supplied by Special Branch. Put another way,
concerns as to the nature of danger appears to shift according to the police perception of
control. Thus at the beginning concerns by the police are weighed against the danger posed,
whilst later on the theories are used to justify the concerns. When the uncertainty of the
danger is most apparent al the height of conflict, the meanings, contexts and models of the
crowd appear to shift fundamentally in assuming the worst, and treating the crowd as
homogeneously problematic.
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22. (C Insp.) 45 POA 25
"These people have got a grievance against the police as well remember, you've got
people who have turned up on a march that is against the BNP, so whilst there is only
900 people in category A and B (police categories of troublemakers) the other 4,100,
they 're not our best buddies, and they will work to a common purpose with the others
and if they see their other buddies getting 'nicked' (arrested) or getting pushed by the
police they '11push back. "
Here again we see a shift over phase from theories which suggest lesser danger
(and hence imply less repression) to those which suggest greater danger (and hence
imply more repression).
4.3.4.3. Acceptance of damage
Phase: No overt conflict
In the initial phase, the dilemma for the police of accepting too much, or not enough,
damage to property, themselves or members of the public, does not arise as there is no
conflict or damage to consider. This dilemma is reserved for the incipient phase, when the
police are being attacked outside the library and in the sustained overt phase, when they are
faced with petrol bombs and firearms. These will be discussed in turn.
Phase: Incipient conflict
When the march passes the library the police serials (constables, sergeants and
inspectors) deployed to protect it, are attacked by missiles thrown by a small minority (40-
50) previously identified by the police as the 'hard core'. At this phase of the exercise the
police are still concerned with not being seen to provoke conflict and hence are willing to
accept some damage in order to make clear that the crowd, and not they, are responsible for
the events.
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23. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"One of the biggest problems that you are gonna have especially in this sort of
scenario is pressure on you to get 'kitted' officers(officers wearing protective riot
gear) in there quickly. Officers these days want to be 'kitted' up. As managers of the
event you are gonna be put under a lot ofpressure by your serials to get people kitted
up, sometimes I know it sounds horrible, sometimes you may have to take a couple of
injuries."
Phase: Overt Sustained conflict
When the police are facing petrol bombs and firearms they cannot at this stage be
accused of provoking disorder, they can however be held to account for permitting disorder.
They therefore seek to minimise damage to property, injuries to the public and to officers.
Officers previously unprotected and injured are withdrawn and replaced by officers wearing
full protective equipment, (flame-retardant overalls, shields and protective helmets). The
march and rally is now categorised as a riot to be dispersed.
24. (C Insp.) 39 POA 20
"We can actually start now looking to withdraw those people who are unprotected
(not wearing riot gear), and replace them with officers who are protected, because
now we've got what is turningfrom a demonstration into a riot situation, and we need
to start enforcing our will on the crowd, so we will start using up the forces we've got
to actually deal with that, we '11 start looking at dispersal areas, where we '11 push
people away, break them up as a crowd. "
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4.3.4.4. Control
Phase: No Overt Conflict
The dilemma for the police in terms of control can be explicated in the relationship of
the police exerting too much or excessive control, and being accused of provoking disorder,
as opposed to exerting too little and being accused of permitting disorder. This changes as a
function of the phases of the exercise.
Initially, when there are no signs of trouble the symbolic nature of the police as
representing agents of the social order requires them to be seen to avoid defeat and in
consequence they retain control over the event by deciding what, when and why things
happen. This is seen initially, in their prescribing the date, time and route of the march. In the
exercise - following overnight rain - the agreed assembly point at Clissold Park was
waterlogged, and therefore unsuitable for use. The challenge to the police tactical plan of
containing the march within the park was met quickly by the trainees who decided on an
alternative assembly for the demonstration, Stoke Newington Church Street, a public road
bordering the park. However, at the same time the police need to consider the danger of
causing conflict by being too controlling. They must be seen to listen to and respect the
views of crowd members. Hence they seek to advise and cajole rather than simply impose
their priorities. This is seen in using police vehicles with personal address systems to provide
guidance about where to assemble.
25. (C Insp.) 54 POA 26
"Yeah you could use the PA systems on one of the vehicles again. Not everybody's so
anti, they all need to know where the start is. Let's just start offwith guidance, getting
bits and pieces out, and just tell them where it is that they need to go now, so make
sure they are not roaming around in the wrong direction because we want them all
down at the bottom of the junction ofStoke Newington Church Street. "
The police take this as an opportunity to shape the geographical decisions made by
the crowd by organising the crowd into a disciplined formation. Consider the following
quotation, from one of the trainees, which makes this point explicitly.
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26. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"
They are gonna form in a naturalpack there, andyour opportunity to turn them into
a discipline file is when they bundle into Stoke Newington, so it's about policing
around that junction to get them in a fairly organised way from both North and
South."
The police act in similar ways when it comes to determining the timing of events.
When police are faced with a request to change the agreed starting time tactics to ensure that
the original time is adhered to are used on crowd members. Firstly, the police argue that it is
inconvenient for them to change the agreed start time, as the following quotation illustrates.
27. (C Insp.) 54 POA 26
"Well, the time that we are working to. We 're talking about, we want to go at 1.30. We
are geared up for this thing to move off at 1.30. Therefore I think that we should be
trying to get them to move offat the time that we want, not at the time that they want
and I'll argue on that basis. "
Secondly, the police seek to persuade the crowd that it is for their own safety to set
off at the agreed time, consider the following quotation, which makes this point explicitly.
28. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"As Mick said, what you've go to do is, ifyou argue that police are not ready they
couldn't care two monkeys whether you are ready or not, but ifyou turn it around
saying it'sfor your own safety because we have still got vehicles on the route, you will
have to give us a little more time to clear the route so that you can march. "
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Phase: Incipient Conflict
When the police are first involved in conflict outside the library, the police begin to
shift from deciding things with the crowd to deciding things for the crowd. Such direct
control is exerted both in terms of space and time as the following extracts show. Overall, the
police seek to control the flow of the crowd and ensure that the march does not stop.
29. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"Can I just come in there. Somebody said stop the march. Your problem ifyou stop
the march is loss of control. You can slow it down but you must keep the march
moving otherwise once you stop it the march will turn round on you, you saw what
happened at Whitehall when they went to the gates at Downing Street, the front of the
march turned round and went back towards them, so ifyou keep it going the majority
of the people wouldgo to where they want to get to. Once we stop it, it gives protesters
the chance to go back andjoin the others so you've go to keep the front of the march
moving even if it is at a snails pace, you keep it going. "
Phase: Overt Sustained Conflict
As violence escalates so the imposition of control by the police becomes both more
draconian in terms of using tactics such as dispersal, and more widespread in the sense of
being applied not only to crowd members but to anyone who might enter the area occupied
by the crowd. This is achieved by closing roads and other access points and communicating
this to the wider public by managing messages delivered to the media.
30. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"You've already done that. I mean you've done that about managing dispersal, it's
managing the public it's managing the media, you've trained your specialist to get
your message out first. It's about managing that outer cordon to stop the others
coming in."
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4.3.4.5. Criteria for intervention/action
Phase: No Overt Conflict.
At the initial phase of events, the police are very concerned to ensure that they
only intervene against those who are known to be troublemakers. Hence interventions
are very targeted and highly differentiated. Consider the following quotation in which
one of the trainees suggests targeting identified organisers, or people with criminal
convictions for violence, as a possible way of selecting the arrests to be made.
31. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"Well no it's 10 on the whole event with what we were shown the other day by as an
example. The principle I am trying to underline here is how would have policing at
Welling worked before the Police Bronzes got nicked 20 minutes before the event.
That's what I want to do with them. I don't want to nick every Inspector and every
PSUdown there I want to take their bonuses 1 want every piece ofequipment there is.
If they have organisers or people with a regular history of serious disorder or been
involved, it's about shooting the chiefs. I'm not talking about nicking 20 or 30, that
early in the day anyway, I thinkyou could nick 10 and bring the troops back out. "
Phase: Incipient Conflict
At the library when the police serials are first under attack the police begin to shift
their criteria for intervention. Arrests are no longer confined to supposed ringleaders. It
becomes possible to contemplate arrest even for minor offences and the police debate the
relative merits of arresting for 'serious' or 'minor' crimes and the practical and logistical
difficulties associated with such interventions.
32. (C Insp.) 48 POA 28
"It comes back to your initial arrest policy, which you made from the very beginning,
what offences are you going to arrest for. You can arrest for a very serious crime or
minor crime, some of them they will be smoking things like cannabis, just purely to
wind the PCs up, so your arrest policy has got to be very clear, what you are gonna
arrest for. It comes back to what Ray said at the very beginning, he said get your
Forward Intelligence Teams (FIT's) down, your evidence gatherers there. "
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The tactics also become less differentiated and begin to be directed at the crowd as a
whole. Thus there is talk of intervening to drive the crowd as a whole past the library.
33. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"Protected officers out (officers in riot gear), in to the crowd to drive them on past the
library. There will be some arrests I think. "
Phase: Overt Sustained Conflict
As the conflict escalates, so the police set out to restore order by all available means.
Once again their interventions become both harder and wider.
The use of shields and mounted officers are now considered to be a legitimate tactic
to achieve the restoration of order. These tactics will be employed directly against the crowd
who will be pushed indiscriminately away from the area of confrontation. Those not wishing
to go will be involved in fighting with the police even if it might be a surprise for them to be
confronted by such officers as the following quotation makes explicit.
34. (Cmdr.) 42 POA 20
"My intention with the horses would be first to reinforce the shields, have shield
serials authorised, use shield serials to stop people coming down Stoke Newington
High Street. I know there's lots of them, but you've got a slight advantage because
most of them can't see what's going on they are still backed up around there, so you
are only going to be using the ones at the front they can't get a lot ofmomentum up
to push, so you could probably stand andfight with the crowd, I suppose, and start
trying to force them, to stop them coming south so they've got no choice but to stand
still, standing still is not getting them where they want to go. "
If the tactics of the police with the use of shields and mounted officers are ineffective
to restore order, the police will ensure that the area is flooded with officers. This will be
achieved by calling on mobile level one-reserve officers some ofwhom, depending on other
commitments, remain on permanent standby for such an eventuality.
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"/ would now be considering Commissioner's Reserve (mobile police reserves)
because we are getting a few seats of disorder here and I would be wondering
whether I had actually got the resources to deal with this."
In response to the perceived need for more resources, one of the Chief Inspectors
suggests it is now time to activate the force mobilisation plan. This will result in the call out
of officers from their homes to be brought to the scene of the disorder. As one trainee tersely
responds when asked what he would do next.
36. (C Insp.) 54 POA 26
"The mobilisationplan."
In this area, perhaps more than any other, we see profound phase shifts as officers
become progressively less concerned with being held to account for provoking violence. Any
concern with alienating or intervening against innocent bystanders is lost. Harsh tactics are
used which target all those in the vicinity and woe betide anyone who gets in the way!
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4.4. Discussion
This analysis of senior decision making during a public order training exercise
provides evidence that the overall framing concerns of the police are to maintain order as
crowds are inherently dangerous and pose the question of control. The police seek to
maintain order or control by setting specific objectives, which attempt to ensure that police
action, is seen not to provoke or permit disorder. But this is not a private belief as they are
accountable internally; from senior officers, peers and junior officers and externally, through
public criticism and scrutiny in the form of public inquiries.
Put another way, police must balance the costs of provoking or permitting disorder
under conditions of uncertainty. The ways they resolve uncertainty and react is related to
how they may be held to account for different outcomes. If this looks familiar it may be
helpful to conceptualise this, in terms of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) where false
positives = assuming dangerous when it is not, i.e. provoking disorder, and where false
negatives = assuming safe when it is not, i.e. permitting disorder (Green & Swets, 1966,
McNicol, 1972). Put another way in the language of hypothesis testing, false positives can be
conceptualised as analogous to Type 1 errors, while false negatives can be viewed as Type 2
errors (Green & Swets, 1966, McNicol, 1972).
Extending the Signal Detection analogy, the analysis shows that the police in
deciding what to do, how to treat information and how to act will depend on a criterion level
which itself is a function of a 'pay offmatrix'. In other words what are the relative costs of
provoking or permitting disorder i.e. false positives versus false negatives? But once again it
is crucial to see these in the context of how police may be held accountable by others.
Crucially, the key link in the analysis is how the specific objectives of the police relate
to the phases of crowd action, when there is no overt conflict, (at the assembly), incipient
conflict (missiles thrown outside the library), and where there is overt sustained conflict
(petrol bombs and the alleged use of firearms), and how the 'pay off matrix' changes due to
the different ways in which one might be held to be account in these different phases.
In the initial stages of the exercise, the police seek to balance the contradictory
nature of false positives and false negatives, in other words not to be held accountable for
provoking or permitting disorder. When incipient conflict starts at the library, the objectives
of the police not to provoke or permit disorder appear to enter an ambiguous zone. While
they can be held to account for not stopping disorder they are not clear whether they can be
held to account for provoking it. In other words, while false negatives i.e. permitting
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disorder are serious it is not clear whether false positives are. Finally, when sustained overt
conflict is happening they cannot at this stage be accused of provoking disorder, so false
positives become trivial. The police can however be held to account for permitting disorder,
it thus becomes vital for them to avoid false negatives.
This analysis has three main findings. First, it confirms and extends Stott & Reicher's
1998 findings (see chapter 1), that police have a concern with crowds and treat all crowds in
a punitive and undifferentiated manner. Second, and more generally, the findings confirm the
review from the historical literature in both the American and British contexts that police
have a fear of crowds. Thirdly, the analysis shows how accountability concerns influence
police decision-making in ambiguous circumstances. These will be discussed in turn.
First, while the findings of the analysis confirm Stott and Reicher's (1998) findings
that police have a concern with crowds, and treat all crowds in a punitive and
undifferentiated manner, the analysis points to the fact that this previous finding may well be
too simplistic. To be more explicit, the analysis in this chapter supports the notion that the
police appear to undergo a transition from differentiated to undifferentiated action. So in the
early phases, action is considered only against identified targets within the crowd, whereas
when trouble begins, the police clamp down and treat the crowd in an undifferentiated way,
deploying all available resources in an attempt to restore order.
Second, the findings from this analysis also confirm the review from the historical
literature in both the British and American contexts that police have a fear of crowds (see
chapter 2). However, what is new in this analysis, is how accountability and phase
considerations shape the decision making of senior public order trained officers, and how
these in turn affect different outcomes.
Third, and perhaps the key point of the analysis, is how accountability concerns
frame police decision-making in ambiguous contexts. We have seen in this analysis that
precursors to accountability include phase, there may be others. The outputs and
consequences from accountability concerns were seen in a series of dilemmas involving
interpretation and action.
Now let me move on to the implications for social psychology in general. We have
seen in this analysis that accountability is a central concept. This has not been present in
previous crowd theories. Why should this be? In previous social psychological
investigations into groups and crowds, researchers have dealt with adhoc groups, which
have no formal criteria for membership or group exclusion. By contrast the police, are a
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formal institution with group rules that have to be met in order to satisfy others that you
should stay in the group. If group members violate these rules then sanctions can include
being excluded from the group. Hence it is crucial to be alert to how others view you, how
your behaviour is likely to be judged by them and how it might affect your standing in the
group.
More generally, it can be argued that where group membership is less a matter of
choice and more a matter of satisfying criteria that are judged by others, so accountability
becomes a major issue. It therefore needs to be taken more seriously by psychologists
interested in group processes.
These conclusions must, however, be tempered by four weaknesses of the present
study. First, it may be argued that the data is reactive in the sense that my participation on
the course may have influenced the behaviour of the officers undergoing training. It will be
recalled from chapter 3 that this was a difficulty highlighted in utilising participant
observation techniques. To counter this, in the week leading up to the training exercise, I
built up the trust of the officers being trained to ensure that I was treated as an in-group
member. This was helped in part by my former experience as a senior police officer.
Secondly, the approach of grounded theory is an iterative one, and it is therefore
impossible, although desirable, to interpret all of the nuances and personal allusions present
in the video transcription. A crucial requirement for high quality grounded theory is that the
initial descriptions of public order policing should approximate or 'fit' this phenomena
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This analysis is therefore open to challenge on the grounds that it
may not be reflecting the participants' social reality, whilst accepting the validity of the
criticism in general, in this particular study, feedback sessions with the participants produced
a unanimous agreement that this analysis provided a close approximation of their subjective
experience of policing crowds.
Third, the use of phase in no way implies an inevitable sequence of no violence,
incipient violence and sustained violence. The phases can occur in any combination moving
from one to the other and back again. The use of phase is utilised to identify differences in
violence rather than to carry any implications about their order of progression.
Lastly, the training exercise was an artificial environment where the officers receiving
training, had prior knowledge that the levels of violence they would experience would start
at a lower level before leading to major violence or in police argot the 'Armageddon
scenario'.
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This knowledge, along with other factors such as the need to impress the instructors
running the course, may well have meant that what trainees did and said may bear little
relation to what they would do or say in a 'live' event. There is obviously a need to
complement these findings with an analysis of such 'live' events. There is also a need to
provide more systematic and controlled evidence of the links between accountability and
phase on the one hand, and how officers perceive and treat crowds on the other.
This is precisely what we will look at over the next three chapters. First, I will report
the results of an experimental study which manipulated the relationship between internal and
external accountability concerns and phase (chapter 5). Second, I will report a series of pilot
participant observational studies of the Muslim festival ofEid and the Sikh festival of
Vaisakhi (chapter 6). Third, I will complement the lessons learnt in these 'live' events with a
further 'live' study, which looked at the 'Carnival against Capitalism' in June 1999 and
resulted in some of the worst scenes of violence seen in London since the 'Poll Tax' riots of
the 1990's (chapter 7).
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Chapter 5.
Two experimental studies of Police decision-making.
5.1. Introduction: Theoretical Model
The key point to emerge from my analysis in the previous chapter, was that
senior police decision making concerning public order is mediated by accountability
concerns, which vary as a function of phase. To be more precise, accountability
considerations can be broken down into internal and external sources. Under
conditions of internal accountability (accountability for their own officers) senior
officers are more concerned to look after the safety of their own officers and not with
the crowd. Under conditions of external accountability (accountability to politicians,
the media and public inquiry) senior officers are concerned with balancing the need to
ensure the safety ofjunior officers with the rights of the crowd, and are, compared to
conditions of internal accountability, less punitive towards the crowd.
Effects of accountability on police action
I would predict that under conditions of internal accountability, senior officers
will seek to avoid permitting violence, even if this means being repressive towards the
crowd. However, under conditions of external accountability, senior officers will seek
to avoid provoking as well as permitting violence, and that this will impact on their
actions, in so far as permissive and repressive tendencies will be balanced against each
other. This may be formally expressed in terms of an initial three experimental
hypotheses:
HI Under conditions of internal accountability, police will place more
weight on permitting than provoking violence.
H2 Under conditions of external accountability, police will place an
equal weight on permitting and provoking violence.
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H3 Conditions of internal accountability will increase the relative concern
with permitting violence over provoking violence compared to conditions
of external accountability. Therefore police will be more prepared to use
repressive actions against the crowd when internal as opposed to external
accountability concerns are made salient.
Effects of phase on police action
Let us now move on to the issue of phase. As I have noted, the nature of
accountability concerns varies as a function of phase. The way in which this occurs can
be represented schematically as follows (where bold implies greater concern):
Phase 1 (no conflict)
Provoking
Permitting
Phase 2 (incipient conflict)
Provoking?
Permitting
Phase 3 (sustained conflict)
Provoking
Permitting
Thus in phase 1 (no conflict), senior officers give an equal weighting to
provoking or permitting violence, since they may be held to account for either. In
phase 2 (incipient violence) officers are clearly accountable for and concerned about
permitting violence, but it is ambiguous as to whether they can be held to account for
provoking violence which is, by definition, already beginning to occur. Hence,
relatively speaking, they are less concerned with provocation. Finally, in the sustained
conflict phase, officers are not concerned with being held to account for provoking
violence (as in a sense it has already happened) but permitting violence is to be avoided
at all costs.
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In other words, I would expect that in these different phases, senior police
officers would see the crowd differently. More specifically, I would expect them to
perceive the crowd as more dangerous, contagious and homogeneous (liable to get out
of hand) as the level of conflict increases, leading them to be more interventionist. This
predicted pattern of results can be formally stated in terms of a further hypothesis:
H4 As the level of violence increases, so the police will become more
concerned with permitting as opposed to provoking violence.
Therefore, police will be more prepared to use repressive actions
against the crowd in more conflictual phases of crowd events.
The phase accountability interaction and police action
In contrast to my clear predictions about the effects of accountability and
phase, the issue of the inter-relationship between the two variables is less clear-cut, and
less central to my argument. Nonetheless, there is reason to suppose that in phase 2
(incipient violence), where the nature of accountability concerns is more ambiguous to
officers, then the effect ofmanipulating accountability may be greater than in phases 1
(no violence) and 3 (sustained violence), where accountability issues are more clear-
cut.
To be more explicit, in phase 1, it is self evident that whatever issues of
accountability are stressed, that officers could be responsible for provoking a peaceful
crowd or for allowing an assembly to act dangerously. Similarly, in phase 3 where a
full blown riot is in progress, it is again self evident, that permitting violence is the only
issue when one is facing ones own officers, the media or politicians.
Yet in phase 2, the incipient phase, ones own officers may be clamouring to
don protective riot clothing and disperse the crowd, whereas a public inquiry might
condemn such actions as 'inflaming' a tricky situation. Here internal versus external
accountability, may well lead to respectively laying more stress on permitting versus
provoking violence, and hence may make one more or less repressive. In short I would
expect a phase x accountability interaction.
Chapter 5. Experimental studies. 102
Accountability, phase and the antecedents of police action
Thus far my predictions have been concerned with the effects of accountability,
of phase and of the interaction between the two, upon the actions as decided by senior
police officers during crowd events. However, the argument also has implications for
the psychological antecedents of such actions.
Accountability concerns are of significance because of the way in which they
alter the value placed on particular outcomes, and not so much the expectation that
such outcomes will occur. Thus, internal accountability makes senior officers place
more importance on ensuring that they don't permit violence that would cause harm to
their own ranks, whereas external accountability makes senior officers balance injuries
to their officers with the rights of the crowd.
In so far as phase effects are important because of the ways in which they alter
how officers can be held to account, phase should therefore effect the valuation of
outcomes. However, it is reasonable to suppose that it should also affect expectations.
Thus as the crowd becomes more violent this should affect expectations about how the
crowds will act, how they will be influenced and how different tactics will impact on
crowd action.
Finally, since accountability effects are only predicted to impact upon values, I
would only predict a phase x accountability interaction on such variables. This can be
formally expressed in the following four hypotheses:
H5 Under conditions of external accountability, police will place more
value on avoiding repressive measures and not provoking violence,
compared to conditions of internal accountability.
H6 Accountability conditions will have no effect on expectations of danger
or violence in the crowd.
H7 As the phases of an event become more violent, so police will both
expect the crowd to be more dangerous, and place greater value on using
repressive measures and avoiding violence.
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H8 The interaction of accountability and phase, will only occur for the
value of avoiding repression and violence such that the greater value
placed on such avoidance under external as opposed to internal
accountability conditions, will be particularly apparent in the incipient
phase (phase 2) of events.
The experimental studies
To test these hypotheses, two experimental studies were designed to look
firstly, at the antecedents of action and secondly, to look at senior police officers
actions. For both experiments the participants were the same 45 senior public order
trained officers of the Metropolitan police, and the two studies were run consecutively.
Clearly, such a procedure is far from ideal. Performance in the first study may well
impact on performance in the second. It is therefore necessary to explain why it was
decided to employ such a procedure.
First of all, the decision to run the two studies rather than one large study was
due to the number of dependent measures. It was felt that, in a single study, the effects
of the manipulations would be all but forgotten - or at least highly diluted - by the time
the later measures were completed. Hence, one could not expect to get meaningful
tests ofmy hypotheses by adopting a 'one experiment solution'.
Secondly, the reason why I used the same participants for the two studies, and
that I ran the studies consecutively, has to do with the practicalities of using senior
police officers as my participants, rather than the more common psychology students
for social psychology experiments. Clearly, since I was concerned with how senior
officers make decisions, they had to be the participants. However, such people are
rather thin on the ground (indeed, rather than being a population sample, the
participants constituted the majority of the entire population of active senior public
order officers in the Metropolitan police). It was therefore impossible to use different
people for the two studies, without reducing the numbers in each study to a level
where a meaningful statistical analysis would be impossible. Senior police officers are
also very busy people. The training exercise was a unique opportunity to get them
together. There was no other time at which they could be assembled, and it was a
matter of considerable good fortune to be given one time slot in which to run my
studies. In the circumstances, the two studies simply had to be run consecutively.
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All in all, while less than ideal, a 'two consecutive study' strategy was the best
alternative in the circumstances. However, the drawbacks will have to be kept in mind
when evaluating the research findings.
The rest of the chapter is therefore divided into two sections, corresponding
to the two studies. The first, looks in detail at the antecedents of police action. The
second, looks in detail at police actions. The main design difference between the two
studies being that whereas accountability is a 'between' participants factor in
experiment 1, it becomes a 'within' participants factor for experiment 2.
The rationale behind this difference is based on the problems caused by running
the two studies together. If study 1, like study 2, had treated accountability as a
'between' participants variable, there would have been two possibilities. Either the
same groupings could have been used in both studies, at which point, responses on
study 1 would have been even more likely to affect study 2, and hence introduce
unwarranted confounds, or else respondents could have been put in new accountability
groups. However, in the latter case, there is a danger of undermining the plausibility of
the manipulation for those who are put in one accountability condition in study 1 and a
different one in study 2. Moreover, one might expect major differences between those
who either have either 'consonant' or 'dissonant' accountability instructions between the
two studies, thus introducing unwanted variance. After deliberation, I concluded that it
would be better to be explicit to all participants that I wanted them to focus on,
alternatively, internal and external accountability considerations, and then to answer
the subsequent questions from one of the other perspectives. Hence in study 2,
accountability became a 'within' participants manipulation.
Therefore, experiment 1 is a 3 accountability (internal, external and both
internal and external accountability) x 3 phase (violence, incipient violence and no
violence) experimental design. Experiment 2, is a 2 accountability (internal and
external accountability) x 3 phase (violence, incipient violence and no violence)
experimental design. Whilst experiment 2 was designed as a 2 (accountability) x 3
(phase) experiment, I was open to the possible effects of the original manipulations of
accountability from experiment 1, and this experiment was analysed accordingly.
For both of the experiments, the opportunity to collect data from such a large
number of officers was taken when they were attending training at the Metropolitan
Police Driving School, for the 1998 Notting Hill carnival. This event, is the largest
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public order operation of the year for the police in London and training for the officers
was run over a period of one week. This was a unique opportunity to gain access to
such a large number of officers and I was able to gain permission to conduct the
experiment by being allocated a 'window' of time for a subset of the officers during
each of these five days. In these sessions, the officers were asked about their reactions
and responses to crowd scenarios of different levels of violence as portrayed on video.
Ideally, when you do a study like this, it would be desirable to pre-test the
videos that were constructed to assess how subjects saw the level of violence being
shown, and to ensure that their perception of the videos filled my categorisation of
phases. However, once again, practicalities got in the way. On the one hand, I could
not pre-test the measures on other officers, since as I have explained, there were no
other comparable officers. On the other hand, it was impossible to pre-test these
materials on the same officers at another time for reasons of access. Thirdly, there was
no time within the sessions to do all the manipulation checks I would have liked. As it
was, showing the compilation video and completion of the dependent measures in the
questionnaire, for both experiments, took in many cases over one and half-hours per
participant. In addition, time had to be allocated for individual and group debriefing
sessions, before the officers resumed the training they were receiving in preparation for
their roles at the 1998 Notting Hill Carnival.
Due to the fact that I needed senior police officers to run the study, I had to
devise a method ofmanipulating the salience of accountability that was meaningful to
them. At the time of the study (June 1998) a concern for the police service as a whole,
was the impact of a new European directive, requiring the police and other United
Kingdom government agencies to comply with Health and Safety legislation relating to
the well-being of employees. Perhaps surprisingly, up until this point in time, the police
and many other government agencies had been exempt from adhering to these rules
under Crown immunity. This was therefore a 'live' debate and was perceived by senior
public order trained police officers to have the potential to make a significant impact
on all spheres of policing activity, including how public order events would be policed.
I was therefore able to take advantage of this issue and manipulated the
salience of internal accountability concerns (accountability to their own officers) by
stressing the impact ofHealth and Safety considerations concerning junior officers to
public order policing.
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Similarly, the training course was being run at the time of the Public Inquiry
proceedings of the 'Lawrence Inquiry', looking at the Metropolitan Police response and
investigation in to the murder of Stephen Lawrence. Again, taking advantage of this
'live' issue I was able to manipulate the salience of external accountability
(accountability to politicians, the media and the courts) by discussing the impact of
Public Inquiries to public order policing.
In a third condition, of both internal and external accountability, I was able to
combine both 'live' issues by stressing the impact of both Health and Safety issues and
Public Inquiry concerns to public order policing.
For experiment 1, the participants, in the different accountability conditions,
watched videos portraying crowd events of violence, incipient violence and pre
violence phases, and then filled in dependent measures concerning the expectation of
different crowd outcomes, the values placed on outcomes, and their perceptions of the
crowds as contagious (liable to get out of hand), dangerous and homogeneous.
In the second experiment, participants watched the same videos, first under
internal, then under external accountability conditions. After each viewing they
completed measures relating to the selection of actions such as the use of officers in
riot gear, use of horses, use of specialist riot officers, and the use of tactics such as
containing the trouble and withdrawal of officers. Following the completion of the
dependent measures in relation to experiment 2, the participants were offered the
chance to be involved in individual or group debriefing sessions.
The layout of the rest of the chapter is as follows. First, I report study 1, then I
will report study 2. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a general discussion of the
implications and limitations of the two studies.
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5.2. Experiment 1
This study is concerned with the antecedents to officers actions. More
specifically, it examines participants expectations about the likelihood that police
intervention would provoke or permit violence. Second, how much value senior
officers placed on provoking violence and how much value they placed on permitting
violence. Third, I looked at how dangerous they saw the various crowds shown on the
videos. Fourth, how contagious or liable to get out of hand they saw these crowds.
Lastly, how homogeneous they saw these crowds. The method by which this was
achieved will be outlined below followed by the results obtained.
5.2.1. Method
Participants
Forty-five senior public order police officers and their advisors were recruited.
These were very experienced senior public order officers of the ranks of Chief
Inspector and Superintendent, who were attending training for the 1998 Notting Hill
Carnival, which is the largest public order event for the year for the Metropolitan
police.
Design
A 3x3 mixed design was involved, with one 'between' participants measure of
accountability (internal, external and both) and one 'within' participants measure of
phase (pre conflict, incipient conflict and conflict).
a) Materials
Compilation video defining crowd scenarios of violence, incipient violence and no
violence. Selected clips from existing videos containing riot footage were used to
construct the three scenarios. The compilation video showed a high level, medium and
a lower level of violence. In the first scenario - an anti Fascist rally - the video showed
concerted missile throwing against police lines. In the second scenario, the participants
viewed a video which showed a vociferous crowd shouting and making threatening
gestures towards the police, along with one or two missiles being thrown, but who
were otherwise peaceful. In the final scenario, the video depicted a low level of
violence directed towards the police lines. This involved sections of the crowd pushing
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and shoving against the police. Attempts were made to standardise these video clips so
as to make them all constant, except for the level of violence. These measures included
providing long shots of the protesters, so that the protesters looked similar, and having
them dubbed with the same crowd noise, and also in such a way that no placards or
slogans could be picked out. Each of the scenarios lasted for thirty seconds.
(b) Dependent Measures
For the purposes of this analysis I will deal only with those items which are
theoretically relevant to this study. The full questionnaire is shown in full at appendix
c. The dependent measures included five important types of items, which were
respectively: participant expectations about the likelihood of violence developing into
full blown conflict, the values or weightings placed by officers on provoking and
permitting violence, how contagious (liable get out of hand) officers perceived the
respective crowds to be, the officers perception of how dangerous they saw the
scenarios; the officers perception of how homogeneous they saw the scenarios. These
will be discussed in turn.
Participant expectations. There were four items. The first item asked about officers
expectations as to whether the use of protective riot equipment or 'kitting' would
result in violence reducing, staying the same or increasing. The second item dealt with
officers expectations that deciding to use protective riot equipment or 'kitting' would
result in the outcomes above. The third item dealt with officers expectations that police
intervention would result in the above outcomes. The fourth item dealt with officers
expectations that not intervening would result in the outcomes mentioned above. In
each case, respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood in percentage terms.
Participant values or weightings. This consisted of six items. The first item required
respondents to evaluate an outcome where not using police riot equipment or 'not
kitting' resulted in the level of violence increasing. The second item asked for an
evaluation of'not kitting' resulting in the level of violence staying the same. The third
item asked for an evaluation of'not kitting' up resulting in violence reducing. The
fourth item asked for an evaluation that police intervention would result in violence
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staying the same. The fifth item asked for an evaluation that police intervention would
reduce the level of violence. The sixth item asked for an evaluation that police
intervention would increase the level of violence. All these outcomes were anchored by
the words very positive (0) to very negative (100), which was displayed at each end of
a dotted line. This line measured exactly 100 millimetres.
Participants were instructed to place a straight line through the dotted line to indicate
their weighting of the outcome.
Crowd contagion (How liable to get out of hand)
This consisted of six items. The first item dealt with the potential of people in the
crowd scenarios to get carried away and become involved in violence. The second item
addressed whether anyone in the crowd scenario who remained was out for trouble.
The third item asked about the influence of agitators. The fourth item asked whether
non-violent people in the crowd scenarios would be likely to remain non-violent. The
fifth item addressed whether the crowd contained decent respectable people. The last
item contained the statement that innocent bystanders were in the crowd. All these
outcomes were anchored by the words strongly agree (0) to strongly disagree (100),
which was displayed at each end of a dotted line. This line measured exactly 100
millimetres. Participants were instructed to place a straight line through the dotted line
to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the above statements.
Crowd danger
This consisted of five items. The first item dealt with the proportion of the crowd
perceived to be actively throwing missiles. The second item dealt with the proportion
of the crowd perceived to be actively involved in the conflict. The third item dealt with
the proportion of the crowd perceived to be liable to become involved in conflict with
the police. The fourth item dealt with the proportion of the crowd perceived to be
involved in illegal acts. The fifth item dealt with the proportion of the crowd perceived
liable to be involved in illegal acts. All these items were measured in percentage terms.
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Crowd homogeneity
This consisted of four items. The first item dealt with the proportion of the crowd
falling into the category of anti social. The second item dealt with the proportion of the
crowd falling into the category of violent. The third item dealt with the proportion of
the crowd seen as anti police. The fourth item dealt with the proportion of the crowd
seen as a threat to public order. All these items were measured in percentage terms.
Procedure
It will be recalled from the introduction to the chapter, that this study was
conducted in a number of separate sessions over a five-day period at the Metropolitan
Police Driving School, Hendon North London. This was to take advantage of getting
access to such a large number of senior public order trained officers in one place, as
they were receiving training for their roles in the forthcoming (1998) Notting Hill
Carnival. Would be participants were informed that participation in the experiment was
purely voluntary. All officers were told they were taking part in a research project
looking at decision making in public order policing. Participants were randomly
allocated to one of three experimental conditions, internal accountability, external
accountability and a condition of both internal and external accountability. The
volunteers were given instructions by the experimenter which included manipulating
the salience of accountability.
In the internal accountability condition, this was achieved by stressing the
impact ofHealth and Safety legislation on the planning and preparation for public
order events. For the external accountability condition, the impact ofPublic Inquiry on
the planning and preparation of public order operations was stressed. In the internal
and external accountability condition, the experimenter stressed the impact ofHealth
and Safety and Public Inquiry concerns.
Fifteen participants were allocated to each of the experimental conditions, and
each condition was run on a separate day. The participants sat in a classroom and
received instructions from the experimenter both orally and in writing. The information
given to the participants included the reason for the demonstration in 'scenario one' - to
protest about proposed cuts in funding for higher education. This information stressed
the heterogeneity of community support and provided an estimate of numbers expected
to attend (in the region of 15,000). Participants were then informed that the Prime
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Minster was due to deliver a 'key' note speech at a meeting with a group of interested
parties, and that police deployed to the outside of the venue had been heckled and
jostled. All the officers were then shown the 'first scenario' from the compilation video.
After watching the video clip, participants were handed the questionnaire and
completed the dependent measures outlined above in relation to the 'scenario one'.
When they had indicated they had finished, the participants viewed the 'second
scenario'. The information given to the participants orally and in writing - included the
reason for the demonstration - called to protest about proposed increase in police
powers. The information again stressed the heterogeneity of community support and
provided an estimate of numbers expected to attend (in the region of 15,000). The
officers were given the route of the proposed march and the fact that it had stopped in
Downing Street. They then completed the dependent measures outlined above in
relation to the 'second scenario'.
Prior to viewing the 'third scenario', information was given to the officers both
orally and in writing, which included the reason for the demonstration - called
following the murder of a local Asian youth - with local opinion inflamed by racist
comments. The information stressed the heterogeneity of community support and
provided an estimate of numbers expected to attend (in the region of 15,000).
Participants then completed the dependent measures outlined above in relation to the
'third scenario'.
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5.2.2. Results
The results will be presented, first of all, by recalling the predictions that were
made about phase, accountability and the interaction for experiment 1. Secondly, by
showing the results for the expectation and valuation variables. Thirdly, by showing
the results for the officers perception of the crowds as contagious, homogeneous and
dangerous. Lastly, by presenting an overall summary table, outlining the predictions
and results for this experiment.
Predictions
All forty-five participants were included in the analysis, fifteen in each cell
of the design.
To recap, the following hypotheses were outlined in the introduction:
Expectation variables
For the expectation variables I would predict a main effect of phase. To
be more specific, as the crowd becomes more violent this should affect
expectations about how the crowd will act, how they will be influenced and how
different tactics will impact on crowd action.
I would predict no main effect of accountability, as accountability concerns are
of significance because of the way in which they alter the value placed on particular
outcomes, and not so much the expectation that such outcomes will occur.
I would not predict a phase x accountability interaction, since accountability
effects are not predicted to impact upon expectations.
Value or weighting variables
I would predict a main effect for phase. More specifically, in so far as phase
effects are important because of the ways in which they alter how officers can be held
to account, phase should therefore effect the valuation of outcomes.
In contrast to officers expectations, I would predict a main effect of
accountability for officers values. It will be remembered from above, that
accountability concerns are of significance because of the way in which they alter the
value placed on particular outcomes, and not so much the expectation that such
outcomes will occur. Thus, internal accountability makes senior officers place more
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importance on ensuring that they don't permit violence that would cause harm to their
own ranks, whereas external accountability makes senior officers balance injuries to
officers with the rights of the crowd.
Finally, since accountability effects are only predicted to impact upon values, I
would only predict a phase x accountability interaction on such variables. To be more
precise, I would predict a phase x accountability interaction such that accountability
effects are greater in the incipient conflict phase (phase2).
Perception variables
I would predict a main effect of phase on all the perception variables. In other
words I would expect that in these different phases senior police officers would see the
crowd differently. More specifically, I would expect them to perceive the crowd as
more contagious, dangerous and homogeneous (liable to get out of hand) as the level
of conflict increases. I would not predict a main effect of accountability, or an
interaction between accountability and phase.
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la) Officer expectations.
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items, and indicated these could be
treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for scenario 1,
Cronbach's alpha.66, for scenario 2, alpha.68, for scenario 3, alpha.71).
These composite scale variables, were then entered into a two-way, one within
phase, (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict), and one between measure of
accountability (internal, external and both), repeated measures factorial analysis of
variance (ANOVA) program in SPSS 8.0. In line with my general predictions, I would
expect a main effect of phase, not of accountability or interaction. This is not what was
found (for phase F2j84 = 1.15; ns, for accountability, F2,42 - 9.34, p < 0001; for phase x
accountability F4;84 = 0.95; ns).
Newman Keuls analysis revealed that officers in the internal accountability
condition, expect that intervention will reduce the level of violence, more so than
officers in the external accountability condition, p< 05. Also, officers in the internal
accountability condition, expect that intervention will reduce the level of violence more
so than officers in both (internal and external accountability) condition, p< 05. A
summary Anova table and a table of the means and standard errors for accountability
are shown in tables 3 and 4 respectively below.
Table 3: Summary Anova table for officers expectations showing source of
variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, Mean square, F ratio and
significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 4501.17 2,84 2250.58 1.15 ns
Accountability (A) 52609.15 2,42 26304.80 9.34 .0001
Px A 7464.78 4,84 1866.19 0.95 ns
Error P 164370.00 2,84 1956.78
Error A 118329.00 2,42 2817.35
Error P x A 164370.00 4,84 1956.78
Chapter 5. Experimental studies. 115
Table 4: Mean and Standard Error of the mean (S.E.) for accountability.
Accountability Phase 1
Mean and SE
Phase 2
Mean and SE
Phase 3
Mean and SE
Internal 79.00 7.84 99.66 7.64 79.53 7.21
External 22.66 5.63 37.66 6.36 53.00 6.24
Both 62.00 8.05 60.00 6.99 70.33 7.01
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the greater the expectation that
intervention will reduce the level of violence.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
(b) Officer values.
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items and indicated these could be
treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for scenario 1,
Cronbach's alpha .62, for scenario 2, alpha .64, for scenario 3, alpha .75).
These composite scale variables were then entered into a 'two-way', one 'within'
phase (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict), one 'between' measure of
accountability (internal, external and both), repeated measures factorial analysis of
variance using the (ANOVA) program in SPSS 8.0. In line with my predictions, I
would expect an effect on officers values that intervention would provoke or permit
violence. This would lead to a main effect of phase, accountability and interaction. This
is not what was found, (for phase F2;84 = 8.81, p < 0001; for accountability, F2,42=
0.24, ns; for phase x accountability F4i 84 =1.31, ns).
Newman Keuls analysis revealed that officers in phase 1 (violence scenario)
value or weight intervening reducing the level of violence, more so than in phase 2
(incipient violence scenario), p< 05. Also, officers in phase 1 (violence scenario) value
or weight intervening reducing the level of violence, more so than officers do in phase
3 (non violence scenario), p<05. A summary Anova table and a table for the means
and standard errors for phase are shown in tables 5 and 6 respectively overleaf.
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Table 5: Summary Anova table for officers values or weightings showing source
of variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, Mean square, F ratio and
significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 15554.41 2,84 7777.20 8.81 .0001
Accountability (A) 2378.68 2,42 1189.34 0.24 ns
P x A 4617.71 4,84 1154.43 1.30 ns
Error P 74143.20 2,84 882.65
Error A 206425.50 2,42 4914.89
Error P x A 74143.20 4,84 882.65
Table 6: Mean and Standard Error of the mean (S.E.) for phase.
Accountability Phase 1
Mean and SE
Phase 2
Mean and SE
Phase 3
Mean and SE
Internal 54.73 6.13 20.53 9.74 31.66 9.32
External 59.73 4.25 40.06 6.49 37.73 4.18
Both 51.60 4.56 44.33 7.90 22.93 7.99
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the greater the value or weighting that
intervention will reduce the level of violence.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
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(c) Officers estimation of the level of crowd contagion (how liable it is to get out
of order).
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items to indicate whether these
could be treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for
scenario 1, Cronbach's alpha .91, for scenario 2, alpha .89, for scenario 3, alpha .69).
These composite scale variables were then entered into a two-way, one within
phase (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict), and one between measure of
accountability (internal, external and both), repeated measures factorial analysis of
variance (ANOVA) program in SPSS 8.0. In line with my predictions, I would expect
as the level of violence increased, the crowd would be perceived as more contagious
(liable to get out of hand). This would lead to a main effect of phase, not of
accountability or interaction. This is what was found (for phase F2,84 = 5.94 p <.004;
for accountability, F2,42 = 0.70, ns; for phase x accountability F4,84 = 2.59 p < .ns).
Newman Keuls analysis revealed that officers in the phase 1 (violence scenario)
see the crowd as more contagious than in both phase 2 (incipient violence scenario),
p< 05 and phase 3 (non violence scenario), p< 01. Also, that officers in phase two
(incipient violence), see the crowd as more contagious than in phase 3 (non-violence
scenario), p< 05. A summary Anova table and a table for the means and standard
errors of phase are shown in tables 7 and 8 respectively below.
Table 7: Summary Anova table for officers estimation of crowd contagion (how
liable it is to get out of hand) showing source of variation, sum of squares,
degrees of freedom, Mean square, F ratio and significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 13036.28 2,84 6518.14 5.94 .004
Accountability (A) 3400.23 2,42 1700.11 0.70 ns
Px A 11352.74 4,84 2838.18 2.58 ns
Error P 92164.31 2,84 1097.19
Error A 100845.00 2,42 2401.07
Error P x A 92164.31 4,84 1097.19
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Table 8: Mean and Standard Error of the mean (S.E.) for phase.
Accountability Phase I
Mean and SE
Phase 2
Mean and SE
Phase 3
Mean and SE
Internal 117.40 5.74 117.66 5.05 124.53 7.02
External 145.93 4.88 132.13 5.88 106.46 8.46
Both 132.60 6.69 121.86 5.16 94.06 6.42
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the more officers see the crowd as
contagious or liable to get out of hand.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
(d) Participants estimation of the level of crowd danger.
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items to indicate whether these
could be treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for
scenario 1, Cronbach's alpha, .92, for scenario 2, alpha .91, for scenario 3, alpha .65).
These composite scale variables, were then entered into a two-way, one within
phase (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict), and one between measure of
accountability (internal, external and both), repeated measures factorial analysis of
variance program in SPSS 8.0. In line with my predictions I would expect that as the
level of violence increased the crowd would be perceived as more dangerous. This
would lead to a main effect of phase, not of accountability or interaction. This is what
was found (for phase F2>84 = 7.09 p< .001; for accountability, F2,42 = 0.56, ns; for phase
x accountability F4j84 =1.22, ns).
Newman Keuls analysis revealed that officers rate phase 1 (violence scenario)
as more dangerous than both phase 2 (incipient violence) and phase 3 (non violence
scenario), p< 01. Officers in phase 3 (non violence scenario) also rate the crowd as
more homogeneous than in phase 2 (incipient violence), p<05. A summary Anova
table and a table for the means and standard errors for phase are shown in tables 9 and
10 respectively overleaf.
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Table 9: Summary Anova table for officers estimation of crowd danger, showing
source of variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, Mean square, F ratio
and significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 42282.05 2,84 21141.02 7.09 .001
Accountability (A) 18739.52 2,42 9369.76 0.56 ns
P x A 14610.18 4,84 3652.54 1.22 ns
Error P 250249.70 2,84 2979.16
Error A 701737.20 2,42 16708.02
Error P x A 250249.70 4,84 2979.16
Table 10: Mean and Standard Error of the mean (S.E.) for phase.
Accountability Phase 1
Mean and SE
Phase 2
Mean and SE
Phase 3
Mean and SE
Internal 141.66 10.39 76.76 11.5 88.61 12.9
External 105.06 10.83 53.30 8.70 77.21 11.9
Both 109.68 12.82 98.68 17.5 105.29 17.4
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the more officers see the crowd as
dangerous.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
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(e) Participant estimation of the level of crowd homogeneity
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items to indicate whether these
could be treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for
scenario 1, Cronbach's alpha, .75, for scenario 2 alpha, .65, for scenario 3, alpha .86).
These composite scale variables were then entered into a two-way, one within
phase (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict), and one between measure of
accountability (internal, external and both), repeated measures factorial analysis of
variance program in SPSS 8.0. In line with my predictions, I would expect that as the
level of violence increased the crowd would be perceived as more homogeneous (liable
to get out of control). This would lead to a main effect of phase, not of accountability
or interaction. This is what was found (for phase F2,84 = 8.87, p< .0001; for
accountability, F 2,42 =0.60 ns; for phase x accountability, F4j84 =0.35, ns).
Newman Keuls analysis revealed that officers rate the crowd in the phase 1
(violence) as more homogeneous than in both phase 2 (incipient violence) and phase 3
(non violence scenario) p< 01. Also that officers in phase 3 (non violence scenario)
rate the crowd as more homogeneous than in phase 2 (incipient violence), p< 01. A
summary Anova table and a table for the means and standard errors for phase are
shown in tables 11 and 12 respectively below.
Table 11: Summary Anova table for officers estimation of crowd homogeneity,
showing source of variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, Mean square, F
ratio and significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 85992.95 2,84 42996.47 8.87 .0001
Accountability (A) 36398.85 2,42 18199.42 0.51 ns
P x A 21557.88 4,84 5389.47 1.11 ns
Error P 368028.50 2,84 4842.48
Error A 1359181.00 2,42 35767.92
Error P x A 368028.50 4,84 4842.48
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Table 12: Mean and Standard Error of the mean (S.E.) for phase.
Accountability Phase 1
Mean and SE
Phase 2
Mean and SE
Phase 3
Mean and SE
Internal 274.35 15.06 187.78 15.70 211.57 16.80
External 214.92 18.02 137.23 14.80 200.53 17.50
Both 230.78 16.90 200.78 22.80 210.12 24.30
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the more officers see the crowd as
homogeneous.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
Overall summary of results for experiment 1
Overall, the results of this study diverge from the predictions, whereas only phase
effects are expected for expectations, and perceptions, for values I expect main effects
of phase and accountability, as well as a phase x accountability interaction. In the event
the predicted pattern is only found for the perception variables. For expectations,
we actually find an accountability effect but no phase effect or interaction. For values,
we only find a phase effect. This unexpected pattern can be summarised by comparing
table 13 (predicted actions) with table 14 (actual results) overleaf.
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Table 13: Summary table showing predictions for experiment 1.
Source Expectations Values Contagion Danger Homogeneity
Phase (P) + + + + + + + + + +
Accountability (A) + +
Px A + +
Note
+ + Significant effect.
- - No significant effect.
Table 14: Summary table showing results for experiment 1
Source Expectations Values Contagion Danger Homogeneity
Phase (P) + + + + + + + +
Accountability (A) + +
P x A
Note
+ + Significant effect at .05 or better.
- - Non significant effect.
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5.2.3. Discussion
The results from experiment 1, were in many ways the inverse ofwhat was
predicted. To be more precise, this was particularly so in relation to the effect of
manipulating accountability, which it will be recalled, was predicted to have effects on
officer values or weightings, and not on their expectations regarding the levels of
violence, but actually turned out to affect expectations but not values. Similarly, the
predicted pattern of results in relation to the phase x accountability interaction was not
seen. Equally, phase does not affect expectations as was expected, however, it does, as
predicted, affect perceptions and values.
However, before we draw any conclusions, especially about phase effects, it is
necessary to look at the manipulations a bit more carefully, and address whether
alternative interpretations could be placed on them and hence their effects.
As explained earlier, the decision to manipulate phase through showing videos
was based on the desire to have stimuli which were 'rich' and 'realistic' enough to
engage the participants, but 'richness' often equates with lack of control. Despite my
desire to make the videos equivalent in all domains except violence, it could be argued
that other differences may well have been paramount, especially given the gloss put on
events (heckling the Prime Minister over education cuts, anti police powers
demonstration, protest over the death of an Asian youth). It could well have been that
the nature of the context, the political sensitivity of the issues or the nature of the
participants (despite my stress on them as widely representative) may well have been
paramount. At best, it can be argued that phase may have been the critical element.
However, even if phase is crucial, it remains questionable as to whether the
categorisation of violence levels as violent, incipient and non-violent, maps on to the
way senior officers categorise them. Ideally, the videos should have been pre tested
but, as explained earlier, this was not possible. In fact, the results indicate that officers
tend to rate phase 2 and 3 similarly, and that the key difference is between these two
and phase 1. It could be that this is because officers, who have considerable experience
of very violent situations, actually categorise phases 2 and 3 as non violent, whereas
phase 1, which I saw as violent, is only seen as of incipient violence. This interpretation
is supported by some comments made in the debrief sessions.
Bearing these points in mind, then, it is possible to make three provisional
conclusions. First of all, phase is important in affecting values and perceptions, though
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- unexpectedly, it has no effect on expectations concerning the effects ofvarious
tactics on crowd action. Perhaps this is an artefact of the scenarios that were
employed, which all involve groups who are typically anti - police: student
demonstrators, anti police protesters and black activists. It could be that, whatever the
phase, officers see crowd members as liable to become violent given any excuse - such
as officers 'kitting up' with protective riot equipment.
Secondly, and more specifically, officers do see crowds as more homogeneous
and more liable to act together in violent ways as conflict starts. This confirms the
findings of Stott and Reicher (1998) that the police may see crowd members as
heterogeneous in many ways, but they are homogeneous in terms of danger, especially
in conflictual contexts.
Thirdly, the results point to the fact that accountability is important in effecting
the antecedents of police action towards crowds, albeit in unexpected ways. The effect
is on expectations. One possible reason is that, if the police concentrate on the safety
of their officers when they decide tactics, they may pay less attention to how crowds
might react, thus lowering their expectation of violence due to various tactical actions.
It is, however, still unclear why values should be unaffected.
However, the obvious criticism of this study is simply, that it only looks at
expectations, values and perceptions and not at actions. Therefore, in the next study, I
go some way to remedying this defect.
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5.3. Experiment 2
As explained in the introductory section of this chapter, experiment 2 was run
after a short break (5 minutes) following on from experiment 1, using the same
participants in the same groups.
Experiment 1 and 2 were exactly the same save for two important differences.
First, in experiment 2 accountability changed from a between to a within participant
measure. Second, the dependent measures focused explicitly on officer actions. These
will be discussed in turn.
The rationale for changing accountability from a between to a within
participants measure has already been explained. To recap, if I had kept the
accountability manipulation as a between participants manipulation it might well have
been that the results for experiment 2 would have been confounded by the previous
results from experiment 1. Also, if the manipulation had been kept as a between
participants factor, attempting to place the officers in new groupings from those
originally allocated, would probably have seemed implausible to the officers.
Therefore, in experiment 2, accountability was explicitly designed to be a within rather
than a between participants variable, so that any differences found in the experiment
could be attributed to the manipulation of accountability alone.
Second, to ensure that participants concentrated on the task, I made explicit the
accountability manipulation by referring to the impact of both Health and Safety
concerns (internal accountability) and Public Inquiry concerns (external accountability)
on their decisions to use specific actions. These actions can be broken down into
actions involving 'interventions' and 'non interventions'.
The 'intervention' actions, focused on decisions by the participants to use junior
officers in riot gear, on horses or riot trained officers. The 'non intervention' actions
focused on decisions by the participants to use junior officers to contain the situations
or to sanction withdrawal ofjunior officers from the crowd scenes shown on the video.
The layout for the rest of experiment 2 will follow that for experiment 1.1 will
first outline the predicted pattern of results in relation to the independent variables of
phase and accountability, and the interrelationship between the two variables. This will
be followed by looking in detail at the dependent measures for experiment 2, before
outlining the results and discussing them.
Chapter 5. experimental studies. 126
In general terms, I would expect phase and accountability to impact on
proposed actions as follows. In relation to phase, I would expect that as the level of
violence increases, officers would be more interventionist. Thus I predict a main effect
of phase.
In relation to accountability, I would expect the following pattern of results.
Under conditions of internal accountability, officers should be more concerned with the
safety of their officers and hence be more repressive towards the crowd. By contrast,
under conditions of external accountability, because officers have to balance the safety
of their officers with ensuring the rights of the crowd, they will be less repressive
toward the crowd. Thus I predict a main effect of accountability.
Finally, as I have previously argued, predictions concerning the interaction are
less crucial to my argument and more tentative. Nonetheless, it is expected that
accountability effects should be greater in the incipient phase, than either the violent or
non violent phase, where the situation is less ambiguous and the appropriate tactics
more clearly defined. Hence, a phase x accountability interaction is predicted.
However, due to the way in which I operationalised this study, the predictions
are slightly different to this general pattern. Since, for reasons already explained,
accountability was a within participants variable and participants knew from the start
that they would be asked to consider both internal and external accountability, it was
felt that respondents would implicitly compare the two, and it would be artificial to ask
them to keep accountability concerns separate. Hence, the comparison was made
explicit. Respondents were asked for each scenario whether a focus on internal (or
external accountability) would increase or decrease their likelihood of using various
tactical options. Hence responses were already normed on their expected response at
each phase, in which case the phase effect should be controlled for. Hence I would
only predict the accountability variable and phase x accountability interaction to
produce significant findings.
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5.3.1, Method
Participants
The same forty-five senior public order police officers and their advisors that
were used in experiment 1 participated in experiment 2. It will be recalled that these
were very experienced senior public order officers (of the ranks ofChief Inspector and
Superintendent) who were attending training for the 1998 Notting Hill carnival, which
is the largest public order event for the year for the Metropolitan police.
Design
A 3x2 design was involved with two 'within' participants measures of
accountability (internal and external) and phase (pre conflict, incipient conflict and
conflict). Whilst the design of the experiment differs from study 1, in the sense that
accountability has now become a within participants variable, rather than a between
participants one, the design took account of any residual effects of the accountability
manipulation in study 1, by including this as a between participants factor in the initial
statistical analyses.
a) Materials
The same compilation video defining crowd scenarios of violence, incipient violence
and no violence used in experiment 1 was also used for experiment 2. In the first
scenario - an anti Fascist rally - the video showed concerted missile throwing against
police lines. In the second scenario, the participants viewed a video which showed a
vociferous crowd shouting and making threatening gestures towards the police, along
with one or two missiles being thrown, but who were otherwise peaceful. In the final
scenario, the video depicted a low level of violence directed towards the police lines.
This involved sections of the crowd pushing and shoving against the police. Attempts
were made to standardise these video clips so as to make them all constant, except for
the level of violence. These measures included providing long shots of the protesters,
so that the protesters looked similar, and having them dubbed with the same crowd
noise, and also in such a way that no placards or slogans could be picked out. Each of
the scenarios lasted for thirty seconds.
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b) Dependent measures
For the purposes of this we will deal only with those items which are theoretically
relevant to this study. The lull questionnaire is shown in lull at appendix c. The
dependent measures addressed five types of tactical option, ofwhich three (putting on
riot gear, using police horses and using police in riot gear against the crowd) were
'repressive interventions', while two (withdrawal of officers and containing trouble)
were 'non interventions'. Respondents were asked about each tactical option twice, for
each of the scenarios. Firstly, they were asked to think about Health and Safety issues
(internal accountability) and then to consider whether such considerations would make
them more likely, less likely or else make no difference to their decision to use the said
tactic in the circumstances shown. They did this by giving a percentage figure for each
of these three. After respondents had completed these measures for all five tactical
options following scenarios 1, 2 and 3, they were asked to think about the prospect of
a Public Inquiry (external accountability) and the process was repeated.
Procedure
At the end of experiment 1, there was a short break of approximately five
minutes, after which experiment 2 began. It was explained to participants that there
would follow a final phase to the session. They were told that a number of factors
impinge on officers as they make decisions such as thinking about the Health and
Safety of their officers and thinking about the possibility of a Public Inquiry. I was
concerned with the extent to which these affect their decisions. Hence they would be
asked to think about the two issues in turn, and then say whether these would affect
their tendency to use various tactics in different contexts. It was explained that they
would be shown the three videos they had previously seen and then rate the impact of
Health and Safety on their use of the five tactical options. They would then repeat the
process while focusing on external accountability (Public Inquiry).
After this had been done, participants were asked a number of demographic
questions these were: firstly, the level of training received by officers, secondly the
experiences of the officers within the command structure of gold silver and bronze,
thirdly, the rank of the officer, fourthly, the number of public order events previously
employed on, lastly, the length of time they had been public order trained officers.
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Immediately following the completion of the dependent measures in relation to
experiment 2, officers were asked for feedback concerning the study and their
responses. They could either stay behind afterwards and discuss things collectively or
else they could come and have an individual discussion with the experimenter over the
following days. Virtually, all the participants gave feedback in one form or the other.
5.3.2. Results
The results will be presented in the following order. Firstly, the results for the
three 'repressive intervention' variables will be provided. Secondly, the results for the
two 'non - intervention' variables will be presented. Lastly, an overall summary table of
results will be provided. However, two notes need to be made about the analysis.
First, and as noted in the introduction, the 'accountability' manipulation from
study 1 has been included as a 'between' participants variable since, although separated
by a break, that variable might still affect the action of respondents. This variable will
be labelled "accountability", while the 'within' subjects manipulation in study 2 where
subjects are asked to think ofHealth and Safety or of a Public Inquiry will be labelled
"prime". Hence each variable will be subjected to 3 (accountability) x 2 (prime) x 3
(phase) analysis, where the first is a 'between' participants variable and the other two
are 'within' participants variables.
Second, since internal accountability, as opposed to external accountability, is
predicted to increase repressive action, especially in the incipient phase of action, the
main effect of accountability should lead to an increased probability ofusing the
'repressive intervention' tactics, and a decreased probability of using the 'non -
intervention' tactics, with the respective differences being greatest in phase 2.
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Intervention variables
a) Use of Protective riot equipment or in police argot 'Kitting'.
It was decided to combine the three percentage estimates of 'more likely', 'less
likely', and 'no difference' in using the tactic into a single scale score. Since being more
likely to use a tactic should be inversely related to being less likely and to making no
difference, this was done by subtracting the latter two scores from the first. Thus the
higher the score, the more likely participants are to employ the said tactic.
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items to indicate whether these
could be treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for
scenario 1, Cronbach's alpha, .64, for scenario 2, alpha, .67, for scenario 3, alpha, .73).
These composite scale variables were entered into a three way two within,
phase, (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict) and prime, (Health and Safety and
Public Inquiry), one between measure of accountability (internal, external and both)
repeated measures factorial analysis of variance in the Anova program in SPSS 8.0. In
line with my general predictions I would expect a main effect of prime, and a prime x
phase interaction in the incipient phase. No predictions are made concerning the
original accountability variable and the interactions involving it. This was not what was
found (for phase F2jg4 = 3.70 p < 05; for accountability, F2,42 = 4.13 p< 05, for prime
Fi,42 = 16.09 p< .0001; for phase x accountability F4jg4 = 0.39 ns, for phase x prime,
F2,42= 1.92 ns, for prime x accountability F2,42 = 0.38 ns, for phase x prime x
accountability F4,g4 = 0.57 ns).
Newman Keuls analysis revealed that officers in phase 1 (violence scenario)
value using police in riot equipment more so than in phase 3 (incipient violence
scenario), p < 05. No other comparisons of phase were significant. Newman Keuls
analysis also revealed that officers in the original, both internal and external
accountability condition, from experiment 1, value using police in protective riot
equipment more so than those in the original internal accountability condition, p< 05.
No other comparisons of the original accountability manipulation from experiment 1
were significant.
The 'prime' effect indicates that participants are more likely to 'kit up' when
internal accountability concerns are made salient. A summary Anova table is given at
table 15. A table ofmeans and standard error of the mean for the phase and prime
variables is given at table 16 below.
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Table 15: Summary Anova table for police action of using officers in riot gear,
showing source of variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, Mean square, F
ratio and significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 13425.74 2,84 6712.87 3.70 .05
Accountability (A) 104428.00 2,42 52213.98 4.12 .05
Prime (Pr) 143520.80 1,42 143520.80 16.09 .0001
P x A 2846.48 4,84 711.62 0.39 ns
Pr x A 6927.22 2,42 3463.61 0.38 ns
P x Pr 4957.22 2,84 2478.61 1.92 ns
P x Pr x A 2977.22 4,84 744.30 0.57 ns
Error P 152194.40 2,84 1811.83
Error A 531135.60 2,42 12646.08
Error Pr 374514.40 1,42 8917.01
Error P x A 152194.40 2,84 1811.83
Error Pr x A 374514.40 2,42 8917.01
Error P x Pr 108315.60 2,84 1289.47
Error P x Pr x A 108315.60 4,84 1289.47
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Table 16: Summary table of means and standard error of the mean for the phase
and prime variables.
Prime Phase 1
Mean and S.E.
Phase 2
Mean and S.E.
Phase 3
Mean and S.E.
Internal accountability 35.11 8.22 30.27 8.25 18.33 6.71
External accountability 6.00 1.85 8.00 1 . 78 12.00 1.66
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the more likely officers will 'kit up' or
use protective riot gear when internal accountability concerns are made salient.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
b) Use of horses
Reliability analyses were carried out on the six items to indicate whether these
could be treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for
scenario 1, Cronbach's alpha, .75, for scenario 2, alpha, .73, for scenario 3, alpha, .67).
These composite scale variables were entered into a three way, two within
phase, (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict) and prime, (Health and Safety and
Public Inquiry) one between measure of accountability (internal, external and both)
repeated measures factorial analysis of variance in the (ANOVA) program in SPSS
8.0. In line with my predictions I would expect a main effect of prime and a phase x
prime interaction. No predictions were made for the original accountability
manipulation or the interactions in which it was involved. This is what was found, (for
phase F2,84 = 6.76 p < 01, for accountability, F2,42 = 3.78 p< 05, for prime FM2 = 4.01
p< .052; for phase x accountability, F4i84 = 1.92 ns, for phase x prime, F2j84 = 7.27 p<
.001, for prime x accountability F2i42 = 0.38, for phase x prime x accountability F4j84 =
1.46 ns).
Newman Keuls analysis of the phase x prime interaction revealed that in phase
three (non violence scenario) officers in the external prime value using the horses as a
tactical action, more so than officers in the internal prime, p< 01. The prime trend
indicates that participants are more likely to use the horses when external
accountability concerns are made salient. A summary Anova table and a table for the
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means and standard errors for the phase and prime variables are shown in tables 17 and
18 respectively below.
Table 17: Summary Anova table for police action of using officers on horses,
showing source of variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, Mean square, F
ratio and significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 16280.18 2,84 8140.09 6.75 .002
Accountability
(A)
118861.30 2,42 59430.64 3.77 .05
Prime (Pr) 7894.81 1,42 7894.81 4.01 .052
P x A 9214.81 4,84 2303.70 1.91 ns
Pr x A 11761.29 2,42 5880.64 2.99 ns
P x Pr 16952.40 2,84 8476.20 7.26 .001
P x Pr x A 6791.48 4,84 1697.87 1.45 ns
Error P 101205.00 2,84 1204.82
Error A 660556.70 2,42 15727.54
Error Pr 82568.88 1,42 1965.92
Error P x A 101205.00 4,84 1204.82
Error Pr x A 82568.88 2,42 1965.92
Error P x Pr 97956.11 2,84 1166.14
Error P x Pr x A 97956.11 4,84 1166.14
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Table 18: Summary table of means and standard error of the mean for the phase
and prime variables.
Prime Phase 1
Mean and S.E.
Phase 2
Mean and S.E.
Phase 3
Mean and S.E.
Internal accountability 50.33 4.14 55.00 4.16 21.00 5.08
External accountability 51.77 4.06 55.77 4.08 54.55 4.07
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the more likely that officers will use the
horses when external accountability concerns are made salient.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
c) Use of riot police or level one officers.
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items to indicate whether these
could be treated as a scale. These indicated that it was reasonable to proceed, (Kline,
1993), (for scenario 1 Cronbach's alpha, .73, for scenario 2, alpha,.66, for scenario 3
alpha,. 81).
These composite scale variables were entered into a three way two, within
phase, (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict) and prime, (Health and Safety and
Public Inquiry) one between measure of accountability (internal, external and both)
repeated measures factorial analysis of variance in the Anova program in SPSS 8.0. In
line with my predictions I would expect a main effect of prime and a phase x prime
interaction. No predictions were made concerning accountability or the interactions in
which it was involved. This is not what was found (for phase F2>42 = 0.24, ns, for
accountability, F 2,42 = 3.62 p < .03 for prime Fi;42 = 9.02 p < .01 for phase x
accountability F4i 84 = 0.38 ns, phase x prime, F 2i84 =1.35, ns, for prime x
accountability F2,42= 0.38 for phase x prime x accountability F4,84 = 0.45, ns).
Newman Keuls analysis revealed that officers in the original internal
accountability condition, value using officers who are riot trained, more so than
officers in the original external accountability condition, (p<05), and that officers in
the original internal accountability condition value using these officers, more so than
officers in the original both internal and external accountability condition, p< 01.
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The prime effect indicated that respondents are more likely to use riot trained
officers when external accountability concerns are made salient. A summary Anova
table and a table for the means and standard errors for the phase and prime variables
are given in tables 19 and 20.
Table 19: Summary Anova table for police action of using officers who are riot
trained, showing source of variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, Mean
square, F ratio and significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 1506.85 2,84 753.42 1.17 ns
Accountability (A) 133064.60 2,42 66532.31 3.68 .05
Prime (Pr) 72520.83 1,42 72520.83 9.02 .001
Px A 990.37 4,84 247.59 0.39 ns
Pr x A 34035.00 2,42 17017.50 2.11 ns
P x Pr 1537.22 2,84 768.61 1.35 ns
P x Pr x A 1031.11 4,84 257.78 0.45 ns
Error P 53927.77 2,84 641.99
Error A 758945.60 2,42 18070.13
Error Pr 337506.70 1,42 8035.87
Error P x A 53927.77 2,84 641.99
Error Pr x A 337506.70 2,42 8035.87
Error P x Pr 47556.66 2,84 566.15
Error P x Pr x A 47556.66 4,84 566.15
Chapter 5. Experimental studies. 136
Table 20: Summary table of means and Standard Error of the mean (S.E.) for
the phase and prime variables.
Prime Phase I
Mean and S.E.
Phase 2
Mean and S.E.
Phase 3
Mean and S.E.
Internal accountability 16.00 11.07 23.33 11.49 23.00 11.44
External accountability 31.33 11.35 38.66 10.73 40.00 11.12
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the more likely that officers will use
riot trained officers when external accountability concerns are made salient.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
Non intervention variables
a) Contain.
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items to indicate whether these
could be treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for
scenario 1, Cronbach's alpha, .61, for scenario 2, alpha, .72, for scenario 3, alpha .64).
These composite scale variables were entered into a three way two, within
phase, (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict) and prime, (Health and Safety, and
Public Inquiry) one between measure of accountability (internal, external and both)
repeated measures factorial analysis of variance in the Anova program in SPSS 8.0. In
line with my predictions I would expect a main effect of prime and a prime x phase
interaction. No predictions are made for the original accountability manipulation or the
interactions in which it was involved. This is not what was found (for phase F2>84 =
0.58, ns, for accountability, F2i42 = 1.63, ns; for prime F ];42 = 0.12, ns; for phase x
accountability F4,84 =1.41, ns, for phase x prime, F2;84 = 0.45, ns, for prime x
accountability F2j42= 1.67, ns, for phase x prime x accountability F4j84 =0.98, ns). A
summary Anova table and a table for the means and standard errors for the phase and
prime variables are given in tables 21 and 22 overleaf.
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Table 21: Summary Anova table for police action of containing the situation,
showing source of variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, Mean square, F
ratio and significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 835.51 2,84 416.75 0.58 ns
Accountability
(A)
44103.51 2,42 22051.75 1.63 ns
Prime (Pr) 607.50 1,42 607.50 0.12 ns
Px A 4023.14 4,84 1005.78 1.41 ns
Pr x A 15860.55 2,42 7930.27 1.67 ns
P x Pr 607.22 2,84 303.61 0.45 ns
P x Pr x A 2640.55 4,84 660.13 0.98 ns
Error P 59593.33 2,84 709.44
Error A 576460.00 2,42 13725.23
Error Pr 199161.10 1,42 4741.93
Error P x A 59593.33 4,84 709.44
Error Pr x A 199161.10 2,42 4741.93
Error P x Pr 56335.55 2,84 670.66
Error P x Pr x A 56335.55 4,84 670.66
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Table 22: Summary table of means and standard error of the mean for the phase
and prime variables.
Prime Phase 1
Mean and S.E.
Phase 2
Mean and S.E.
Phase 3
Mean and S.E.
Internal accountability 7.00 1.56 6.00 1.49 7.00 1.40
External accountability 6.00 1.68 7.00 1.68 6.00 2.67
Note.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
b) Withdrawal
Reliability analyses were carried out on the items to indicate whether these
could be treated as a scale. These were adequate to proceed, (Kline, 1993), (for
scenario 1 Cronbach's alpha, .74, for scenario 2, alpha .61, for scenario 3, alpha, .82).
These composite scale variables were entered into a three way two, within
phase, (conflict, incipient conflict and no conflict) and prime, (Health and Safety, and
Public Inquiry) one between measure of accountability (internal, external and both)
repeated measures factorial analysis of variance in the Anova program in SPSS 8.0. In
line with my predictions I would expect a main effect of prime and a prime x phase
interaction. No predictions were made for the original accountability manipulation or
the interactions in which it was involved. This is what was found (for phase F2,84 =
3.09 p <.05, for accountability, F2,42 = 2.17 ns, for prime Fij42 = 17.02 p< .0001, for
phase x accountability F4)84 = 0.26 ns, for phase x prime, F 2> u = 10.70 p< .0001, for
prime x accountability F2; 42 = 0.23 ns, for phase x prime x accountability F4,84 = 0.38
ns).
Newman Keuls analysis of the phase x prime interaction, revealed that in phase
one (violence scenario) officers in the prime ofPublic Inquiry value withdrawal as a
tactical action, more so than officers in the prime ofHealth and Safety, p< 01. In phase
two (incipient conflict) this switches over and officers in the prime ofHealth and
Safety value withdrawal as a tactical action, more so than officers in the prime of
Public Inquiry, p< 01. In the final phase (non violence scenario) this again switches
with officers in the prime ofPublic Inquiry again valuing withdrawal as a tactical
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action, more so than officers do in the prime ofHealth and Safety. A summary Anova
table and a table for the means and standard errors for the phase x prime interaction
are shown in tables 23 and 24 respectively.
Table 23: Summary Anova table for police action of withdrawal of officers,
showing source of variation, sum of squares, degrees of freedom, F ratio and
significance level.
Source SS df MS F P
Phase (P) 10598.51 2,84 5299.25 3.09 .05
Accountability
(A)
77084.63 2,42 38542.31 2.17 ns
Prime (Pr) 42814.81 1,42 42814.81 17.02 .0001
Px A 1810.37 4,84 452.59 0.26 ns
Pr x A 1136.85 2,42 568.42 0.23 ns
P x Pr 24287.40 2,84 12143.70 10.70 .0001
P x Pr x A 1759.25 4,84 439.81 0.38 ns
Error P 143807.80 2,84 1711.99
Error A 45338.90 2,42 17746.16
Error Pr 105640.00 1,42 2515.23
Error P x A 143807.80 2,84 1711.99
Error Pr x A 105640.00 2,42 2515.23
Error P x Pr 95336.66 2,84 1134.96
Error P x Pr x A 95336.66 4,84 1134.96
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Table 24: Summary table of means and standard error of the mean for the phase
and prime variables.
Prime Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Mean and S.E. Mean and S.E. Mean and S.E.
Internal accountability 16.55 3.45 62.33 4.70 35.22 8.90
External accountability 36.21 3.67 35.82 8.91 65.00 6.78
Note.
Mean figure in bold, the higher the mean the more likely that officers will
withdraw officers.
StandardError (SE) ofmean in italics.
Overall summary of results
Overall, the results for this study diverge considerably from the predicted results. This
can be seen by comparing tables 25 (predictions) and 26 (results) below. Nonetheless,
three things stand out. First of all, there are strong prime effects on all but one of the
variables. Secondly, in two cases the effects of prime are qualified by an interaction
with phase. However, this does not follow the expected pattern, whereby the prime
effect should be stronger with incipient conflict (phase 2) than with other phases.
Thirdly, contrary to expectations, phase continues to exert an effect in three out of five
tactics, although the effects are generally weaker (only one at .01 or better) than for
prime or the interaction.
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Tabic 25: Summary table predictions for experiment 2
Source Expectations Values Contagion Danger Homogeneity
Phase (P)
Prime (Pr) + + + + + + + + + +
P x Pr + + + + + + + + + +
Note
+ + Significant effect.
- - No significant effect.
Table 26: Summary table results for experiment 2
Source Expectations Values Contagion Danger Homogeneity
Phase (P) + + + + + +
Prime (Pr) + + (*) + + + + + (*)
P x Pr + + + +
Note
+ + Significant effect.
+ Trend
- - No significant effect.
(*) Pattern of results as predicted
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5.3.3. Discussion
The results from experiment 2, lead to three patterns which need to be
explained, the effects of the original between participants manipulation of
accountability, the pattern of results against predictions and the prime effects.
First of all, there are a number of effects of the original between participants
accountability manipulation. Whilst these are relatively weak (none better than .05)
they are supportive of the notion that internal accountability leads to the greater use of
repressive intervention.
Secondly, and against predictions, there are a number of phase effects. Perhaps
this is not surprising since, although logically the questions involve norming responses
on their general response to the scenario, and hence parcelling out the phase effect, the
fact that questions were asked about each of the phases in turn, may have encouraged
respondents to make comparisons between them.
Thirdly, and in general, there are strong prime effects, in the case of using riot
trained officers, the pattern is counter to predictions in this case, and also that relating
to the use of the horses. Information from the feed back sessions sheds some light on
this.
To take the use of'riot trained' officers first, participants interpreted this as
officers who were 'not kitted up' (given that this was distinct from a previous item
which stressed 'kitting up'). The use of such officers to intervene could be dangerous to
them and so, with a stress on Health and Safety, they would be unlikely to use this
option, especially given other available options, which might be more effective in
quelling the crowd. That is, their judgement was made in relation to other equally
effective, safer (for officers) and possibly more repressive options like 'kitting up' then
intervening.
In the case of the horses, participants did not see this only as a repressive
measure but also as a way of calming crowds and stopping unrest occurring, that is,
relative to other options, it is non repressive. Hence, horses are more likely to be used
in the external prime.
The last point, also helps me to address another matter - the unexpected
patterns of the prime x phase interaction. Thus the greater use of horses when external
accountability is primed, only occurs under non - violent conditions. In effect, this is
because all officers see horses as an effective tactic for quelling trouble, but they differ
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in seeing them as a preventative measure, as a function ofwhether they focus on the
safety of their officers, or the need to be seen publicly to do all they can to prevent and
not just to deal with trouble.
The case of the interaction in the use ofwithdrawal as a tactic is more complex,
and was less clear or consensual in this matter. However, once again it indicates that
while accountability concerns are crucial, and their effects depend on phase, the exact
way this happens depends upon a more complex appreciation of the nature of the
relevant tactic, how it stands in relation to alternative tactics, and hence the meaning of
its use in various contexts. In short my categorisation of 'repressive interventions'
versus 'non interventions' proved too simplistic and, in understanding the impact of the
key variables, it is crucial to start from participants own understandings.
5.4. General Discussion
The results from the two experiments reported in this chapter are complex and
messy, with the pattern of results rarely coming out exactly as predicted. These results,
to a large extent, come down to the fact that the conditions under which the study was
operationalised were far from ideal. On the one hand, the sample was in effect the
population of senior public order officers, such that validating measures on a matched
sample was impossible. Secondly, there was no choice over where and when the study
was run, making for a problematic compromise in running consecutive studies on the
same participants. Thirdly, the sample were 'powerful', unlike participants over whom
we have 'power' (such as undergraduates) they were liable to challenge, reject and
reinterpret the measures, such as, what is violence and what is the significance of
different tactics? With such powerful people the notion of 'experimental control' is in
serious jeopardy.
Despite all this, there are consistent and strong indications that accountability is
crucial, especially in regard to the key issue ofwhat officers actually do in tactical
terms, that phase is crucial and the effects of accountability depend upon phase. As
already indicated, we not only get strong statistical effects but also large effects in
absolute terms.
In part at least, these confirm Stott and Reicher's (1998) findings. Police, both
see crowds as more homogeneous and are more likely to favour homogenising tactics,
such as the donning of riot gear (with which police all look the same to crowds and
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crowd members - through a usually scuffed Perspex visor - the crowd look all the same
to police) as conflict occurs.
More generally, these studies once again demonstrate the importance of
accountability to an understanding of group processes and reinforces the message that
it is important to consider how group members are held to account and by whom if one
wants to understand the behaviour ofmembers of formal groups. In passing, it is also
worth noting that the manipulations also affected a number of general social
psychological processes, most notably phase impacted upon perceptions of outgroup
homogeneity. While it is not entirely clear why this should be, the finding does indicate
that we should not view outgroup homogeneity as a perceptual process, but rather
should take into account such factors as theories of the crowd action (i.e. the idea that
violence is contagious and will lead all members to behave likewise).
On a methodological level, the difficulties I encountered in running these
studies raises some instructive points for the use of experimentation in social
psychology. The sample I used were very different from the staple fare of such studies.
Unlike most subjects who have less power than the experimenter and are more likely to
accede to the definitions and instructions that the experimenter imposes, here the
subjects were more powerful. They contested and rejected some of the terms of the
experiment. As I have suggested, this may lie behind the way in which some of the
results deviated from my predictions. This is a graphic illustration of the way in which
experimentation is framed by specific power relations and how it is important to be
aware of the way in which these relations affect both our ability to conduct
experiments and the results we receive from them.
All in all, then, the results of these studies show that accountability and phase
have large effects, but the exact nature of those effects is more complex than I
originally examined. The apnon assumptions were too simple, and a more subtle
analysis of the exact nature of internal and external accountability concerns, and the
situated significance of using particular tactics relative to others, needs to be
undertaken before I can see how the one impacts on the other. This need for a situated
analysis, and the complexity ofboth accountability and its effects - but also of its
crucial importance - will be a major theme, that will arise again in chapter 7. However
first, in chapter 6,1 will describe some pilot field studies which helped shape the way
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the major study was conducted, as well as delivering some further insights into crowd
policing in their own right.
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Chanter 6,
Pilot Particinant observation studies, Eid, and Vaisakhi,
Festivals, February and April 1997.
6.1. Introduction
The results reported in the previous two chapters provide both qualitative and
quantitative support for the notion that accountability concerns are central to the
decision making by senior police officers during public order events.
The obvious problems with these previous studies is that they did not look at
real events, therefore we can't say that this is what people do in 'live' situations. There
are two aims to the studies reported in this chapter. The first and major aim is to act as
pilot studies for the major study conducted in the next chapter. In each study a slightly
different approach is taken in order to investigate the best way of gaining access, and
collecting the richest possible data, on the decisions taken by senior officers and
reasons lying behind them. These lessons concerning 'best practice' will then be used to
plan the major study. The second and subsidiary aim has to do with the substantive
findings coming out of these studies. I simply want to see if the data can be used to
confirm, deny, or enrich my emerging model of public order policing.
This chapter is organised in two sections. First, I will look at the analytic
protocols for collecting and recording the data. This will follow the arrangement set
out in chapter 4, with the exception that it will not include a section on grounded
theory, because on this occasion, the data was not subject to systematic analysis.
Second, I will look in detail at four participant observation studies. Two of
these looked at the festival ofEid; (a celebration to mark the end of the Ramadan fast)
and two observations centred on the Vaisakhi celebrations (marking the birth of the
Sikh nation). All four ethnographic studies were carried out in Southall, London,
during February and April of 1997. These will be discussed in turn.
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6.2. Analytic issues
6.2.1. Data collection
As I have explained, the studies in this chapter are principally pilot studies,
which seek to test different ways of studying crowd policing, in order to see which
delivers the richest data. For the first Eid event, I followed the briefing officer (a Chief
Inspector) as he prepared to brief the officers in charge of the individual Police
Support Units (PSU's) on the police aims for the event. On the second day of the Eid
festival I looked in more detail at the processes involved in gathering information in the
'intelligence cell' based at Southall police station. These revealed intergroup differences
between those collecting intelligence within the police.
The two Vaisakhi celebrations were held on two consecutive Sundays in April
of 1997. For the first Sunday, I concentrated on how the gold commander took
decisions in relation to the event. This observation highlighted the difficulties involved
when the researcher is not able to follow in detail the selected person in question. To
be more explicit, this officers concern with national security considerations, in relation
to the perceived terrorist threat to the Coca-Cola Cup Final, meant the withdrawal of
access to him for this day. He had these concerns because he had also been allocated
the role of performing gold for both the Vaisakhi celebrations and the Coca-Cola Cup
Final. Due to the very sensitive nature of the information being given to this officer,
and the sources from which they were coming, access to this officer was withdrawn
and the ethnographic study had to be abandoned.
The second Vaisakhi Sunday saw a change in the observational focus. It was
decided to follow the mobile reserve bronze, a very experienced senior officer of Chief
Inspector rank, who was responsible for the deployment of the mobile Police Support
Units (PSU's) assigned to the event. This observation also raised practical issues of
how to follow and record the officers decisions in this environment. At moments of
tension, this officer did not articulate in detail the reasons for his decisions, because he
was consumed by the immediacy of the situations presented for him to deal with.
These four events will be explicated in detail after outlining the protocols for recording
the data.
The protocols for recording the field notes were as follows. A small hands free
tape recorder was used to record data where practicable. Where this was not possible,
due to officers not wishing to be tape recorded, or for practical reasons such as
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interference with police control room technology, or the batteries having run out, these
notes were augmented by written field notes made in note books. Whether the notes
were recorded by audio or written means, these notes were either spoken into the tape
recorder or written up as soon as practical and later transcribed. The field notes were
supplemented by filling in a field journal, which outlined general themes emerging from
the observations and which was completed at the end of every observational day. This
was also transcribed.
The above 'primary sources' of data were complemented by 'secondary
sources'. These were in the form of intelligence briefing notes from Special Branch (SB
- assessing the actual threat of disorder); local intelligence records, briefing materials
and internal police correspondence concerning the events. In addition, for the second
Vaisakhi Sunday, the Information Time Line - a document collating the police
intelligence for the day - was obtained from officers running the local 'intelligence-
gathering cell' based at Southall police station.
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6.3. Pilot 1: Eid al Fitr, Saturday 8th February 1997
6.3.1. Rationale for Research Strategy
For the first pilot participant observation study, it was decided to follow one of
the bronze commanders (an officer of the rank of Chief Inspector) who was
responsible for the briefing of officers assigned to the event. Practically, this involved
following him around Southall police station while he conducted a series ofbriefings
for officers. It was decided to focus on the bronze commander because I wanted to see
how officers at this level of command influenced the decision making process during a
'live' public order event.
6.3.2. The Events
The event ofEid al Fitr marks the start of the festival to celebrate the end of
the Muslim Ramadan fast, the start ofwhich is decided by the senior Imam (Muslim
Priest) for the United Kingdom. Historically, this event has been marked by the
majority of the estimated one million Muslims in the United Kingdom by meetings and
prayers between family members and friends. In the case of the celebrations centred
around Southall in west London, the event had been used by some younger Muslims as
an occasion for them to go to this area in expensive hire cars, to wave flags and to
insult local Sikhs who own the majority of retail outlets on Southall Broadway.
According to police records the resulting intergroup conflict between the two
groups had resulted in serious confrontations which had necessitated police
intervention. As an example, the police had made fifty-five arrests the previous year
(1996) for a variety of offences including the possession of offensive weapons and
serious assaults. The police information for the 1997 festival, included an assessment
of worsening relations between the young Muslims based on the Chalvey estate in
Slough and the Sikhs of Southall, and had lead them to predict large scale disorder.
To contextualise this intergroup rivalry it is necessary to understand the
historical enmity between the Sikh and Muslim followers in this area. This, according
to police Special Branch intelligence sources, could not be divorced from the context
of intergroup conflict between Sikhs and Muslims which had occurred over many
centuries, and had resulted in various atrocities on the Indian sub continent.
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1. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"There is a history dating back hundreds of years of I don't think hatred is too
strong a word to use, between the Sikhs of India and the Muslims of India. Both their
histories are littered with battles, wars, conquests, and uprisings involving those two
groups. Indeed it continues to the current day, when Indira Ghandi was assassinated
by her two Sikh bodyguardsfor herpart in storming the Golden Temple in India, this
is the holiest of holy shrines for the Sikhs, approximately 4000 Sikhs were killed in
India byMuslims andHindus. Racial violence on such a scale is not unknown. These
events colour the attitudes ofall sections of the community from adults through to the
children."
According to this officer, the historical intergroup conflict between the Muslim
and Sikhs in India had been relatively self-contained within the sub continent, until an
incident in the winter of 1995, when a small series of attacks between Sikhs and
Muslims started to occur in Southall. These incidents had got progressively worse with
an attack on a young Muslim at a local community college.
2. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"Normally they are kept fairly well hidden and up and to the point ofJanuary 1995,
or it might have been February, there hadn't really been any friction that had spilled
over into violence between the two communities. On that date, a very small event took
place, which seemed to spark off a whole series of tit for tat attacks and retaliations
that have been continuing andgetting more andmore serious over the last two years.
The initial event itselfwas an argument between a Muslim and a Sikh at Hounslow
College, no hang on, Isleworth College ofHigher Education."
The consequences of the attack on the young Muslim were seen in an
immediate deterioration in intergroup relations. Tangibly, this was seen on the Monday
following the Friday attack, with about 150 Muslims gathering at the local college for
the purposes of extracting revenge on Sikh men attending the college. Intelligence
gathered through police sources enabled several units of public order trained officers
of the Territorial Support Group (TSG) to be waiting outside the college for the
purposes of preventing the anticipated conflict between the Sikhs and Muslims.
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According to eyewitnesses, as the Muslims attempted to gain access to the college,
police intervened and the resulting confrontation resulted in the arrests of one Sikh and
twenty Muslims.
3. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"The upshot was that the Muslims called for reinforcements and on the Monday
following the argument on the Friday night, approximately 150 Muslims turned up at
the college with a view to extracting revenge on the Sikhs, who make up the majority
of the students. Special Branch (SB) were able to warn the commanders that this
event was going to occur, as we had received intelligence over that weekend that the
Muslims were going to do this. Territorial Support Group (TSG) units were therefore
deployed to the area prior to the event. Somewhat unusually, the 150 Muslims
attempted to gain entrance to the premises, at thatpoint TSG arrived, a stand up fight
tookplace, the Muslims turned and attacked the TSG. It ended with 20 Muslims being
arrested and I think one Sikh. There were demonstrations outside Chiswick police
station where the prisoners were taken to, and demonstrations outside the court when
they appeared in court. "
It was widely held by both the local Sikh community and the police, that after
the resulting trial, that intergroup relations would improve following the conviction of
the Muslims who had been arrested. However, the trial was stopped on the grounds
that the defendants could not get a fair trial following the adverse publicity
surrounding the event. This was perceived to be unfair by the local Sikhs and wider
divisions grew between the two groups.
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4. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"Following this strand through, the people that were arrested there, eventually
appeared at Crown Court, where the trial was halted by the judge on the grounds that
they couldn't get a fair trial because of prejudicial press reporting in the local
newspapers. This decision left everybody flabbergasted but left the Muslims in
particular with the opinion that they could get away with anything as far as attacking
the Sikhs. The Sikhs were thrown into great consternation about the whole event and
decided that this wouldn't happen again, that they would be prepared for future
activities like that with the Muslim, andfrom that seedgrew the two camps. "
Set against this historical context of intergroup conflict between local Southall
Muslims and Sikhs, the festival ofEid (marking the end of the Ramadan fast) was seen
by some Muslim youth to be an ideal way of asserting their presence by driving
expensive hire cars and waving Muslim flags along Southall Broadway. The Broadway
is symbolic for local Sikhs who own the majority of the shops along this road, and thus
the behaviour ofMuslims is seen to be very provocative in nature.
5. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"The Muslims had started to celebrate the festival of Eid in Southall itself, they do
this by driving up and down Southall Broadway, usually in vehicles that they have
hired specifically for the Eid festival, wave Muslim flags and generally assert their
presence. This was seen as very provocative by the Sikhs, Southall Broadway has
always been a symbolic location and they have tried very hard over the last few years
to stop theMuslimsfrom going on to the Broadway. "
Perhaps not surprisingly the provocation seen during Eid had resulted in a
number of conflicts between the two groups, and on a previous occasion, police
narrowly averted a possible confrontation between 300 Sikhs trying to get onto
Southall Broadway, already full with Muslims.
Chapter 6. Pilot studies, Eid and Vaisakhi. 153
6. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"The worst case of this occurring was, I think, in 1995, when it was only due to some
very goodpolicing to block off the 300 or so Sikhs who were trying to get on to the
Broadway from the direction of Norwood Green that kept the two sides apart, and
from the intelligence perspective their routes up to the Broadway were passed to the
commander who was able to take blocking action with uniform officers. "
The response of the police to these escalating intergroup conflicts between
Sikhs and Muslims had resulted in all religious festivals of the two communities
requiring an overt police presence to deter actual confrontation. In addition, outside of
these festivals, a series of attacks by both groups on members of the other had resulted
in a number of injuries and, in some cases, death was only narrowly averted.
7. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"We now have a situation where the Muslim 's festivals of Eid and increasingly the
Sikhs festivals of Vaisakhi andDiwali require heavy police presence to ensure that all
things pass offpeacefully. Between these big festivals there is a constant stream of
attacks on one another, these have been getting more and more serious and there are
at least two or three people walking aroundwho were seriously injured by attacks and
are very lucky that they are not dead, such were the level of their injuries. "
For the police, violent groups on both sides, such as the Sikh 'Sheery Punjab'
and the Muslim 'Chalvey Boys', legitimated their actions on both political and religious
dimensions. This led to a progressive worsening of intergroup relations.
8. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"Another disturbing trend within the whole issue has been the politicisation of the
whole thing and the fact that it's both national and religious. In the normal context of
events, if two groups ofyouths were trying to fight and were attacking one another, it
would be seen as just 'yobbery' and nobody would be too bothered, but both these
groups, the Sheery Punjab from the Sikhs and the Chalvey Boys from the Muslims,
have taken upon themselves this cloak of defending their religion, in particular, and
defending their nationality to a lesser extent. "
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Prior to the 1997 Eid festival, police were concerned about how these attacks
were being represented as political and religious in motivation, and feared even greater
intergroup conflict as places ofworship and individual symbols of the two religions
were attacked. Tangibly, this had manifested itself in an increase in attacks on both
Sikh Gudwara's (Temples) and Muslim Mosques as well as incidents in which the hair
of young practising Sikhs (men and women) had been cut off. For practising Sikhs,
having uncut hair or Kesh, worn under the turban, is one of the five K's or symbols of
Sikhism. The others are carrying a symbolic dagger or Kirpan, having a steel comb to
fix the hair or Khangha, a steel bangle or Kara and the wearing of special undershorts
or Kaccha. The cutting of hair is therefore seen, not only as a deep insult to the
individual in particular, but to be just as insulting to the Sikh community in general.
Several instances of this type of attack had been reported prior to the Eid celebrations
of 1997 and the police feared further conflict between the two groups during this
particular festival.
9. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"Because religion is involved, it involves the rest of the community and the potential
for serious disorder is increased. Attacks have taken place on Sikh Gudwara's and
Muslim Mosques and last weekend a Sikh hoy had his top knot cut off which is seen
as a deep insult, the top knot is one of the five religious symbols that the baptised Sikh
must have and the girl with him had part of her pigtail cut off, again an attack on
women is seen as highlyprovocative. This has had ramifications throughout the whole
community and undoubtedly there will be a further problems. "
It was set against this background that the first pilot ethnographic study was
conducted on Saturday 8th February 1997. On my arrival in London a police Inspector,
who was assigned as my liaison officer, collected me for the period of the two-day
participant observational study and drove me to Southall police station. On the way
this officer outlined the latest updated information regarding this event, which had
been something of a surprise for the police, as the Southall community leaders had only
decided the night before that the Eid festival was to be held over the weekend of the
8th and 9th February 1997. This officer confirmed that tension between young Muslims
and Sikhs had heightened and that police information indicated that Sikhs from Leeds
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and Bradford had come to London to defend the local Sikhs on Southall Broadway.
Interestingly, this officer also highlighted the intergroup tension between the local
senior officers and the central control room, of the Metropolitan Police in Scotland
Yard known in police argot as GT, which was perceived to be interfering in this event
by local senior officers. In contrast, the central control room had insisted that they
would monitor the event so that, in the case of disorder, they could arrange for the
Metropolitan police response to be co-ordinated in quelling any riot.
10. Inspector
"It was only decided at 8pm last night by the Southall community that the Eid
Festival would be today. Tension has been reported between young Sikhs and
Muslims. There is information suggesting that young Sikhs have been brought down
from Leeds and Bradford to fight. There have already been problems with the role of
GT (centralpolice control based at New Scotland Yard) and the local Southallpolice
control. This is seen by gold and silver as interfering in a local event. They have been
instructed that GT has a shadowing role in order that the organisation can supply a
contingent response as necessary. "
Whilst driving to the police station I became aware of the large numbers of
Sikhs and Muslims being stopped and searched by groups of officers on foot and in
police vans. Many of the young Sikhs and Muslims were driving expensive cars
(BMW, Jaguar and Mercedes). I also noticed the majority of officers carrying long
batons and wearing protective riot equipment, albeit, without the crash helmet.
On entering the back of Southall Police station through a controlled barrier I
noticed a large number of police vehicles and officers, the police driver and myself
were escorted to the briefing officer's office. This briefing officer informed us that gold
had left the police station to go to Scotland Yard, to resolve the issue of control of the
event.
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Briefing
The briefing by the Chief Inspector began at 3 p.m. This involved this officer
providing a pack for the Inspectors and Sergeants present and was split into three
parts: first, a general briefing on the background to the event, second, an information
update, and third, personnel deployments. The briefing officer began with the news
that there had been problems between the local police Chief Superintendent, in charge
of the policing of Southall police area, and the central control centre of the
Metropolitan police based at Scotland Yard. The view of the local Southall senior
officers was that it was the purpose of the central control room to monitor the
communications systems of Southall police, so in the case of serious confrontation they
could assume the command and control functions from the local officers. It was not
the role of the officers at GT (the central control centre) to command the event from
the start.
11. Chief Inspector
"Gold has gone to GT (Metropolitan Police central control room at Scotland Yard) to
resolve who is in charge of the operation. GT should be shadowing the event so in the
circumstances of serious disorder they could assume command and control function
from the local communications. "
After outlining the purpose of the Eid festival the briefing officer gave the
historical data from previous Eid celebrations. He ended this section of the briefing
with the latest information update, which predicted that several hundred youths were
coming to London from Bradford, Leeds and other parts ofNorthern England to
'fight' with each other.
The second part of the briefing focused on the anecdotal use of incidents to
illustrate the power of community figures within the Sikh and Muslim communities to
deal with the misbehaviour of the young. The sources of information, available to the
police, both overt and covert, were outlined before drawing attention to selected
targets, or in police argot 'faces', in both the Sikh and Muslim communities, as the
photographs of these identified targets were being passed around, the information
about the 'Chalvey Boys' (Muslim youth from Slough) was given.
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The 'Chalvey Boys' history was seen by the police to be 'generically
problematic' with evidence supporting this derived from two sources. The first had to
do with covert data sources, which provided information as to the 'Chalvey Boys'
previous behaviour and projected involvement in the days events. Second, in anecdotal
evidence supplied by the briefing officer that a unit of Thames Valley police had been
subjected to physical search by this group. An air of silence descended in the room
with unanimous agreement "that this would not happen in the Met. "
The briefing continued with a reminder from the briefing officer of the need to
act sensitively in dealing with people stopped under Section 60 Public Order and
Criminal Justice Act 1994. This legislation empowers the police to specify a
geographical area in which people can be stopped and searched for weapons, without
the need to reach the criteria normally required for stopping and searching suspects
under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Authority had been given
by the local Superintendent who had specified the area in which the searches could
take place and prescribing a time limit for the authority.
The use of the above legislation was to provide one of the main sources of
input into the 'fast time' intelligence cell located at Southall police station and staffed
by local officers. In an ideal world, this was conceived to work in the following way,
once a person had been stopped and searched for weapons, the officers having checked
the person's details would complete a record of the search. This would be taken by the
officers to Southall police station and given to intelligence cell staff to be fed into the
intelligence system. The benefits perceived to accrue from such an arrangement would
be that the officers grading the information provided on the record of the stops, would
be able to compile intelligence updates, which could be circulated quickly for both the
benefit of local senior and junior officers.
At this stage of the briefing, the briefing officer pointed out the potential
problems ofusing Section 60 in stopping practising Sikhs. Their religious beliefs
require them to carry five items including a 'Kirpan' or large dagger. In the past
tensions between officers and Sikhs had arisen when they had been arrested for
carrying offensive weapons. The need to deal sensitively with this issue was reiterated
by the briefing officer to avoid possible confrontations between officers on the streets
and young Sikhs carrying Kirpans of varying size and length.
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At the end of the briefing I was invited to go to the canteen to await the arrival
of the silver commander (in this case a Superintendent), who would update me as to
the conflict between the officer performing the role of gold (the local Chief
Superintendent), and the central Met control room (GT).
At about 4.10pm, whilst waiting for this officer to arrive, a large number of
officers attached to various Police Support Units (PSU's) entered the canteen. These
were mainly of Constable and Sergeant rank, many ofwhom expressed a general
concern about the police tactics of stopping young Sikhs and Muslims. In fact, these
junior officers believed, that having been alerted to this police tactic, many of these
young Sikh and Muslim men would avoid the chance of detection and arrest for
offences of carrying weapons, by encouraging their girlfriends to carry these weapons
for them.
12. Constable
"The numbers ofofficers here today and the use of intelligence means that a lot of
young Sikhs andMuslims will be stopped. They know the police will be out in force so
others, for example, girlfriends, will carry weapons. If they do fight it will be
arranged by leaders of the groups awayfrom the area of the police operation. "
A short while later, the silver commander sent word to the canteen that he was
in a position to see me and I went to his office. Whilst there, he explained that the
difficulties that had arisen between the local Southall control room and the central
control room at New Scotland Yard (GT) had arisen because the central control
believed that it was their responsibility to control the event. To clarify the situation, the
local police commander, and gold for the event, had left the police area and had gone
to New Scotland Yard (GT).
The local senior officers believed that if the collation of intelligence in relation
to the event was controlled by the central control room, they would not be able to
respond quickly to any information generated as a result of using the 'fast time'
intelligence system. This system relied on the local officers collating the results of the
record of people stopped in the area using the powers sanctioned by Section 60 Public
Order and Criminal Justice Act 1994.
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13. Superintendent
"Gold has gone to GT, as they have had a difference of opinion as to who is
controlling the event. Our position is that we have to respond quickly to fast time'
information, which is graded for intelligence content and acted upon by control in
deploying officers to deal with potential troublemakers. Undoubtedly, if we needed
increased resources and the event became protracted, GT would have to step in and
take control. We were hoping to have GT shadowing the event so that this could be
achieved. Technically, the sophistication of GT would be let down due to the time
delay (several minutes), in responding to fast time information and preventing
disorder escalating. In utilising a local system we can discriminate and target
individuals and groups of individuals and apply selectively the powers under Section
60."
Following this discussion I was introduced to the officer in charge of the
mobile reserve public order trained officers (PSU's) who was a Chief Inspector with 28
years service. He began to discuss how junior public order officers, Constables and
Sergeants had been complaining of the 'stress' felt by young officers, and how the
group rules within these Police Support Unit groups might effect these officers.
14. Chief Inspector
"Previous research on stress, imposed bypublic order policing situations, has tended
to focus on Bronze and Silver levels and monitored heart rates. The stress ofyoung
officers who are actuallypolicing the event is high or so they tell me. There is a need
to look at individual officer responses as opposed to group rides ofPSU units and
how this effects junior officers. "
During the remainder of the day I took the opportunity to look at the set up,
for the 'Intelligence Cell' in gathering information about identified targets from covert
sources. In this sense, the word covert covers all police information gathering facilities,
that were not in the form of uniform officers stopping young Sikhs and Muslims to
search them for weapons. This part of the observation involved being given access to
information that was extremely confidential and of possible risk to the source of the
information. For these reasons this part of the day will not be explicated in detail.
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However, it did provide an opportunity to look at how the intelligence gathering
facility was managed, and to decide how to conduct a participant observation study, to
look broadly at how information is gathered and categorised before being passed on to
different groups within the police. This observation will be outlined below after
outlining the summary of findings for the first day of the Eid festival.
6.3.3. Implications of Pilot 1 findings
Methodological issues
The data from this first day ofEid, highlights the difficulties of following a
senior officer who at times was too busy to speak to me and passed me on to other
officers to fill in these busy periods. From a practical perspective whilst this officer was
part of the gold, silver and bronze command structure, he was not on the ground and
was therefore a long way from where the decisions were being made, and in a sense
was out of touch with what was happening, as a result he was not in a position to
discuss and explicate in detail the decisions that were being taken throughout the day.
Theoretical issues
The data from this pilot study provides evidence that in the same way that
crowds cannot be treated as a homogeneous group, the police are far from the
homogeneous group I believed. More specifically, there is intergroup tension between
different ranks, junior and senior officers, between the same ranks in different
locations, and between local officers at both junior and senior and central officers at
both junior and senior levels.
The data also confirms the police fear of disorder and loss of control in crowd
events. Even when crowds are peaceful officers perceive them as always having the
potential for violence and this fear of violence is uppermost in their minds as they
decide on tactics.
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6.4. Pilot 2: Eid al Fitr, Sunday 9th February 1997
6.4.1.Rationale for Research strategy
The rationale for the second day ofEid built upon the lessons learnt from the
first day. While these previous days findings were interesting, they did not tell us much
about the decision making process on the ground, as the officer was distanced from the
decisions made on the ground. It was therefore impossible to follow through these
decisions and the rationale for them. The second day therefore concentrated in the
main, on the process on intelligence gathering to see how police information was
gathered and disseminated for action by officers on the ground. Practically, this
involved spending a period of time talking to the officers involved in gathering
information and looking at how intelligence was passed on to the senior officers on the
ground.
6.4.2. The Events
It will be recalled that the first day of the observation ofEid had ended looking
at the intelligence gathering facility at Southall police station. During this observation it
became clear that intergroup tension was present between the various different groups
within the police gathering information. In addition the weighting given to the
information sources (Special Branch, Public Order Intelligence unit and Local Officers)
appeared to differ between officers of different ranks.
To be more specific, on the one hand some senior officers give little or no
weight to the information provided by Special Branch. On the other hand, some
restrict the weight given to their information, to the pre event planning stage of an
event.
This distinction is further complicated by some senior officers doubting,
whether other senior officers are able to interpret what Special Branch say, in the
assessment of the level of threat of violence, also by the fact that junior officers
involved in gathering information about events question the process by which Special
Branch gathers information as well as the accuracy of their forecasts.
In order to explicate the intergroup differences within these information
gathering police groups, the research focus for the second day of the Eid Festival
concentrated on the process of intelligence gathering, assessment and dissemination.
More specifically, I looked at how the 'fast time' system at Southall police station
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dealt with the completed search records of the patrolling officers, and how this system
incorporated other methods of intelligence gathering from both overt and covert
sources. The intergroup tensions arising from the control ofPublic Order Intelligence
can be illustrated through the relative positions of local officers and Special Branch.
Senior officers at the gold level of command appear to show intraindividual
variation in the stress they place on Special Branch intelligence prior to an event. They
are sceptical of reports which seem to be written in a style which is probabilistic, and
which may be at variance with a senior officers desire to be able to have information of
a more concrete nature. Whilst they themselves may wish to manage the information
they give to others, due to accountability concerns (see chapter 4), they deny that it is
legitimate for others to do likewise.
15. Commander
"I mean, it's a musicaljoke, they never tellyou anythingyou didn 't know before and
it's a bit like a surveyors report, it covers everything but commits them to nothing.
That's not necessarily true, I have seen some, which are really very good they are
spot on. By and large, though, I think perhaps they could be a bit more accurate or
precise, if that's the right word. I woidd prefer it if they were a bit more precise
because I don't think anybody's going to get into the game of blame, you know, but if
they got it badly wrong, and its based on the information they had available, and its
all been assessedproperly, that's what has come out of the ink, nobody can actually
blame them, all they are doing is giving you the information they had available.
Therefore perhaps what I need to say is that they need to be bit more precise that
relies on, I suppose years ofpractice. "
The intergroup conflict within the police between Special Branch officers and
other units dedicated to providing intelligence for public order events had resulted in a
'turfwar' between certain sections of the police. This tension had arisen because, from
Special Branch perspective, they are the only group within the police who are
specifically mandated by law to gather intelligence on public order. Perhaps more
importantly - and a further source of intergroup conflict between them and officers
collating public order intelligence outside of Special Branch - was the exemption
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enjoyed by Special Branch officers from complying with the restrictions imposed by
the Data Protection Act, 1984.
16. Commander
"I think if they can just work out where their destiny lies then I think that's getting
fairly close now. The debate is going on at the minute, as you probably know, there is
a sort of little local difficulty between Special Branch and the Public Order
Intelligence unit. They have got this issue, about them calling themselves an
intelligence unit, when nobody else is allowed to do intelligence about public order
apartfrom SpecialBranch. This sort of turfwar. "
The negative view of Special Branch information is echoed by more junior
officers, who question the process by which Special Branch arrive at the assessment of
disorder, and having arrived at a figure how accurate it is.
17. Sergeant
"I must admit Special Branch threat assessments are a bit of a mystery, in that I'm
unsure of how they actually get their actual assessments, for instance at the recent
Dockers march (1997), I can't remember the figure but they gave something like 250
people that were likely to cause disorder. Where does this figure actually come from,
I think they need to be more open on where these figures actually come from, do they
go round and ask 250 people that they know or have they got some sort offormula.
The other thing is the actual information they give, it's not graded, it's not evaluated
so there's no way of actually knowing how accurate it is. The other thing with it is
that they woidd say they got all of their information from sources, yet I've seen some
threat assessments which have actually been written on the information that I've
given them. Why not say, yes, this has come from a police source or where has this
information come from, how accurate is it? That's my main gripe about the actual
threat assessment, you have no way ofknowing how accurate it is. "
However, not all senior officers blame Special Branch (SB) for the tensions
with public order officers. They accept that SB is acting under special constraints
which affect what information they can give and how it is given. It is the failure of
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middle management in the public order division, to appreciate such factors which leads
them to denigrate SB and downgrade the information provided by them.
18. Commander
"I have a real problem with the overlap between Public Order Intelligence and
Special Branch, as do Special Branch. Special Branch have a quite specific role, its
defined effectively by statute. I can see circumstances where it would not be in the
interests ofSpecial Branch, it would not be in the interests of the organisation for us
necessarily to have information disclosed to us that they are privy to, because that
might possibly prejudice informants, it might not be in the broader interest of the
bigger picture, as it were. A lot of Public Order, a lot ofpeople involved in Public
Order at middle rank (Superintendents) don't always understand this, they clearlyfeel
that any information must be put through to them. However, the Special Branch role
is perhaps not as important as the Public Order intelligence role, the Forward
Intelligence Team (FIT) team role, for real time activity. I can imagine, obviously I
know, that a Special Branch assessment is useful in the broader planning ofan event,
but for 'real time' activity I would put my faith in the FIT (Forward Intelligence
Teams)."
This officer also had a problem with the Special Branch assessments of the
threat of disorder during an event, which is in some ways exacerbated by the writing of
these documents in a code that is not necessarily understood by senior officers in
charge of events. Again priority is given to these assessment, prior to the event, but for
the actual day greater reliance is given to the flow of intelligence on the day.
19. Commander
"I understand that the way that they construct their threat assessments, some of it is
effectively in code, they are saying things by the use of certain phrases and I
understand them. Give them their due, they are largely accurate, there are not too
many occasions when they have been very, very wrong in my experience. One or two,
but not very many. I take due note ofwhat we are advised to give them. But overall, it
is probably better after you have taken that, to rely on the flow of intelligence on the
day because things change so quickly. "
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The perspective of Special Branch officers is rather different, they perceive
themselves to have been on the receiving end of 'positive dis- information' and to
have been heavily criticised in the aftermath of the 'Poll Tax' riots in the 1990's. The
position of Special Branch was that they believed that they were accurate in the
predictions that they had made regarding these incidents, and the resulting inter group
conflict between Special Branch and sections of senior public order police officers, was
due to the perceived unfairness of these senior officers in holding the Branch
accountable for not providing accurate intelligence.
20. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"Yes, there certainly is and I think that would seem quite strongly, not only rumour
but I thinkpositive dis-information after the Poll Tax riots, where Special Branch was
heavily criticised, and is still being criticised on training courses for not getting it
right. Having been privy to seeing the assessment and knowing what was in it, Special
Branch got it exactly right, we told them where the disorder would break out, we told
them that Downing Street would be a target, we told them the numbers ofpeople that
were likely to come seeking disorder, but it's being used as a, well we can always
blame lack of intelligence rather than a lack ofdoing anything with it. "
The lessons learnt from the 'Poll Tax' riots had resulted in Special Branch
providing even more information to senior public order officers, with the claim that
senior public order officers are often unsure about what to do with all the intelligence.
This increased output from Special Branch is seen as ensuring that accountability for
the outcomes of events is placed back with the senior officers in charge of dealing with
them.
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21. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"From my experience, I'm starting to get cries the other way ofwhat am I supposed
to do with all this information? It'sputting the onus back on people to brief their own
officers, they can 7 hide behind the screen of, well, I've not been told anything. The
vast majority of cases are now fully briefed, particularly through the area liaison
system that Special Branch runs and if its not getting down to the officers who are
policing the demonstration, it's not because it isn 7 there. I think there is a way to go
yet, to get that built in as a natural extension of the way things are done, but it is
greatly improvedfrom what it used to be. "
For Special Branch the requirements of the threat assessment compiled by them
for senior public order commanders has to address three fundamental questions. Who
are the people turning up, how many and what is the likelihood of violence?
22. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"I think the public order commanders requirements are, who are these people? How
many of them are going to turn up and are they going to give me any problems? Once
those have been answered, anything else is icing on the cake or even might be seen as
unnecessary, from my perspective, I would like him to have as much information as
possible out ofwhich he can cull what he needs, rather than boil it down to the bare
bones of just answering those three questions. I think with those three questions
answered, he is then in a position to be estimating the numbers of officers he will
need and start to formulate how he will deal with the demonstration or public order
event."
Special Branch (SB) officers are unequivocally negative about attempts by
public order officers to gather their own intelligence - the so called 'Public Order
Intelligence System'. In fact, SB officers point out that it may lead to confusion and
they question the efficiency of using two systems.
Chapter 6. Pilot studies, Eid and Vaisakhi. 167
23. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"There has been a Public Order Intelligence System in existence for many, many
years and its been run by Special Branch. Over and above that, there is another
system that has been imposed, which is now called the Public Order Intelligence
System. I am not convinced that this second system is desirable or necessary and can
lead to confusion."
The confusion arising from the two sources is seen to arise for police officers
attached to local police stations throughout London, who collect information on public
order and who are then in a quandary over what to do with it. According to Special
Branch, this information should be sent to them, as they are the only group within the
police specifically mandated in law to collect information on public order. The ability
to classify individuals in terms of political allegiances, is helped by the Branch
exemption of complying with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1984, and for
which the rest of the police must comply. The resulting intergroup confusion about
what the respective roles were was acknowledged to require resolution.
24. Detective Chief Inspector (Special Branch)
"At the moment, there is definitely confusion out at (Operational Command Units -
OCU's), or local police stations, they are unclear as to where Public Order
information is sent. In the past, it has always been to Special Branch and it should
continue to come to Special Branch, we are the body, the only body that produces an
assessment ofa demonstration, that is our role. The Public Order Intelligence System,
or (CO. 11), does not produce assessments and because of restrictions under the Data
Protection Act from which they are not exempt, they are not allowed to classify
people according to their groups or their politics, therefore any information can only
be partial. There needs to be some clarity or clarification between Special Branch
(SB) and CO. 11 as to the exact roles, and at the moment I don't think either side are
entirely sure as to what the other is doing. "
As I followed officers in the 'Intelligence Cell' it became apparent that a third
tier of intelligence gathering had to be added to those of Special Branch and of the
public order division. Officers at the local level were running the 'Intelligence Cell' at
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Southall police station, utilising covert and overt means of recording information.
These officers were relying on the majority of their intelligence coming from the
officers policing the event, stopping people in the area and recording their details,
which would then be fed into the 'fast time' intelligence system which was also
operating on the first day. Due to the sensitive nature of this material it will not be
used to illustrate specific points, but rather to confirm that local officers see both
information sources based centrally in Scotland Yard (Special Branch and the Public
Order Intelligence Unit at CO. 11, the Public Order Branch) to be a 'black hole'. In
other words, local officers often supply information to both Special Branch and the
Public Order Intelligence Unit, and receive little or no feed back on their information.
25. Detective Sergeant
"The problem with both Special Branch and the Public Order Intelligence Unit is that
they both are trying to out do each other as regards the information they supply to the
senior officerspolicing these events. The system that was usedyesterday and also
today seeks to turn information around quickly so that the senior officers can be
updated throughout the event. "
Officers in this unit identified with the problems caused to local senior officers
by what was perceived to be unwarranted interference by central senior officers in the
policing of a largely local event. This was mirrored by their own frustrations in having
to supply information updates to officers based in New Scotland Yard, which would
then be passed back to senior officers at Southall police station. The time delay in
question was perceived to be a problem by these officers, who were able to provide the
same information more quickly and in response to the information coming in from the
streets being patrolled by the police support units.
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6.4.3. Implications of Pilot 2 findings
Methodological issues
In opting to follow the information and intelligence gathering process a number
of issues arose. Firstly, the sensitive nature of the information put a number of areas
out ofbounds. I was simply denied access to much of the key decision making. This
led to a second problem, namely that officers were unable to articulate the reasons for
these decisions, due to concerns they had about the sensitivity of some of the
information in their possession. Third, and lastly, these decisions were again being
made at the police station and were removed from the decision making of the senior
officers in control on the ground.
Theoretical issues
The evidence from the second day ofEid shows that there are big intergroup
rivalries between those groups involved in the gathering of information about public
order events. Many senior officers are sceptical and even hostile to Special Branch
(SB). They see the information they provide as generally unhelpful and often wrong.
Junior officers question both the process by which SB assessments are made and the
accuracy of the forecast. By contrast, Special Branch perceive this allocation of blame
to be a deliberate ploy, to shift the blame from the public order commanders to them.
This would seem to suggest that accountability issues are important in framing
intergroup relations between Special Branch and other groups within the police.
To be more specific, in order not to be held accountable, for being seen to get
things wrong by both senior and junior officers, it would appear that Special Branch
accounts of the crowd inevitably play up danger. They have less to lose by suggesting
trouble will happen when it doesn't (they can then claim that their briefings allowed
officers to act in ways that reduced the problem) than by suggesting that trouble won't
happen when it does. Then the unpreparedness of public order officers can be laid
fairly and squarely at their door!
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6.5. Pilot 3: Vaisakhi, Sunday 6th April 1997
6.5.1. Rationale for Research strategy
The two previous observations ofEid had highlighted the problems of decision
making occurring away from the people observed, and a lack of explanation about
decisions made, either because these reasons were never articulated in the first place,
or because they were, but I could not access them for security reasons. The research
strategy for the third observation attempted to address these problems by selecting the
gold commander for this particular event, so that the 'top down' level of decision
making could be explicated.
6.5.2. The Events
It will be recalled that the festival of Vaisakhi marks the birth of the Sikh nation
and the formation of the Khalsa (name given to baptised Sikhs). The celebrations
organised by the Southall Sikh community, involve processing from the Sikh temple in
Havelock Road by a circular route around the town centre before returning to the
Temple or Gudwara. Prior to the 1997 celebrations, attacks had been made on these
Temples and the police were keen to avoid any possibility of violence reoccurring.
The procession had in the past been well supported by local Sikhs with an
estimated 10,000 people expected for this year (1997). Due to the slow nature of the
procession, and the fact that the route measures approximately 4.5 miles long, the
event can take in the region of 4-6 hours to complete depending on the route selected.
In the past a small number (estimated for this year at 500) of young Sikhs had
used the procession to demonstrate 'a show of strength' against the Muslim
community. The concern of the police centred on the potential for serious disorder
between the Sikh and Muslim youths. In the period 1995 to 1997 police had made over
four hundred arrests. (Metropolitan Police, 1997). The celebration for this particular
year (1997) was split between two Sundays 6th and 13th April 1997. These will be
discussed in turn.
Data collected on the first Sunday focused on the role of the gold commander.
However, the ability to collect data in situ during this Sunday was seriously impeded as
the officer nominated as gold was also gold for the Coca-Cola Cup Final. On the
Sunday a perceived terrorist threat to Wembley stadium preoccupied the gold
commander. As participant observation is a supremely opportunistic data gathering
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technique, I was able to switch from the gold commander and gain an overview of the
management of the 'intelligence' by following the 'Intelligence Co-ordinator', in this
case a Special Branch officer. Due to the sensitivity of the actual information it will not
be possible to explicate this process in great detail, but it did provide an interesting
perspective on the intelligence filtering process. Specifically, I gained insights into
what intelligence came in, how it was assessed, what was passed on and how longer
messages were 'condensed' into shortened versions of the original information
received. This filtered version was then made available to assist silver in 'fast time' or
immediate decision making on the ground.
6.5.3. Implications of Pilot 3 findings
Methodological issues
The perceived terrorist threat to the Coca Cola Cup Final illustrates the point
that in conducting research of this nature in these environments, it is difficult to
maintain control of the research process, or even maintain contact with the person
being observed. This is perhaps a cautionary tale for anyone attempting to conduct
research in this area in the future, as without that necessary control and access to the
person to be observed, the phenomena cannot be studied.
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6.6. Pilot 4: Vaisakhi, Sunday 13th April 1997
6.6.1. Rationale for Research strategy
Building on the lessons learnt from the first Vaisakhi Sunday, a decision was
made to change the methodological focus for the second event. I elected to follow one
person, in this case the mobile reserve bronze, responsible for the tactical deployment
of Territorial Support Groups (TSG's). Additionally, information was also recorded
from the silver command post, which contained the 'fast' time intelligence cell. The
object of this recording was to specifically concentrate upon processes of intelligence
assessment and analysis and how this fed into and influenced the selection of tactical
deployments by bronze and silver.
6.6.2. The Events
In this final pilot study I was able to observe the unfolding events on the
ground in somewhat more detail. Accordingly, it is possible to give more detailed
descriptions, which I have divided into a series of significant moments and incidents:
(a) At about 1 lam the Sikh march in Slough containing about 3,000 people moved off.
Information received from Thames Valley Police identified individuals from
Southall and other areas.
(b) At about 12 noon information was received that the 'Chalvey Boys' had stored up
bottles of paint to attack any Sikh vehicles who were unfortunate enough to
possibly stray onto the Chalvey estate. Reports were also made of anti Sikh graffiti
being prominent on this estate. The march at this point was estimated as being in
the region of 3000 strong.
(c) At about 1.40pm a white van carrying 12 Sikh males was stopped on Southall
Broadway by police on the way to the Slough procession.
(d) Shortly later at 2pm several of the 'Chalvey Boys' were seen observing the march in
general and in particular a group of about 150 Sikh youths identified by the police
as 'troublemakers from Birmingham.' Reports were also made of a Sikh car
"cruising the Chalvey estate. "
(e) At about 2.20pm the march in Slough concluded with many of the Sikhs making
their way back to the Gudwara or Temple from which it had started.
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(f) Around 3pm the police reported a large number of cars carrying Sikhs, in excess of
thirty, which were gathering on Southall Broadway, with an open top video car
recording the scene.
(g) At about 3.45pm approximately 20 cars were seen in the vicinity of the Broadway
carrying a large number of Sikh youths. The first car in this group of vehicles was
playing loud music from a sound system in the car.
(h) Around 4pm a 'target' known to Southall police was seen in a local Temple and
information was received that a number of 'violent' or in police argot 'Heavy Sikhs'
were making their way down to the Broadway.
(i) At about 4.40pm a crowd of Sikhs estimated in the region of'200 hundred strong'
were believed to be heading to the Jet service station on the Broadway. This
incident will be explored in fuller detail with extracts taken from the field notes
made at the time and subsequently transcribed. Immediately prior to this crowd
being spotted, a build up of tension was discernible. There were reports of
convoys (vehicle and foot) and of 'masked' (wearing handkerchiefs over the lower
parts of the face) members of the crowd.
26. Extract from field notes
The periodfrom 4pm saw a build up of 'tension' when there were reports of 'convoys'
(vehicle andfoot) drumming (using drums in the street) and the use ofmasks (in the
form ofhandkerchiefs) by crowd members. A march developed, described at one point
by the police as 'organised' and 'political' (pro-Kurdistan). Police identified crowd
members with 'loud hailers' asproviding leadership to the group ofabout '200'
strong andwith 20% 'masked up' (wearing handkerchiefs). This march travelled
north up South Road and then turned West along Southall Broadway. This route was
not immediately clear to the officer in charge of the Territorial Support Group (TSG)
units, nor to the silver commandpost located in Southallpolice station.
This march was felt by the police to be problematic and the silver commander
decided that it should be stopped by police before it went further along the Broadway.
Due to the heavy nature of the traffic, the police vehicle took about ten minutes to
reach the scene, when we did, I noticed a large number of public order trained officers
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and their vehicles had arrived at the scene of the march, with many of these police vans
displaying blue lights and blocking the road.
27. Extract from field notes
Silver directed that this march be stopped, utilising the Territorial Support Group
(TSG) units. Due to the extremely heavy nature of the traffic flow, it took perhaps ten
minutes for the bronze commander to arrive. Upon our arrival at the scene, there
appeared to be a large number of TSG units partially blocking the Broadway, with
many other units arriving using 'blue' lights.
This march was eventually turned back on itselfwith police using several units
of TSG to do this. I noted that there were several features to this incident. First, the
estimate of the numbers ofmarchers remained remarkably consistent at about 200.
Second, despite intelligence from both Special Branch and the 'Intelligence Cell' at
Southall police station, the police decided that all 200 posed a threat and were treated
in an undifferentiated way. Third, after the incident, junior officers at both the silver
command post and the 'Intelligence Cell', commented that Southall was no busier than
any other Sunday. Fourth, whilst the incident was being dealt with, there was a period
of several minutes when the silver commander could not be contacted by radio. This
resulted in a considerable heightening of tension with the bronze commander urging
the driver of the police landrover to get to the scene quickly. Lastly, in the heat of the
action, officers made decisions without having time either to discuss them beforehand
or to articulate their reasons afterwards. All these factors are clearly identifiable from
my contemporaneous field notes.
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28. Extract from field notes
The march was eventually turned back on itself using several units of TSG. There
were several interestingfeatures of this 'incident'
•The estimates of numbers, which were askedfor on numerous occasions, by
the central command complex (GT), the silver and bronze commanders remained
remarkably consistent at 'about 200'
•The 'crowd' appeared to be defined as 'problematic' or dangerous by the
silver commander despite 'intelligence' both from the fast' time intelligence
gathering operation and the intelligence co-ordinator (a Special Branch officer
located at the 'yard'). The result of this homogeneous perceptual categorisation fed
into a generic police action taken against all the 200 strong. Tangibly this was seen in
the decision by police to halt this group in Southall Broadway before turning them
around and escorting the 'crowd' back the way they had come.
•Staff in the silver command post and the fast' time intelligence at Southall
police station commented to me (after it was resolved) that the Broadway was no
busier than on any normal Sunday.
•There was a briefperiod of between 3-4 minutes at the height of this incident
when silver was being called repeatedly on the command channel and did not respond
to either GT or the silver command post. This caused a considerable heightening in
'tension' which was manifested by the bronze commander urging the driver of the
police landrover to get to the scene quickly. The staff in the silver commandpost also
commented upon this tension.
•Silver command staff, when asked by the bronze TSG commander 'what the
problem was with the group of200? did contact units with the group for an answer. In
conversation later they did say they had speculated that there would be 'big trouble'
if this group had got to the Jet Service Station located further West in Southall
Broadway.
•There was talk by bronze and the silver command post about whether the
mounted officers shoidd be deployed as they were close by and could be 'well used'.
When silver could not be contacted (it required a 'cadre' Superintendents authority to
deploy mounted officers - an officer who has been specially trained to authorise their
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use) consideration was given as to whether gold should be contacted (he was still at
Scotland Yard, sorting out the difficulty in relation to the control of the event).
•The use of language was important at several junctures. Specifically,
requests by the command team to 'turn them over', and when at one point a TSG unit
was directed to go to 'give another TSG unit assistance' alarm bells were ringing all
over.
(j) After this march was turned back, the period from 5.50pm saw an increase in
police activity. At about this time the police in Thames Valley cordoned off the
Chalvey estate and invoked a Section 60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act order
around it. Police information at this time suggested that "100 plus Chalvey boys were
looking for trouble." Reports were made of minor incidents of fighting between
groups of Sikhs and Muslims, but no large-scale disturbances took place. The
observation concluded at about 10pm.
6.6.3. Implications of Pilot 4 findings
Methodological issues
The research strategy of following the mobile reserve bronze, whilst providing
the opportunity to collect systematic data from one source, highlighted the problems of
using this technique in the field. At moments of crisis this officer was far too busy to
articulate the reasons for the decisions he was taking. The study highlights the
difficulties of ethnographic studies in general, and in particular how can you access and
collect practically, what police are saying by way of explanation about their decisions.
Theoretical issues
The data from Vaisakhi provides further confirmation that under conditions
where conflict is seen as imminent, police perceive and treat crowds as homogeneous
and they ignore information from Special Branch and their own 'Information Cells',
that might suggest that not all those present are likely to be involved in conflict. It
would appear that the police do not need to experience actual physical threat or actual
conflict to act in this way. The assumption of danger seems sufficient to produce
homogenising approaches.
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Discussion
The pilot participant observational studies have both theoretical and
methodological implications. Theoretically, the various substantive findings may be
summarised as follows. First, the police have perceptions of the crowd as dangerous.
Second, they appear to have homogenising tendencies towards the crowd, even when
their own information sources are at variance with such a position. Third, far from
being the homogeneous group that I thought, they were there are clear tensions within
the police between different groups. The impact of these tensions may well be, that
accountability concerns may make Special Branch officers more pessimistic about their
assessment of the likelihood of violence during public order events, to avoid them
being held account by other groups within the police for getting things 'wrong'.
From a methodological perspective the following problems can be summarised
from the pilot studies. First, the ability to keep with senior public order officers when
they are out on the ground dealing with events as they unfold. Second, the ability to
see the key decisions made, which was difficult when the officer being observed is
distant from the action, and cannot follow what is going on, and then don't articulate
the reasons for the decisions taken. Thirdly, chance factors, and the need for the
researcher to have a bit of luck i.e. the bomb alert at Wembley and the subsequent
exclusion of the researcher from the person being studied.
Incorporating the methodological problems from these pilot participant
observational studies together I can draw up an ideal specification for conducting such
research during a public order event. Ideally, this would be with a senior officer in one
place, to be with officers in a group where they will discuss and articulate decisions
and rationales, to be in a place where one can see all the action and hence key
decisions can be made and to follow intelligence and senior officers. While these may
seem contradictory (if one says in one place, not moving around on the ground, how
can one see all the action) there is one place in which they are reconciled: the
Metropolitan Police Control Room or GT.
The method of reconciliation involves officers being together in a large
communications room made up with communication pods. These pods have various
different functions; command and control, Intelligence, and access to a video wall
which displays police cameras from static and mobile positions including Heli Teli (the
police Helicopter).
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During major events in London, GT, is often where the gold commander will
sit, in order to provide a overview perspective of all aspects of the event. This is where
it was decided that the final participant observation study looking at a 'live' event of
significance would be covered from, following the gold commander for the 'Carnival
against Capitalism' (June, 1999). This event resulted in some of the worst scenes of
violence since the Poll Tax riots of the 1990's.
In choosing the control room I could follow in detail all the sources of
communication for this event, both audio and visual, and look in detail at how the gold
commander made decisions while seated in front of a large video screen receiving
CCTV images through the video wall. This officer was supported by a group of
officers assigned to provide monitoring facilities for the various audio and video
channels of communication used during the event. This participant observation study
had the obvious advantage in that as well as providing an overview to the event
decisions could be recorded as they were made and officers could be probed for the
reasons for an explanation as to why these decisions had been made. The results of this
final participant observation study are reported in chapter 7 overleaf.
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Chapter 7.
Riot in the City: The Psychology of police decision making in a crowd
event.
"Innocent people were hurt on Friday and millions of pounds worth of damage
was done after a day of mayhem...Why were the police not prepared to disperse
the rioters once they had assembled - with tear gas and water cannon if
necessary" (Sunday Times 20/06/99 p.20).
7.1. Introduction
It will be remembered from chapter 4, that accountability and phase emerged as
key issues in senior officer decision making, and that these issues were supported to
some extent in the experimental study in chapter 5. These studies suggested that the
impact of phase and accountability on decision making may have been more complex
than I originally assumed. In chapter 6, the pilot studies of Eid and Vaisakhi provided
evidence of these issues, but crucially, also highlighted tensions within the police.
Additionally, these 'real' studies threw up practical issues ofwhere, how and who to
talk to during events.
The aim of this final study was to conduct a major piece of participant
observation research looking at a 'live' event of significance, and the police view of
different phases within it when there was a likelihood of disorder. I therefore liased
with the Public Order Branch of the Metropolitan Police who identified, six months
before the event was due to occur, the 'Carnival against Capitalism' (lune 18th 1999)
as having the potential to be the most problematic event of the year for them.
This event was seen to be unique on many fronts. First, it involved two police
forces, the Metropolitan and City of London. Second, because of sovereign collective
responsibilities and accountabilities, it required that these two forces had separate
senior officer command structures at the gold, silver and bronze level. Third, separate
control rooms of the two forces supported this separate command structure. Fourth,
the separation of both command and control between the two forces, required them to
agree on the protocols for deployment of officers within each force area and what
tactics would be considered appropriate for each of them.
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The 'Carnival against Capitalism' required the police from both the
Metropolitan (Met) and City police to draw up plans for the policing arrangements
with no known organiser having been identified. The police simply had information
that an umbrella organisation known as Reclaim the Streets (RTS) expected that
between 10 -12,000 supporters from thirty-five different groups would attend the
carnival. These were thought to include such disparate groups as the Movement
against Monarchy (MAM), protesting for a Royal free zone, Critical Mass Cycling
(CMC) protesting against the use ofmotor vehicles in London, and a group protesting
about the militarisation of space. Despite the fact that these groups represented a wide
variety of interests and had different ideologies, the police believed that they would put
these differences aside for the day for the sake of the 'Carnival against Capitalism'.
Despite the fact that the police had no contact with any organisers, the event
had been widely advertised through a wide variety ofmedia including, posters on the
tube and bus systems ofLondon and more widely through the Internet. However, the
information supplied by these means was limited to advertising the date of the event
and proposing to would be participants that they meet at Liverpool Street Station, an
area covered by the City of London police.
Information available to the police included a 'sketchy' timetable of activities
which could include all or none of the following:
07.30 Cycle ride near Liverpool Street Station.
10.00 Demonstrations at Reed employment agency locations throughout
London.
10.30 Demonstration at Smithfield meat market by animal activists.
11.00 Anti Mc Donald's demonstration at Liverpool Street.
12.00 Human chain around treasury building in Whitehall.
It was believed that at about this time the main 'Carnival against Capitalism'
would start, possibly focused outside Liverpool Street Station for a
street party in the City of London, with the aim of causing maximum traffic
disruption. Tactics in previous 'parties' had included the use of flares
to signal the start, blocking the road with cars abandoned at strategic
locations, the use ofmobile sound systems, damage to traffic lights and
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bollaids and protesters occupying targeted offices.
13.30 Green Park tube station - demonstration by supporters of anti
militarisation of space.
18.00 A march by the Movement against Monarchy (MAM), from Trafalgar
Square to protest for a 'Royal Free Zone'outside Buckingham Palace.
19.00 Demonstration at Guildhall, where the Duke ofEdinburgh was speaking
at a dinner for the Rugby World Cup.
The event was seen by Special Branch (SB) to be unique, due to the many
organisations with targets/agendas, and with the overall aim to disrupt the City of
London by blocking roads, disrupting the tubes and causing minor acts of damage to
selected buildings within the City. However, the majority of protesters were expected
to be legitimate and good-natured.
The Police Strategic and Tactical response
Strategy: Gold Commander
The Metropolitan police (Met) strategic aims were set out by the gold
commander for the event as being to prevent disorder, stop crime, public safety,
protect the Royal Palaces and economic activity. The City police strategic aims were
broadly in agreement with the Met, but focusing on the need to protect institutional
buildings in their police area such as the Stock Exchange, Bank ofEngland and the
Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey). A source of possible tension, between the two
forces, was perceived to lie in the requirement for the police command structure to
include two separate gold, silver and bronze(s) due to differing sovereign
responsibilities and accountabilities. To be more explicit, for the Met, they were
accountable to the Public, Institutions and protecting the rights of demonstrators
within the area covered by them. In contrast, the City, because in effect they have no
Public, were responsible to the City institutions for the policing of the event, to ensure
that these were not damaged or disrupted during the protest.
Chapter 7. Riot in the City. 182
Tactics: Silver Commander
For the Met, the strategic aims for the event would be achieved by adopting the
tactics of isolating and containing the disorder if and when it occurred. These tactics
were based on previous encounters that officers in this force had with Reclaim the
Streets (RTS). By contrast, the City force intended to respond to disorder in their area
by disrupting and dispersing the protesters from the City limits. Prior to the event this
was perceived to pose a route of possible difference between the two forces, as the
Met were unwilling to have an uncontrolled dispersal from the City area into the Met
area.
Control of Police Support Units (PSU's or serials): Bronze Commanders
In light of previous protests and the information concerning the numbers likely
to attend, the Met police planning team decided to employ thirty-five level one and
two Police Support Unit (PSU's) serials to the event. For the City police their own
three PSU's were augmented by six PSU's provided by the Met prior to the start of
the day. It will be recalled (from chapter two) that a serial is made up of one Inspector,
three Sergeants and twenty-one Constables, and that the differentiation between the
level one and two serials can be seen in the amount of training received. To recap, the
level one serials known as the Territorial Support Groups (TSG's), and who are the
permanent mobile police response to riots in London, attend training in tactics set out
in the Public Order Manual, and discussed in chapter 2, on a monthly basis. In contrast
the level two Police Support Unit serials, are drawn from stations throughout London
and attend training on a six monthly basis (Metropolitan Police, 1999).
The need to provide a co-ordinated approach to the policing meant that the
two forces had to agree protocols for the deployment of Metropolitan police officers
within the limits of the City ofLondon (and vice versa), prior to the event. It had been
decided that Metropolitan officers following groups into the City, would do so if
deemed necessary, but would hand over to City senior officers as soon as possible, and
then leave the City limits. Conversely, as the Metropolitan police had in effect all the
public order resources, if the City senior officers were escorting groups to the limits of
the City, they would be met by senior officers from the Metropolitan police to ensure
an orderly dispersal from the City area.
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Research Strategy
Drawing on the lessons from previous studies, a longitudinal approach was
adopted and in consequence data was collected prior to the event (in the form of semi
structured interviews with the gold and silver commanders of the Metropolitan police)
during (participant observation of the Metropolitan police gold commander and
intelligence gathering facility in the Metropolitan police control room) and post event
(semi structured interviews with the gold and silver commanders of the Metropolitan
police). These will be discussed in turn.
The pre event interviews focused on the expectations and contingencies for the
event with the gold and silver Metropolitan police commanders (the interview schedule
is shown in full at appendix d). The broad general themes were, how does one identify
signs of safety and danger, and what are the key issues for assessing a positive
outcome to an event? What were the specific issues concerned with 'Stop the City'?
What are the various sources of information available for planning an event, and how
do people rate/rely on them? What are the structures of command and accountability
used during events? Lastly, what are the considerations in the use of different tactical
options?
The second element of the research design involved conducting a participant
observation study during the event. Whilst adopting an exploratory approach to the
research, it was designed also to act as a confirmatory study to see if the concern for
public order and accountability would be replicated in a 'live' situation.
Building on the lessons from the pilot studies of Eid and Vaisakhi (see chapter
6) an ethnographic (participant observation study) was designed to avoid the problems
encountered previously.
The criteria for the study were: being able to stay with the relevant senior
officer(s), to be in a position to observe these officers making the key decisions about
how to police events on the ground, and to be in a context where officers would
articulate the reasons for these decisions.
All three criteria were achieved by conducting the study in the control room
(GT) of Scotland Yard. Firstly, since officers stayed in the room throughout the event
there were no logistic problems in remaining with them. Secondly, since GT is supplied
with communication, including live video of events, through both fixed cameras
throughout London and also helicopter mounted cameras ('Heli tele'), officers are fully
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abreast of events and able to make relevant decisions. Thirdly, GT is arranged in 'pods'
- that is clusters of desks with communications technology. Officers sit in groups
within these pods and are able to discuss events, discuss their decisions and comment
on the events and their own reaction to them. In this context, especially during lulls in
the action, there is ample opportunity to record officers articulating the reasons for
their decisions. Two researchers covered the event, one in the 'Gold' commander pod,
which included all the senior officers, and one in the 'Intelligence' pod.
In contrast to the gold pod, the 'Intelligence Cell' pod was being run by more
junior officers, Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors. The rest of the control room was
made up of several other communication pods with officers assigned to dealing with
specific tasks i.e. the monitoring of the traffic cameras located around London and
liaison with other forces.
The data collection ran from 7.30 a.m. until after 9.30 p.m., and the main
incidents that occurred during this period are outlined in the account of the days events
outlined overleaf.
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7.2. An account of the event
7.2.1. Early events
(a) The day began at New Scotland Yard at 7.30 am in the Metropolitan police
(Met) control room (GT) following the Met gold commander assisted by his team. A
second researcher followed junior officers (Constables and Sergeants) supervised by
senior officers (Inspector and Chief Inspector) in the 'Intelligence Cell' set up for the
event. The events started with two abseiling protesters leaving the engine room at
Tower Bridge at about 8.10 am, and unfurling a banner which read 'Life before Profit'.
In this early period of the day a number of bank alarms were activated within the City
police force boundary, and attempts were made to gain entry to buildings. One of the
protesters managed to get into the Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey).
(b) At around 10.30 am, a sound system started up outside Westminster Abbey.
More protesters were successful in chaining themselves to buildings; with eleven
people able to attach themselves inside Lloyds Cheapside and with fifteen outside.
(c) At about 1 lam, in Bishopgate junction with Liverpool Street, 50 cyclists
surrounded a black hackney cab and then sat in the roadway with their bicycles.
Shortly after, a demonstration outside the Farringdon Mc Donald's started. Just before
midday, 200 'hard-core' protesters were identified by police going towards Liverpool
Street Station, including people affiliated to 'London Animal Action'. In police eyes,
these were 'hard-liners' capable of causing trouble.
(d) After midday, the numbers of people in and around Liverpool Street Station
increased considerably, from several hundred to several thousand. Police identified
those who were seen to be in possession of red, green and gold masks as 'hard core'
individuals. At about the same time as these masks were donned by these crowd
members, the crowd of several thousand outside Liverpool Street Station, split into
three large groups. The police assumed that these groups would converge on one of a
series of possible targets such as the Liffe (London International Foreign Futures
Exchange) building, the Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey), the Bank ofEngland and
other major financial institutions housed in various different buildings within the City
police area.
(e) At about half past one a sound system began at Warbruck Street junction
with Cannon Street. This was followed shortly afterwards in Upper Thames Street
with a vehicle being left locked and abandoned in the road.
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7.2.2. Conflict starts
(f) Just before two-o clock at London Wall, bottles and cans were thrown at
police which resulted in a Police Support Unit (PSU) being forced backward. At this
stage the police units were surrounded and trapped and demonstrators were seen to
climb on the police vehicles and throw paint on the windscreens. Reports were also
made ofCity Traders dropping bottles and photocopied £10 and £50 notes on the
crowd in Cannon Street.
(g) A few minutes later, five City police vans were surrounded in London Wall.
People began opening the back of the vans and hanging and swinging on the doors.
Several people got into the vehicles and began to throw out police kit bags and riot
shields. People in the crowd were then seen to be carrying City police riot shields,
these are distinguishable from the Metropolitan police clear Perspex riot shields, as
they are black in colour.
(h) A few minutes later, as the police vehicles began to leave, a protester was
seen to fall and be trapped under one of them. Reports were also made of people
entering buildings through air conditioning units and by smashing windows. At this
juncture there were two events discernible. First, the conflict at London Wall junction
with Moorgate. Second, a relatively quiet crowd, at Mansion house junction with
Cannon Street.
(i) As the conflict began to escalate at London Wall, more Police Support Units
and police horses were sent to the City senior officers, in addition, a number of police
units were sent to the person trapped under the police van.
7.2.3. Conflict escalates
(j) Sometime around two o clock, a crowd was seen to be gathering around
the London International Foreign Futures Exchange (Liffe) building, Dowgate Hill
junction with Cannon Street. This building deals with foreign investment banking
services, and was seen to be a possible target, prior to the event. Officers from a
Metropolitan police riot serial (wearing riot protection equipment and carrying clear
Perspex riot shields) came under attack from a crowd estimated by police at the time
as 'a few hundred strong'. Following short shield tactics (riot police running towards
the crowd), one of these Met riot officers became isolated and was surrounded by
several people, before being pushed backwards and falling to the floor. Several
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demonstrators surrounded the fallen officer, who was rescued by a couple of
colleagues who pushed their riot shields at these demonstrators. All the officers then
retreated a safe distance from the crowd. As the violence intensified, police cordons
were put in west of upper Thames Street junction with Dowgate Hill, with police units
in riot gear pushing west towards the crowd at up to about twenty yards at a time.
(k) At about the same time reports were made of staff being blocked in the
Stock Exchange and the Liffe buildings. Workers from both these buildings were seen
to be arguing with crowd members. Entry to the Liffe building was eventually forced
by some protesters and extensive damage to the inside fabric of the building and
computer systems reported. In an effort to force people from the vicinity of the Liffe
building, the police at this location were involved in conflict with sections of the
crowd, as they attempted to drive them from the Liffe building.
(1) Just before 5' o clock reports were received of injuries to crowd members in
Upper Thames Street and to two officers in College Street, who had sustained leg
injuries. In an adjacent side street wheely bins were launched at police lines. More
extensive damage to buildings was reported in Upper Thames Street when a Mercedes
dealership was attacked. At about this time further units of police horses were
deployed and reported attacks to themselves and their horses.
Dispersal from the city
(m) Just after five o' clock, the police began to organise a contained dispersal
from the City police area into the Met police area. This involved the police pushing
demonstrators across Southwark and Blackfriars bridges into cordons of police
vehicles, which then filtered the crowd onto the Embankment.
(n) At about half past six, a group of demonstrators estimated to be in the
region of 1,000 moved away from the vicinity of these bridges towards Ludgate Circus
and then on to Fleet Street. Reports were made of damage to shops and to McDonalds
in Charing Cross.
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Standoff - Trafalgar Square
(o) At about 8pm, the police had contained a crowd estimated as 'a few
thousand strong' in Trafalgar Square. There were reports of'agitators' seeking to
goad police into conflict, with minor acts of defiance in the form of blocking traffic
driving around the square. The vast majority of these remaining demonstrators had left
the area a few hours later.
The aftermath of the event
The media in the immediate aftermath of the riot, focused on the physical cost
in terms of injuries to members of the public and to police officers and the damage
caused to buildings in the City and the Metropolitan police areas. The extent of
damage was measured by one newspaper report as follows: "almost 40 people were
taken to hospital, including sixpolice officers, one ofwhom was struck on the head
with a scaffoldingpole. Many were treatedforfacial cuts andminor injuries. One
woman remained in hospital last night with serious leg injuries. The City ofLondon
Corporation said the rioters had caused about £2 million pounds worth ofdamage"
(Sunday Times, 20th June 1999, p.5).
Whilst the buildings were being removed of graffiti and the City returned to
normal, the media began to speculate on the causes of the violence. Blame was
allocated by certain quarters in the newspapers (Sunday Times) to the failure of the
City senior officers to support "the courage of the bobbies" (Sunday Times, 20th June
1999, p.20). The resulting furore as to who was exactly to blame, resulted in an
internal police inquiry being conducted into the causes of the perceived police
mishandling of the riot.
The report of this inquiry, whilst praising the bravery ofjunior officers, was less
complementary about the role of senior City officers, both in responding to the
protection ofjunior officers, and in failing to protect buildings within the City police
force area, including the damage caused to the Liflfe building (Evening Standard, 24th
June 1999). The differences between the Metropolitan and City police, and the failure
to co-ordinate their responses, were also highlighted by sections of the media (Evening
Standard, Sunday Times).
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7.3. Analytic issues
7.3.1. Data collection
The pre event interview with the Metropolitan police silver commander was
conducted in the week running up to the event at a police traffic garage in South
London. A short interview with the Met police gold commander was conducted in the
police control room (GT) on the day of the event. Both interviews were conducted in a
semi-structured format and focused upon officers expectancies about the likely
outcomes for the event (the interview schedule is shown in full in appendix d).
On the actual day of the event, Friday 18th June 1999, the participant
observation began in the Metropolitan police control room (GT) at about 7.30am, with
one researcher sitting in the gold communication pod, and the second researcher sitting
in the intelligence pod. To recap, whilst the purpose of the observation was to look in
detail at the 'in vivo' processes concerning the decisions at the strategic or gold level
as they took place, the opportunity to gather data from more junior officers in the
'Intelligence Cell' was also taken.
Practically, the observation of the Metropolitan police gold commander
involved sitting in the Metropolitan police control room (GT), and facing a video wall
which contained CCTV images from cameras around London, including pictures from
the police helicopter. The officer performing the role of gold has over thirty years
police service and has considerable experience in policing public order events in
London.
The other researcher sat in the intelligence cell pod in the control room
observing more junior officers (Constables and Sergeants) supervised by senior officers
(Inspector and Chief Inspector). These officers were taking information from a variety
of covert and overt sources about the event and supplying regular updates to the gold
commander and others in the control room.
The protocols for recording the field notes for the day were as follows. Small
hands free tape recorders were used to record data where practicable. This material
was later transcribed. Where this was not possible, due to officers not wishing to be
tape recorded, or for practical reasons such as the batteries having run out, or due to
the possible interference with the police control systems, this was augmented by
written field notes made in note books. These notes were either taken
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contemporaneously or, where that was not possible, as soon as practically possible
after the event.
The coding notes, either audio or written, whilst detailing as much as possible
where, how, what was said and what actual decisions were made, was generally
looking at the following four themes. First, how are crowds perceived in general
terms? Second, what are the general concerns of the officers regarding the policing of
the event? Third, how did concerns feed into specific decisions in the course of the
event? Fourth, and finally, did all officers share the same concerns and, if not, how did
differences affect relations between officers (the coding note schedule is shown in full
in appendix d)?
It was hoped to be able to conduct the post event interviews with the
Metropolitan gold and silver commanders at the conclusion of the day's observation.
Unfortunately, due to operational and time commitments for both officers it was not
possible to do this. Instead the post event interviews had to be conducted several
weeks after the event. These interviews were conducted in west and central London on
separate days. The interview format was the same for both officers, semi structured,
and discussed the day of June 18th 1999 as experienced by both officers and their
perceptions of the crucial moments within it (the interview schedule is shown in full at
appendix d).
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7.3.2. Data analysis: Grounded Theory
It will be remembered from the previous section, that the design of the study
incorporated a longitudinal design, and data was collected prior to (in the form of tape-
recorded semi structured interviews) during (ethnographic field notes in audio and
written format) and post event (semi structured tape-recorded interviews). The tape-
recorded interviews, written and audio field notes were then transcribed onto a word
processor. The completed transcription yielded forty-five pages of text (43,000
words). The data was analysed using grounded theory, as described in chapter 3 and as
used in chapter 4. Hence the analysis again follows the style advocated by both Miles
and Huberman (1994) and Strauss and Corbin (1998). To recap, this involves
examining the data in a 'fine grained' analysis in open coding, a more abstract coding of
themes representing these underlying codings, and a final stage in which the themes are
grouped together to provide a theoretical model of the data. The only difference
between the present analysis and that in chapter 4 is that, this time, the process was
facilitated through the use of specialist software called (NUD*IST - Non - numerical
Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and Theory building, version 4).
(NUD*IST - Non - numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and
Theory building software).
This software has been described as "a tool kit to assist and support
individuals andgroups who are engaged in qualitative research processes " (Gahan &
Hannibal, 1998, p.l), as such it is not meant to replace the coding skills of the
researcher but allows the process of grounded theory to be conducted with software
which is more user friendly than just using a simple word processing package (Gahan
& Hannibal, 1998).
In JNUD*1ST, following the initial transcription of the data onto the word
processor, a decision has to be made as to how fine an analysis is required. In this case
a sentence by sentence coding schedule was used, and therefore the data was exported
from the word processing package into the software in a format where this was
recognised as being the case.
The advantage of selecting sentences as an appropriate unit of analysis is that a
'fine-grained' analysis can be conducted in the open coding process of grounded theory.
Practically, this involved allocating each NUD*IST page of text with consecutive
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sentence and page numbers. In this open coding process, each text unit or sentence
was examined and systematically coded, and this process continued for the whole
document, with each different coding given a separate place in the NUD*IST indexing
system, referred to as 'nodes' (Gahan & Hannibal, 1998).
Put another way, it will be recalled from chapter 4 that the concept cards were
generated on 8 by 5 written record cards. The nodes within NUD*IST can be
considered as analogous to these cards, albeit that they are stored electronically. As
Gahan and Hannibal (1998) put it: "each of the nodes has a numerical address, a title
and definition. You may organise these nodes in various ways: as a hierarchy, as a
flat structure or as unstructured or free nodes " (p. 8). This intensive period of coding
resulted in 34 nodes emerging, which are shown in figure 1 overleaf.
In other words, the software allows text units to be coded together and then
labelled as NUD*IST nodes. Relationships between these nodes can be examined and
emerging ideas regarding the analysis can be written electronically as theoretical
memos. The labels attached to these nodes, and how they fit together to build the
model developed, will be explicated below in a format that will be familiar to the
reader from chapter 4. To recap, the 'paper trail' will start with the open coding of the
transcribed data, how these concept nodes were grouped and the final grounded theory
model before going through elements of the model and providing data in support of it.
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Initial analysis: Open coding
Table 1: Grounded Theory: Nudist nodes
Concept Node number Concept Node number
Leadership 1 External accountability 18
Foliowship 2 Home Office 19
Signs of danger 3 City Fathers 20
Banners 4 Financial institutions 21
Balaclavas 5 Public 22
Mobile phones 6 Protesters 23
Sound systems 7 Strategy 24
Crowd irrationality 8 Tactics 25
Crowd fickleness 9 Intergroup Tension:
Junior/senior officers
26
Le Bon 10 Intergroup Tension:
Met/City Police
27
Allport 11 Met experience 28
Le
Bon/Allport/Hybrid
12 City inexperience 29
Levels of violence 13 City tactics 30
Tactics of protesters 14 Communications 31
Information 15 IntragroupTension:
Junior Met officers
32
Spatial location 16 Complexity 33
Symbolic buildings 17 Context 34
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Axial coding or how the nudist nodes are grouped
It will be recalled from chapters 3 and 4, that after the initial coding of the data
in grounded theory, a process ofmore focused coding seeks to build up the codes into
selected core categories. Links between categories were identified in a process
involving constant comparison between the categories until they became 'saturated'
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The ways in which these
NUD*IST nodes were linked together is shown in figure 3 overleaf.
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Figure 3: Nudist nodes and how they were grouped
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Figure 4: Grounded Theory model of Public Order Policing
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7.4. Analysis
7.4.1. Explanation of the model
The grounded theory model in this chapter is much like that in chapter 4, a
concern with public order, and hence generated by fear of provoking and permitting
violence. This balance is determined by accountability concerns, which in turn affect
action. However, this model differs from the one in chapter 4 in three ways. First,
whether generic concern with crowds leads to accountability concerns, depends on
whether the specific officers feel that they are implicated in what is going on. Second,
accountability concerns are more complex than hitherto, it is not simply that internal
accountability leads to more repression and external accountability less so. Third,
different officers have different accountability concerns, leading to different notions of
action and this in turn leads to conflict within the police. The analysis in this chapter
will touch on all elements of the model but, to avoid duplication, will concentrate on
novel elements.
To be more specific, I will look in detail and focus upon the parts of the
analysis where accountability concerns are more complex, and the notion of crowd
repression or permission is a consequence of different positions held within the police
both in terms of force (Met and City) and rank (Junior and Senior).
The analysis is therefore structured in four parts. First, I will look in detail at
how police notions of crowds being a problem for the social order are informed by
theories of the crowd, which see the crowd as inherently problematic. It is seen as
either 'mad' (Le Bon) or 'bad' (Allport) or a hybrid between the two i.e. the 'mad'
leading the 'bad'. I will show that what changes through the phases of the event is the
balance between these crowd theories, which is informed by the presence or absence of
accountability concerns.
Secondly, I will show that accountability concerns only come into play, if and
when officers consider that they will be identified with those policing the event and
that this, in turn, is a function of context. Thus, during the event, Met officers saw the
policing as conducted by City rather than by themselves and they were deeply critical
of them for inflaming the event. Subsequently, when criticism was directed at 'the
police' as a whole and where Met officers categorised themselves, along with the City
police, and in contrast to external media and political sources, so the nature of
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explanation altered. The crowd rather than the City officers were seen by Met officers
as responsible for the violence.
Third, I will look in detail at accountability concerns and how they are more
complex than first thought. Rather than the notion of a simple distinction between
internal and external accountability, we need to consider the nature of different
external sources and how these impact on the balance between repression and
permission.
Fourth, I will look in detail at the sources of intergroup tension within the
police. Tangibly, this can be seen between different forces (Met and City) and between
different ranks (Junior and Senior). Those in different positions (Forces and Ranks)
have different accountability concerns, which leads to a different notion of the balance
of crowd permission and repression and in turn leads to intergroup conflict between
forces (the Met and City) and between ranks (Junior and Senior officers).
These four areas will be explicated in detail below, beginning with the police
theories of the crowd. To illustrate that this theory is 'grounded' in the data, selective
quotations from the police participants will be utilised (as in chapter 4). Coding
conventions indicating the source of the data will be utilised as follows: Pre event
interview (PEI), Participant observation (PO) and Post event interview (PI).
As already explained, for the purposes of this analysis I will concentrate on
those aspects of the data which do not merely duplicate the analysis in chapter 4. I will
look briefly at fears of the crowd which are fed by pathologising models (Allport & Le
Bon - see chapter 1), before focusing upon those parts of the analysis where
accountability concerns are more complex, and the notion of crowd repression or
permission is a consequence of different positions held within the police both in terms
of force and rank.
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7.4.2. Fears of the crowd
It will be remembered from chapter 4, that the police view crowds as
problematic holding 'agitator' (Allport) and 'mad mob' (Le Bonian) conceptions of
them. This analysis confirms and extends that view. To be more explicit, the police
have a limited notion of the crowd which sees it as pathologically 'bad' (Allport),
'mad' (Le Bon) or a hybrid notion of the 'bad' leading the 'mad'. This remains
constant. What changes is the balance between them, which is informed by the
presence of and nature of accountability concerns.
In the initial phase of the event, the police legitimate their actions by utilising
theories of the crowd, which reflect the Allportian notion of the crowd as being
comprised of at least some 'bad' people. This can be seen in their attempts to identify
and differentiate groups such as 'hard-liners' and 'hard-core' from the rest. Put another
way, they have a clear sense that the crowd has 'troublemakers' in it's midst, and they
are also concerned that these people may take a 'leadership' role. In this phase of the
event they actively seek out these 'troublemakers'.
The police do this by seeking to identify people in the crowd who they consider
to be acting in the form of 'leaders', so in the early stages of the event, prior to the
conflict starting at London Wall, police officers use their information sources to locate
those who they believe to be able to influence others in the crowd. Consider the
following quotation from a senior police officer tracking the movement of alleged
'hardcore' members of the crowd, in the early phase of the event, and prior to any
conflict, as they moved towards Liverpool Street Station.
1. Chief Superintendent (PO)
"700 hard-core with named targets into Liverpool St."
At this phase of the event the police see masking up (using balaclavas or
handkerchiefs to hide their faces), to indicate leadership in the crowd.
2. Sergeant (PO)
"Several masked members of the crowd in Cannon Street one wearing a red
handkerchiefcovering the lower halfofhisface. The leaders have come out to
play.»
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However, as conflict escalates outside the Liffe building, the stress on
'dangerous elements' gives way to a more Le Bonian sense that all crowd members are
by nature unpredictable and at least potentially violent. Consider the following
quotation, which explicitly makes this point, made by a senior officer in the gold pod at
the height of conflict.
3. Chief Inspector (P0)
"Throughout the day the crowd was volatile when in close contact with police,
which is why Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) were 'softly softly.' They
were going to be opportunistic was the intelligence with a couple of flash
points. The crowd isolated a serial early on, and outside the Liffe building is
when the City police started pushing people away. Not sure why they did it.
Now not sure why they are blocking crowd at Southwark Bridge, after earlier
pushing them along."
The above quotation raises another issue, that is, the Met officers explain their
strategy in relation to events. The quote comes from a context in which a contrast is
being made with the more interventionist strategy of City police officers. Hence, this
strategy is blamed for the escalation of conflict. This willingness to blame City, and to
use accounts of crowd danger which render them blame worthy, is due to the fact that
Met officers differentiate City from the Met, and in blaming the City officers on the
ground, feel that they are not criticising themselves. If anything, they are praising
themselves by contrast. This takes me to the next part of the analysis.
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7.4.3. Responsibility and comparative context
From the quotation above, it can be seen that in the 'restricted context' of the
event itself, Met officers see City officers as an 'outgroup' and are not responsible for
what City officers do. After the event, in an 'extended context' of the police versus
external sources, all police form a common group, the Met feel responsible and
accountable for what City officers do and this affects their accounts. The difference has
to do with 'comparative context'. When it is just Met and City, then City are 'outgroup'.
Where external sources - (politicians, media and others) are brought into the equation,
so to speak (an 'extended' context), the categories shift into 'them' against the police
(Met and City), who are now 'ingroup' members. The shift in categorisation from
'outgroup' to 'ingroup' members will be charted below.
At the height of conflict outside the Liffe building, when the City senior officers
were trying to move the crowd away from this and other buildings belonging to
institutions within the City, the Met senior officers were keen to distance themselves
from the tactics of the City senior officers and were in fact openly critical of the City.
Consider the following quotation which shows explicitly, that how in the 'restricted
context', senior Met officers talk about the senior City officers as the 'other' and how
they feel no responsibility for what the City does.
4. Commander (PO)
"This has gone badly wrongfor the City, if they don't back offnow we will
have another 'Poll Tax' riot."
However, when the police are under attack from the politicians and media after
the event, City officers are talked of as part of'us' or the police 'ingroup'. At this
juncture Met officers clearly feel responsible for what all officers, City or Met, did in
the event and the talk is very different. Consider the following quotation, from the
same senior officer, and contrast it's tone with the quotation above, in the context of
this officer commentating about the event after it's conclusion, when both forces are
accountable for what happened to external sources of criticism (media, politicians and
public inquiry).
Chapter 7. Riot in the City. 202
5. Commander (PEI)
"I think from a policing perspective (Met and City) we dealt with it (the day)
pretty well, also from both theMet and City perspectives, the tactics that were
implemented to support the overall policing plan dealt with it pretty well.
What we could have done better perhaps, was we should have thought more
carefully about how we could getpeople into the City. A certain number of the
units took a long time to get there, of course that in turn might have been
because traffic was chaotic due to other events. "
Put another way, whether the Met or City feel accountable, depends on the
context in which they are doing the policing, and this is informed by the presence or
absence of accountability concerns for each force. To be more explicit, the notion that
we saw in chapter 4, that internal accountability leads to more repression, whilst
external accountability leads to more permission of crowds, needs to be amended. The
complexity of internal and external accountability concerns, and how this maps onto
the permission and repression of crowds takes me to the next part of the analysis.
7.4.4. The complexity of accountability concerns
While my previous studies show the importance of accountability concerns for
police decision making, they also show that my original division into internal and
external accountability, and the idea that internal accountability increases the level of
repression compared to external accountability, may have been too simplistic. The
police are externally accountable to a number of sources; politicians, media and others,
sometimes that accountability will lead them to be more rather than less repressive. As
an example, recall the visit of the Chinese President to the United Kingdom in early
1999. Accountability to politicians led senior police officers to be very repressive to
the crowd, often to the dismay ofjunior officers. Rather than the simple notion of
internal and external accountability, we need to look at the contextual structure of
accountability and the impact on the balance of repression which in turn leads to
intergroup tension between officers of different forces (Met and City) and ranks
(Junior and Senior).
One way of illustrating this complexity is by contrasting the structure of
accountability for the City and Met forces, and which will be discussed in turn.
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To be more explicit, external accountability for the Met ana City mean quite
different things, for the City it is about the City institutions and less about the Public.
This makes the City senior officers concerned about the probity and integrity of the
City buildings, as in effect these institutions make up the City police constituency, as
the quotation overleaf, from a senior police officer makes explicit.
6. Chief Inspector (Extract from field notes - P0)
"The City senior officers are concerned about the probity and integrity of the
City buildings because they are very close to the City Fathers as the
institutions of the City are their constituency, they have in effect no public. "
In other words, for the City senior officers, because of their external
accountability concerns to the institutions of the City, they cannot allow disruption or
damage to these. Thus the City senior officers will do what they can to avoid damage
to buildings of significance within the City limits such as the Stock Exchange, Bank of
England and the Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey), by repressing the crowd with all
available means or in police argot 'dying in the ditch' to defend these buildings.
Consider the following quotation from a senior police officer highlighting the 'no - go'
areas for the City police, in terms of them utilising all resources in an attempt to
repress the crowd, with the goal of avoiding damage to buildings within the City police
area, for which they are accountable.
7. Chief Superintendent (PEI)
"The Citywill 'die in the ditch' - repress the crowdwith all available means -
to try to avoid damage to buildings such as the Stock Exchange, Bank of
England and the Central Criminal Court (OldBailey). "
Conversely, for the Met, they are not responsible to the City Fathers but to
public institutions, and also to the public at large. They are not responsible for the
buildings identified by the City police as important, so they can be more permissive in
their actions, by not 'repressing the crowd with all available means'. However, for the
Met, as they have a particular responsibility to the central institutions of state, such as
Buckingham Palace, Downing Street and the Palace ofWestminster, attacks on these
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buildings would resuit in the Met !dying in the ditch' to repress the crowd from gaining
access or permitting damage to these buildings of significance. Consider the following
quotation overleaf, from the same senior officer as before, which sets out the 'no go'
areas for the Met and the willingness to use all available resources to repress the crowd
attacking these buildings of significance for the Met.
8. Chief Superintendent (PEI)
"TheMet are not responsible for the buildings in the City police area, we will
however, 'die in the ditch' - repress the crowdwith all available means -for
Buckingham Palace, Downing Street and the Palace ofWestminster. "
Thus it can be seen that how external accountability affects action, depends on
the type of external accountability and the precise context. In the City, external
accountability as we have seen above, means the financial institutions of the City, and
the financial workers, not the general public. Hence, when it comes to those buildings,
external accountability means being more repressive, because the buildings are more
important than the cost to junior officers in defending them. By contrast, for the Met in
this context, external accountability means the public and the institutions less so.
Hence, it leads to more permissive tactics. This leads to different notions of crowd
permission and repression as one force (the City) says repress the crowd and the other
force (Met) says permit the crowd this leads to intergroup conflict, which takes me to
the next part of the analysis.
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7.4.S. Intergroup conflict Met and City: Different accountability concerns
It will be recalled from the introduction to this chapter, that the Met and City
forces disagree on tactics and their use. While the Met adopt the tactics of isolating
and containing trouble, the City favour disrupting and dispersing the crowd. However,
it is clear that they have different notions ofwhat is non-negotiable.
It will be recalled from the section above on the complexity of accountability
concerns that the Met and City have different accountability concerns. For the Met, as
they are accountable to the central institutions of state, they cannot tolerate disruption
to places like the Royal Palaces, Downing Street and the Palace ofWestminster. In
those circumstances they would in police argot 'die in the ditch' or use all possible
resources to repress the crowd.
By contrast, as the City are essentially accountable to the financial institutions
of the city, as they are their main constituency, and they cannot allow disruption to
these. They will thus do everything they can to avoid damage to buildings of
significance within the city limits such as the stock exchange, Bank ofEngland and the
Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey), by repressing the crowd with all available means.
As the City have in effect no public; they are accountable to the City
institutions. When the conflict begins in the vicinity of the Liffe building and the City
police vans are attacked and the buildings of the City institutions are under threat, the
City senior officers on the ground try to repress the crowd with riot trained officers.
Consider the following extract from my field notes which records the fact that the City
police were donning protective riot equipment outside the Liffe building as they
engaged the crowd with a view to dispersing them from the vicinity.
9. Extract from field notes (P0)
1.52 p.m. City 'kitting' up (donningprotective riot gear) and engaging the
crowd outside the Liffe building.
In contrast to the City tactics of using riot equipment to engage the crowd,
because the Met were not accountable for the buildings within the City, they were
openly critical of the City police senior officers for using these tactics. The extract
from my field notes below captures this strength of criticism of the City police tactics
Chapter 7. Riot in the City. 206
by a Met police tactical advisor, an officer specially trained in the deployment of police
tactics in crowd events. This officer was in the gold pod advising the Met gold
commander.
10. Sergeant Extract from field notes (P0)
1.55 p.m. "City 'kitting' (donning protective riot gear) earlier than I would
have advised. "
Later on during the day, when damage was being caused to the Liffe building,
it was very clear that the City police wanted to repress the crowd by dispersing them
from the City limits. They attempted to do this by calling for more horses and police
units to be sent to the City from the Met. Again, consider the following extract from
my field notes which captures the contrast between the City desire to disperse the
crowd, and the Met response challenging the need for more officers, and the purpose
to which they are going to be put.
11. Extract from field notes (P0)
4.25 p.m. Following short shield runs at the crowd by officers outside the Liffe
building, a request for more Met police riot units and horses is sent to the Met
police control room from the City control room. The request is challenged by
the Met police control room staff who ask the City control room the purpose
and numbers to be sent. In reply, the City control room indicates that these
additional units would be used for the purposes of "pushing the crowd away
from the Liffe and other buildings on to the embankmentfor dispersal. "
In contrast to the desire of the City police to disperse the crowd away from the
Liffe and other institutional buildings, because of accountability to the City Fathers, the
Met were not accountable for this area and were happy to contain the trouble with
damage to these buildings. In fact, they directly call into question the City tactics of
repression of the crowd and advocate a more permissive approach to the crowd by
withdrawal of the police units to avoid inflaming the situation. This tension is captured
in the following extract, which is taken from my field notes, which were made at the
time.
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12. Extract from field notes (P0)
2.00 p.m. London Wall police carriers (vans) being jumped on. Five carriers
under attack. Paint on windscreen. Male commander "we will have another
'Poll Tax', the City need to back off to diffuse it. "
Met and City: Different balance of permission/repression
Put another way, the accountability of the Met, to both the institutions and the
public, means that they balance the repression and permission of crowds, because, in
effect the City have no constituents, apart from the financial institutions, they seek to
repress the crowd. Outside the Liffe building when the conflict begins to escalate the
police had to decide whether to isolate, contain or disperse the crowd, for the Met,
they wanted to contain the levels of damage to the buildings, as they were not
accountable. However, for the City because of accountability concerns to the financial
institutions, which was non-negotiable, they wanted to move the crowd on. This leads
to inter group conflict between the Met and City as one force (City) says repress the
crowd while the other (Met) says permit the crowd.
Evidence of intergroup conflict
To recap, the different balance of permission and repression of the crowd, due
to different accountability concerns of the two forces, led to different notions ofwhich
tactics were appropriate and to intergroup conflict between the Met and City. Tangibly
this can be seen at the height of conflict, outside the Liffe building, when the building is
attacked. In the Metropolitan police control room, senior officers of all ranks were
openly criticising the tactics of the City senior officers about the deployments of riot
trained officers sent from the Met to the City silver or ground commander. Consider
the following quotation, which explicitly captures this conflict between the two forces
with Met senior officers openly challenging the deployments of public order trained
officers by the City silver or ground commander.
13. Extract from field notes
3.50 p.m. Confusion over deployments of Met units by City silver. The City
want further units to go to Finsbury Square. Met ChiefInspector 'Whatfor?'
"Topush crowd onto the embankmentfor dispersal. "
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At this stage of the event the atmosphere in the control room changed
dramatically, as the gold communications pod was surrounded by senior officers from
all parts of the control room. The temperature rose sufficiently for mobile air
conditioned units to be brought out to cool things down.
Further requests from the City control room for further riot trained Met
officers and mounted units, were met with the observation by senior and junior officers
of all ranks, in the vicinity of the gold pod, that things had gone badly wrong for the
City police. In fact as the extract from my field notes records, the Met gold
commander was openly critical of the City tactics, noting that it had 'gone badly wrong'
for them.
14.Extract from field notes.
4.45 p.m. Male commander "This has gone badly wrongfor the city. "
At about this time a message from the Met gold commander to the City gold
commander resulted in the Met gold commander receiving a telephone call from this
officer. The person on the other end of the telephone appeared to have raised his voice
as he spoke to the Met gold commander about sending the remaining riot trained
officers to the City. This was in contrast to the Met gold commander who appeared
calm in his demeanour, although other Met senior officers in the vicinity of the gold
pod were not, as my field notes record, as calm.
15. Extract from field notes
5 p.m. The City gold rings the Met gold, from where I was, I could hear the
voice on the other end of the telephone raised, as a result of this conversation,
all the remaining Met units of riot trained officers were sent to the City police
to rendezvous at Southwark Bridge. The Met gold remained calm during this
conversation when several Met Superintendents were openly criticising the City
tactics.
5.15 p.m. Chief Superintendent "There have been a lot of complaints by the
Police Support Unit (PSU) commanders about the lack of experience of the
City senior officers. "
Chapter 7. Riot in the City. 209
5.15 p.m. Superintendent "This would not have happened in the Met, the City
are leaving themselves no room for manoeuvre. "
Whilst other senior officers were openly criticising the City, the only comment
made by the Met commander was to comment upon the demeanor of the City gold.
The following quotation makes this point clearly.
5.16 p.m. Met Commander (commentating upon the phone call he had recently
received) "City gold less calm than he was afew hours ago. "
At this juncture, very experienced Met senior public order officers were openly
debating and criticising the plan by the City senior officers to push the crowd away
from the Liffe building and disperse it over Blackfriars Bridge and into the Met area as
the following quotation makes clear.
16. Superintendent (Extract from field notes)
"Plan is to push over Southwark Bridge and contain them. City have no
control over this at the moment. Our policy is one of isolation and
containment. Play the waiting game like every other time. Have learned
dispersal doesn 7 help. "
Summary: Balance of permission and repression Met/City
In summary, the Met and City forces have a different balance of accountability
due to different accountability concerns. For the Met, because they are not accountable
for the City, they wish to contain the trouble and damage to the City buildings. In
contrast because the City are in effect responsible to the City institutions, as they are
their main constituents, they seek to disperse the crowd. This leads to intergroup
conflict between the two forces, as one force says contain the crowd and damage
(Met) whilst the other says stop the damage and disperse the crowd from the City
limits (City). The intergroup conflict between the two forces is mirrored by intergroup
conflict between officers of different ranks (Junior and Senior), and which brings me
on to the next part of the analysis.
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7.4.6. Intergroup conflict Senior and Junior officers: Different accountability
concerns
Junior officers are not concerned with public inquiry considerations but with
their own safety and the safety of friends on the front line. Senior officers are
concerned with safety ofjunior colleagues as well as balancing the need not to have
been seen to have overreacted, and the Home Office phoning the control room to
demand 'What's going on?' Therefore, there are different notions of repression in
relation to different accountability concerns between officers of different ranks.
When the conflict begins at London Wall, we see in the interchanges between
junior and senior officers in the 'Intelligence Cell' an increasing concern with the safety
of other junior officers by junior officers. Tangibly, this is seen in expressing concern
that fellow junior officers are being beaten up, with direct language utilised to
articulate that concern to more senior colleagues in the 'Intelligence Cell'. Consider the
following quotations, from two junior officers in the 'Intelligence Cell', which makes
this point explicitly.
17. Constable (PO)
"Getting a hiding down there."
18. Constable (PO)
"Police getting a rightpasting."
By contrast, because senior officers are accountable, to both junior colleagues
and to external sources, we see them unwilling to categorise the violence as a riot.
Even when there are reports of officers being injured in the conflict outside the Liffe
building, we see in their discourse a willingness to downplay injuries to junior officers
and to use the command structure to counter the rumours ofjunior officers. Consider
the following extract from my field notes which records the Met gold commander
seeking to find out the extent of the injuries sustained by two junior colleagues injured
in College Street, in order to counteract the rumours ofmore serious injuries that
could be disseminated by junior colleagues.
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19. Commander (PO)
"Find out injuries to officers to tell bronzes, so we can tell troops' Not 19,000
injured- two - and they are hobbling aroundwanting to be out there. "
Similarly, when the Liffe building is broken into and damaged, we see senior
Met officers downplaying the damage caused.
20. Chief Inspector (PO)
"At the end of the day ifafew buildings and vehicles get trashed andwe have
afew injuries, who cares, the day is a success. "
At this stage of the event, we see in the discourse of senior Met officers, a
willingness to accept injuries to officers, damage to property and a perception of the
threshold of violence, which is quite different from junior officers. In response to
media reports on London Today "rioting breaks out in the City", a senior officer
assessment of the event is captured by the following extract from my field notes.
21. Chief Superintendent (PO)
"I wouldn't call what we saw today as rioting. "
Other senior officers who go on to describe the event, echo this theme, again
captured by my field notes.
22. Commander (PO)
"Bijou event, no problem. "
When the police vehicles are surrounded and attacked in London Wall we see
in these interchanges between different ranks, junior officers increasingly angry and
frustrated by the actions of senior colleagues, especially when the police are attacked
outside the Liffe building. Tangibly this frustration is seen with junior officers banging
the table in anger at the apparent inaction of senior officers, and in fact being openly
critical of senior colleagues as the following extract shows.
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23. Constable (PO)
"Frustrating, so frustrating."
This overt anger and frustration at the senior officers boils over, with junior
officers openly challenging more senior officers, and calling for more repressive
measures, such as the use ofwater cannon to disperse the crowd from the vicinity of
the Liffe building.
24. Constable (PO)
"In other countries they would have water cannon to disperse the crowd. "
Junior and Senior officers: Different balance or permission/repression of crowds
In sum, the different accountability concerns of the different ranks, map onto
different notions of permission and repression of crowds. This leads to inter group
tension as one part of the police, junior officers says repress the crowd, and another
part, senior officers, says permit the crowd. This leads on to intergroup conflict.
Junior and Senior officers: Evidence of intergroup conflict
Conflict arises, as those in one position believe one course of action should be
taken, while those in another position believe in an alternative and incompatible course
of action. Junior officers advocate repression. Senior officers advocate a more tolerant
approach. One incident sums up the different concerns and the different priorities of
junior and senior officers. It relates to a point where protesters were clambering onto a
police van and the van began to accelerate in order to escape the crowd. As senior
officers and junior officers in the 'Intelligence' pod watched the events together, the
junior officers were all for the escape and took pleasure from the possibility that those
protesters clinging to the van might fall and be hurt. The senior officers were alarmed
at what might happen, precisely because they were concerned at being blamed for any
injuries to protesters. Consider the following extract from my field notes, which
recorded this interchange between senior and junior officers at the time.
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25. Field note extract (PO)
"I'd run him over (constable). Hang on we might" (concerned inspector).
Man on the windscreen falls, arrested. Cheersfrom constable.
Summary Junior and Senior officer accountability balance
In summary, junior officers are concerned with being hit on the head, and are
not influenced by external accountability considerations (public inquiry), they see the
crowd as more violent and dangerous and wish to clamp down or repress the crowd.
In contrast, senior officers have to balance the safety ofjunior colleagues with making
decisions, which are a potential threat to them, as they are accountable to the public,
so relatively speaking in relation to junior officers they do not repress the crowd. This
leads to intergroup conflict between junior and senior officers.
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7.5 Discussion
In broad terms the analysis in this chapter confirms crucial elements of previous
models. It shows in practice as well as training a concern with the crowd, permission
and provoking balance, affected by accountability, which affects action. It extends this
in ways explained above. Of crucial importance are accountability concerns, but this is
not as simple as internal accountability equalling crowd repression and external
accountability equalling permission equation, that we have seen in earlier chapters.
Rather we must look at the exact configuration, the nature of external agencies and
what they demand.
The nature and balance between internal and external accountability concerns,
differs at different times. This leads to a different balance between permission and
repression of crowds, which leads to intergroup conflict between Junior and Senior
officers, and between the Metropolitan and City of London forces.
To be more specific, it will be remembered that the model suggested that the
balance of permission and repression of crowds depend upon the accountability of
different groups within the police. This can be seen to operate in the way a variety of
conflicts emerge between Junior and Senior officers and Met and City police relations.
The conflicts between Junior and Senior officers occur because of different
accountability concerns. To recap, in the context of fellow junior officers being injured
in the violence, other junior officers are not concerned with public inquiry
considerations. They are unwilling to accept injuries to their fellow junior colleagues
and in many cases angrily demand more repressive measures being taken towards the
crowd as a whole. Thus we see the junior officers articulating the need for the use of
water cannon as a means of dispersal.
By contrast, senior officers have to balance accountability to fellow junior
officers being injured, with the knowledge that they are responsible to external
agencies for the rights of the crowd and what happens during the event. We see a
willingness by senior officers to accept injuries to officers, damage to property and a
threshold of violence that allows them to categorise the event at the height of the riot
as a "Bijou event, no problemThus different accountability concerns for junior and
senior officers, lead to different notions of repression and permission of crowds,
leading to intergroup conflict.
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The intergroup tensions arising between the Met and City forces also arise
because of the difference in their respective accountability concerns which lead to
different notions of permission and repression of the crowd. It will be recalled from the
above analysis that because in effect the City have no public, their constituents are the
financial institutions of the City, when the Liffe building was attacked they had to
engage the crowd and defend the symbolic buildings associated with the City, because
of their accountability concerns to the City Fathers.
In contrast, the Met were not accountable to the City Fathers and sought to
contain the damage to the Liffe building, by advocating withdrawal of officers to avoid
preventing a target to crowd members.
These different accountability concerns of the Met and City lead to different
notions of crowd permission and repression, which in turn lead to intergroup conflict
as one force advocated one thing and the other another, leading to tension between the
two.
Once again accountability is central to understanding group processes. If
anything, my analysis extends our understanding of how important such concerns are.
Most notably it is apparent that intergroup conflict between different ranks and forces
cannot be understood without reference to issues of accountability. Hence the study of
formal groups raises an issue that is all but absent in the copious literature on
intergroup processes, there is virtually no mention of accountability in explanations of
intergroup conflict. For instance the term is absent from Brown's recent and
comprehensive text on group processes (Brown, 2000).
A second issue arises from this study in relation to group processes. This is a
nice field illustration of SCT's point that who is ingroup and who is outgroup depends
upon the comparative context. As noted above, in the 'restricted' comparative context
of the police the City were seen as ingroup members. However, in the 'extended'
context of the police as a whole (Met and City together) the City were seen as fellow
ingroup members as the police defended the actions that were taken on the day.
This analysis extends this further by linking changes in comparative context,
and hence group structure, to the issue ofgroup biases in attribution. Previous
research has shown that good outcomes are attributed internally to the ingroup, and
bad outcomes externally to the outgroup (Islam & Hewstone, 1993b). Conversely, for
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the outgroup members, good outcomes are attributed externally and bad outcomes
internally (Islam & Hewstone, 1993b).
In this study we have seen that these previous social psychological findings on
the attribution ofblame have to take account of how comparative context affects
intergroup relations. In the 'restricted' where City were seen as outgroup the Met
were very negative and graphic in outlining the incompetence of the City senior
officers. Conversely, in the 'extended' context of the police (City and Met) being held
to account after the event by politicians and the media, Met officers construed the City
as part of the common ingroup, they therefore saw the riot as due to outgroup violence
and not the fault ofCity officers.
However, the study has four major shortcomings. First, the data almost
exclusively comes from senior Metropolitan officers, the data from junior officers was
gathered opportunistically from the 'Intelligence Cell'. On a related point, whilst I have
data from the Met side, and predominately from senior officers, I have none from the
City side, neither senior or junior, to contextualise their experiences.
Second, whilst the pilot reported in chapter 6 led to the research strategy
adopted for this study, I still encountered problems in observing the Metropolitan
police gold commander in the control room. To be more precise, at moments of
frenetic activity it was difficult to get explications from senior officers about the
decision making process, and in consequence, it was not as explicit as it might have
been. On a related point, after the stand off at Trafalgar Square, it would have been
preferable to interview both the gold and silver commanders to get their immediate
reactions to the day. Due to operational and time constraint limitations on these
officers this was not possible, and therefore the post event interviews with both
officers did not take place until several weeks after the event.
Third, I must consider the possibility of reactivity, what was said and done
during the day arose artificially in response to my presence. However, it could be
argued that in the intensity of the events of June 18th 1999, that the senior officers
ignored my presence. This 'anonymity' in the research setting may well have been
helped by my former status as a serving senior officer, and have lead to me being
accepted as a police 'ingroup' member.
Fourth, this is only one case study event, which may have been unique in nature
due to the people taking part. In order to generalise these findings we need to conduct
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further research, which are more genuinely intergroup in nature. Ideally, this would
involve a series of other events with the Metropolitan and other forces, and look at
both senior and junior officers together in these events.
Having said all that, we have seen in the preceding chapters in training,
experimental and 'live' settings enough qualitative and quantitative evidence to give us
confidence that accountability concerns are a powerful model on which to understand
senior police officer decision making during crowd events.
Chapter 8. General discussion. 218
Chapter 8. General Discussion.
8.1. Summary of findings
The purpose of this thesis was to look at the police perspective in crowd
events. This is important both in its own right but also as a necessary element of
understanding the overall dynamics of crowd events. In particular, the research was
motivated by a concern that police assumptions and perceptions of all crowd members
as hostile and dangerous may constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The thesis was therefore an exploratory study, but five major findings have
come out of it. First, the police see the crowd as danger. Second, how they respond to
the crowd is mediated by accountability concerns, which are complex. Third,
accountability concerns in turn are affected by phase of the event, position (different
groups within the police) and force (Met and City). Fourth, at moments of danger they
are repressive, but what constitutes an appropriate level of repression, differs between
those in different positions. Fifthly, the police as an organisation are more complex
than first thought, and we need to consider the dynamics within the police in order to
understand dynamics between the police and crowd. These will be discussed in turn.
First, we have seen in the preceding chapters that the police see the crowd as
danger. More specifically, ifwe look at the quotation below from a senior officer, we
can see the genuine, and generalised fear, that senior public order trained officers have
about crowds posing a threat to the social order, to the extent of destabilising and
threatening that order.
1. Commander
"People will always say that this is very, very important, this brings down
governments, you can have a high crime rate butyou don't get resignations of
the Commissioner or the Home Secretary. Public Order policing does have
these consequences and it can cause profound damage and destabilises our
way of life, the veryfabric ofsociety, and that's why it is so importantfrom a
police perspective."
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Second, how the police respond to crowds is mediated by accountability
concerns, which as we have seen in this thesis are complex. It will be recalled from the
training study (chapter 4) that it was proposed that internal accountability would make
officers more repressive and external accountability less so. I also suggested that the
effects of accountability were a function of phase. The experimental studies reported in
chapter 5 confirmed the importance of accountability and phase, but suggested that the
way they operate, and the way that they map onto what the police do, is rather more
complex than I first imagined. This complexity was further brought home by the June
18th 1999 events (reported in chapter 7).
In sum, we have seen that this simple equation is far more complex than this
simple mapping suggests, and that accountability depends upon the particular context
that officers find themselves in.
A couple of recent examples may help to clarify this position. Recall from the
recent anti capitalist march on May 1 st 2000 where the Cenotaph and other public
symbols were daubed with graffiti. Here the dilemma facing the police in balancing
internal and external accountability concerns, was captured the following day by the
Guardian newspaper. Consider the following quote taken from a feature article by
Sarah Hall under the banner headline "softly, softly approach, falls down as Mc
Donald's is wrecked by anarchists. " (Guardian 2nd May 2000, p.3).
2, Sarah Hall Guardian reporter 2nd May 2000
"Despite the vastly increased numbers (from earlier protests), the Met was
determined to operate a "softly softly approach", minimising the police
presence and turning a blind eye to minor offences to avoidprovoking violent
clashes. The approach foundered once a breakaway group ofanarchists
began to smash up and loot a branch ofMc Donald's in Whitehall." (p.3)
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Thus the simple configuration of internal accountability concerns leading
officers to be more repressive, suggested in chapter 4, was replaced in this instance by
external accountability sources, in the form of politicians and sections of the media,
calling on the police to have taken far more repressive action than they did to deal with
the protesters. During a parliamentary debate following the violence, the Guardian
reported that Ann Widdecombe - the Conservative shadow Home Secretary - was
critical of police tactics and contrasted the Met action in dealing with the May day
protests, with the robust action taken by police to deal with protests against a visit by
the Chinese president earlier this year.
3. Michael White Political Editor The Guardian, 2nd May 2000
"Politicians ofallparties yesterday weighed in behindJack Straw's
condemnation ofMonday's May Day demonstration as "criminality and
thuggery masquerading aspoliticalprotest" but proved divided over the
tactics deployed by police Anne Widdecombe (Conservative) contrasted it
with the tough tactics when China'spresident Jiang Zemin visited
London, "(p. 3)
Third, the complexity of accountability concerns discussed above, leads on to
the next findings that these accountability concerns are affected by phase of the event,
position (different groups within the police) and force (Met and City). These will be
discussed in turn.
It will be recalled from both the training study (chapter 4) and the 'live' events
(chapters 6 and 7), that senior officers have a threshold of violence, which depends
upon the phase of the event that they are in. In the early stages of an event, because
they must balance being held to account for provoking violence with permitting
violence, they are willing to take injuries to junior colleagues to avoid the accusation
that they overreacted. Consider the following quotation overleaf from a senior officer,
which highlights the dilemma ofwhat level of violence, in the form ofmissiles being
thrown at the police, constitutes a threat to the safety ofjunior officers who are not
wearing protective riot gear, and how these junior officers need to be aware of
accountability concerns, to avoid the accusation that the police overreacted.
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4. Chief Inspector
"I think I've stood on cordons (lines ofunprotectedpolice officers) on
numerous occasions and had lots ofwhat Iwould deem minor missiles thrown
at the police officers I have been in charge of I am talking here aboutminor
bits andpieces being thrown at us, empty cans, placards and smallpieces of
rubbish. Junior officers have to realise that you have to stand there and take
that sort ofmissile to avoid being accused by a court orpublic inquiry of
overreacting."
In what I have referred to as the incipient phase of violence in previous
chapters, we are not sure whether the police are concerned with being held to account
for permitting violence, but are sure they are concerned with being held to account for
provoking violence. In this phase of an event they need to balance the injuries being
sustained by their officers, with a need to retain control of their officers by controlling
any over aggressive behaviour by junior officers. This is a difficult balance for a senior
supervising officer to judge and requires the junior officers to be tightly controlled, in
order for them not to be seen to have aggressively overreacted. Consider the following
quotation, from the same senior officer as before, and the categorisation of violence
towards the police, both in terms of the type and quantity ofmissiles being thrown at
the police. This senior officer acknowledges the difficulty, whilst on the one hand being
seen not to have overreacted by outside bodies, on the other, it is important in terms of
intergroup control ofjunior officers by senior officers, that they retain control of the
junior officers who in many cases are frightened and attempting to control these
feelings by acting aggressively towards crowd members.
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5. Chief Inspector
"Well ifyou leave the junior officers in a situation where they are getting
loads and loads ofstuff being thrown at them, andwhat I mean here is bits of
4 by 2 wooden posts, iron railings and bricks andfull bottles, then often junior
officers will suffer the same sorts ofstress andfeelings offright that
individuals in the crowd do. Often when youngjunior officers are deployed on
the streets in a Public Order operation they are frightened and often try to
overcome these feelings by becoming aggressive themselves. It is at thispoint
that you have to be able to control them to avoid the situation ofyou losing
control of them. "
Finally, in what I have previously termed the overt sustained conflict stage, the
police don't believe that they can be held toaccount for provoking violence but are
concerned with being held to account for permitting violence. At this stage, both to
retain support of their junior officers, and to avoid the accusation that they lost control
of the situation and permitted violence to occur, they categorise the event as requiring
them to retain order by using all possible tactical options. Officers left previously
unprotected are removed with all possible speed to avoid injury and thus loss of the
officers to the policing operation. Senior officers sanction interventions so as to avoid
the possibility of the morale of officers being adversely affected, by seeing other junior
colleagues injured and no action to stop it being taken by senior officers. Again,
consider the following quotation from the same senior officer as previously, that when
violence has reached a stage where junior officers are being injured, the police have to
withdraw these officers and replace them with other junior officers in protective riot
gear. This withdrawal ofunprotected officers whilst acknowledged by senior officers
as possibly sending a message to the crowd that they have 'won the first battle', is vital
to maintain the morale ofjunior officers who are witnessing injuries to junior
colleagues.
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5. Chief Inspector
"When you have reached the stage ofpetrol bombs then you have to restore
order as quickly aspossible. At this stage there is absolutely no point in
leaving officers who are not in possession ofprotected riot equipment
(helmets, shields andflame retardant overalls) to sustain injuries. Whilst you
have to be mindful that by withdrawing non protected officersfor their own
safety, that you send a message to the demonstrators that they've actually won
the first battle....However, you have to set that against the fact that in keeping
them there, that officers injuredwill be lostfor the rest of the day. This would
impact badly on the morale ofother junior officers who seeing a colleague
injured and nothing done about it wouldfeel vulnerable. It is vital at this
stage to deal with this issue quickly. "
Having removed the unprotected officers, the police go on to restore order by
considering all possible tactics that they possess, weighing the response to the
circumstances appertaining at the time. Again, consider the following quotation
overleaf, from a different senior officer, who would consider the following use of
tactical actions against crowd members in an ascending order of police repression. This
scale of repression goes through various stages including the use of riot trained
officers, the police horses, before moving on to the highest levels of repression
available for use against crowds, the use of specialist weapons, such as baton rounds
and firearms. In fact, this officer openly questions whether the police have got the use
of baton rounds in the right order on this scale of repression, believing they should be
used at an earlier stage than other senior officers would authorise, as he believes they
can be fired at crowd members with more accuracy than can be achieved by using the
police horses.
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6. Commander
"Depending on the levels of violence being used and the actual orpotential
casualties sustained, or likely to be sustained, Iwould consider in the
following order the use ofspecialist tactics. First, the use of level 1 (riot
trained officers) perhaps in combination with the use ofpolice horses. Second,
if the violence was such that lives had been or were possibly going to be lost
whether the use ofCS gas, baton rounds andfirearms would be appropriate. I
believe that the police have got the use ofbaton rounds wrong, in the sense
that in they are a more discriminate use offorce, than perhaps sending the
horses into a crowd ofpeople. There are obviously Home Office guidelinesfor
the use ofsuch specialist weapons, and the criteriafor use would have to be
assessed and met, but Iwould be considering their use earlier than perhaps
other senior officers would in order to restore order."
The foregoing quotations indicate not only the importance of phase on
accountability and action, but also the fact that officers in different positions - senior
and junior - may have very different accountability concerns. This was quite clear in
the study of the 'Carnival against Capitalism' (chapter 7). Junior officers on seeing
other junior officers surrounded by crowd members and attacked, were not concerned
with being held to account by a public inquiry, but were simply concerned with
avoiding injuries to their colleagues. We saw that, when the conflict began at London
Wall, junior officers laid the entire stress on danger to their peers. Two constables in
the intelligence cell used graphic language to express their concerns.
7. Constable (PO)
"Getting a hiding down there."
8. Constable (PO)
"Police getting a rightpasting."
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By contrast, because senior officers are accountable to both junior colleagues
and to external sources, we saw them unwilling to categorise the violence as a riot.
Even when there are reports of officers being injured in the conflict outside the Liffe
building, we saw in their discourse a willingness to downplay injuries to junior officers
and to use the command structure to counter possible rumours ofjunior officers.
9. Commander (PO)
"Find out injuries to officers to tell bronzes, so we can tell troops' Not 19,000
injured- two - and they are hobbling aroundwanting to be out there. "
The difference in accountability concerns between those in different positions
within the police is also mirrored by different accountability concerns between those in
different forces. To be more specific, it will be remembered that, when the Liffe
building was attacked, the City police were far more eager than Met officers to
intervene against the crowd, given their greater accountability to City institutions and
lesser accountability to the public at large. My field notes from the day capture the
ensuing tension.
10.Extract from field notes (PO)
4.25 p.m. Following short shield runs at the crowd by officers outside the Liffe
building, a request for more Met police riot units and horses is sent to the Met
police control room from the City control room.
The request is challenged by the Met police control room staff who ask the
City control room the purpose and numbers to be sent.
In reply the City control room indicates that these additional units would be
used for the purposes of "pushing the crowd away from the Liffe and other
buildings on to the Embankmentfor dispersal. "
In fact, as another extract from my notes makes clear, the Met directly called
into question the City tactics of repression of the crowd, and they advocated a more
permissive approach to the crowd by withdrawal of the police units to avoid inflaming
the situation as shown overleaf, in an extract taken from my field notes.
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11. Extract from field notes (PO)
2.00 p.m. London Wall police carriers (vans) being jumped on. Five carriers
under attack. Paint on windscreen. Commander "we will have another 'Poll
Tax' riot, they need to back off to diffuse it. "
The fourth implication ofmy studies, is that due to these different
accountability concerns for those in different positions, and due to ensuing differences
as to appropriate action - often in the middle of very fraught circumstances - tensions
arise between different groupings in the police. Again recall, in the context of chapter 7
and the 'Carnival against Capitalism', that at the height of the conflict at the Liffe
building we saw junior officers concerned with the safety of fellow junior officers. In
fact, they were advocating that the crowd should be repressed by water cannon as the
extract below makes explicit.
12. Constable (PO)
"In other countries they would have water cannon. "
By contrast, senior officers, because of the need to balance the care of their
officers with protecting the rights of the crowd, downplayed the levels of violence and
damage to such an extent, that they were advocating withdrawal of officers to avoid
presenting a target as the extract from my field notes shows.
13. Commander
"Get them to withdraw from the rear of the building to avoid presenting a
target
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Fifthly then, the police as an organisation are more complex than first thought.
In the same way that it is wrong to consider the crowd as an homogeneous entity, the
police reaction to crowds can only be understood by amplifying the inter and intra
group differences within this heterogeneous organisation.
To be more specific, it will be recalled from both chapters 6 and 7 that we need
to consider intergroup differences on three levels. First, in terms of rank (Junior and
Senior). Second, in terms of force (Metropolitan and City). Third, in terms of different
groups within the police (Special Branch and uniform Public Order officers). These
will be discussed in turn below.
Recall from chapter 6, and the first Vaisakhi study, that the police strategy was
one of stopping Sikhs and Muslims, using the powers defined in section 60 Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act, 1994. This, according to local senior officers, was the
main source of information about the people actually in Southall, who were stopped by
police officers and whose details were recorded, and was to be used to update the local
'fast time' intelligence gathering operation. It will be remembered that the friction
between local senior officers in charge of the operation, and the central
communications complex (GT) based at New Scotland Yard, resulted in the local
senior officer (who was acting as the gold commander) going to the communications
complex to resolve who was in charge of the event. The local argument that 'fast time'
intelligence about the operation, could only be processed locally quickly and for the
benefit of the officers policing the event, was contrasted with the slow turn around
time of this information, from officers at the central command complex.
By contrast, while junior officers broadly supported the stance taken by senior
officers from the local station, over who was in control of the event, they still had
misgivings about the policy of the blanket use of stopping young Sikhs and Muslims in
the area, and passing information through the intelligence system. In fact, junior
officers, employed on such duties, were openly sceptical as to the value of this
information and criticised its usage as being counterproductive.
As well as differences between officers of the same and different ranks, at both
different and the same working locations, it will be remembered that during the
'Carnival against Capitalism' we saw big differences between the City and the Met
police, because of different accountability concerns. More specifically, at perceived
moments of crisis when the City police were trying to avoid further damage to
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buildings and to push the crowd away from the Liffe building, we saw Met senior
officers openly critical of the City senior officer tactics.
Another example of the intergroup differences between different groups within
the police, was seen in chapter 6, in the second Eid study, which showed that Special
Branch (SB) and other sections of the police, have a mutual distrust following the
accountability for the information supplied to senior officers policing the 'Poll Tax'
disturbances in the 1990's. From a non-Special Branch perspective, this is seen in
questioning the probabilistic nature of the assessment of the threat of disorder, and
calling for more concrete predictions. Consider the following quotation from a non -
Special Branch officer, which openly questions both the format of Special Branch
predictions about crowd events and their accuracy.
14. Commander
"I mean, it's a musical joke, they never tell you anything you didn't know before and
it's a bit like a surveyor's report, it covers everything but commits them to nothing.
That's not necessarily true, I have seen some, which are really very good - -they are
spot on. By and large, though, I think perhaps they could be a bit more accurate or
precise, if that's the right word. I would prefer it if they were a bit more precise,
because I don't think anybody's going to get into the 'game of blame', you know, but
if they got it badly wrong but its based on the information they had available, and its
all been assessedproperly, that's what has come out of the 'ink', nobody can actually
blame them, all they are doing is giving you the information they had available.
Therefore perhaps, what I need to say is that they need to be bit more sort ofprecise,
and that relies on I suppose years ofpractice. "
Recall, also from chapter 6, that from a Special Branch perspective, that this
criticism and disinformation about the accuracy of their forecasts, was perceived to be
unfair both by Special Branch officers and by certain senior public order trained
officers.
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8.2. Limitations of the research
This was an exploratory study, which in the main concentrated on
accountability, which is important, but other factors might be as well.
As an example, one of the main themes occurring in the forty five semi
structured interviews conducted with senior public order officers at the gold, silver,
bronze and sub bronze level of command, is the concern expressed by 'experienced'
officers at the bronze and silver levels of command, about a lack of experience of some
officers allocated the role of gold.
To be more explicit, experienced bronze and silver commanders have voiced
concern that as experienced gold commanders retire from the police, they are being
replaced, on occasions, by officers who have little or no experience of command
during large scale public order events. The potential pitfalls of replacing experienced
gold commanders with officers with very little experience in the field of public order
has real ramifications in terms of the response by police to crowd action.
Consider the quotation, from a 'very experienced' silver commander, which
specifically highlights the problem of an 'inexperienced' gold commander, dealing with
an event involving groups such as the Movement against Monarchy (MAM), a group
whom we met previously in the 'Carnival against Capitalism' (chapter 7). The silver
commander, whilst acknowledging that a lot of activity by crowd members was taking
place, openly expressed concerns about the possibility of this 'inexperienced' gold
commander 'overreacting' and possibly escalating violence between the police and the
crowd. This tension between gold and his silver and bronze commanders was brought
to a head when, the gold commander was so alarmed by what he saw on the monitors
at the control room or GT, that he wanted to mobilise the Metropolitan Police reserve
response. This would have required officers to be called from police stations
throughout London, to attend the scene to quell the 'trouble', and was considered to be
a 'disproportionately' excessive measure, by three experienced silver and bronze
commanders, to the actual threat posed by the crowd, as the following extract makes
explicit.
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15. Chief Superintendent
"The only way of teaching how to deal with Public Order events is through
experience. A good example of this was one of the lastMovement against
Monarchy (MAM) marches. This involvedpolice doing a big dispersal of the
crowd and the Forward Intelligence Teams (FIT's) were coming in with loads
of information about these groups, which was beingfed into GT, and the gold
commander, who was not very experienced, with these type ofprotests. The
gold commander sat down with three experiencedPublic Order officers, and
wanted to push the panic button forforce mobilisation, because he had heard
lots ofactivityfrom crowd members, reported by the FIT's. The three
experiencedOfficers said collectively 'no, this is not neededwe are dispersing
the crowd, we are in control.' It was only with the experience of these
experienced, although junior in rank to the gold commander, thatprevented
goldfrom overreacting andperhaps escalating a situation with the crowd,
which in effect, we were controlling."
From a methodological point of view, the studies are not perfect. Whilst I was
given generous access, this was not total (access to intelligence was severely restricted
see chapters 6 and 7). Constraints were also placed on where I could study, most
notably perhaps in the experiments (see chapter 5), but also the first Vaisakhi study,
and the delay in getting interviews from the Met police gold and silver commanders
after June 18th 1999 (see chapter 7). On a related point, it was impossible to get
access to video material from the Met police control room (GT), due to the
requirement for it to be used for post event investigation into the criminal inquiry
which commenced immediately after the riot. This would have been a useful resource
with which to conduct the post event interviews, by going back over the video footage
with both the Met police gold and silver commanders.
On the subject of resources, there were limitations as to how many
conversations could actually be covered. In an ideal world, it would have been nice to
record everything that everyone said, but again practically impossible.
Perhaps, one of the most obvious limitations to the studies, are that they only
cover senior officer level in the Met police. However, it is clear that there are
differences between those in different positions. Again in a perfect world, it would be
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nice to be able to cover junior as well as senior officers, and also look at the two
together so as to assess the dynamics. Similarly, it would be good to look at different
forces through the same event, to gain insights into force perspectives and how they
interrelate.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, I talk of studying the police to understand
overall dynamics, and there are interesting pointers as to how police action might
affect the crowd, but we need to go on and look at both the police and crowd in the
same event. Indeed, ideally, I would look at different groups in the crowd, and
different groups in the police in one large study.
8.3. Future directions
Identifying the limitations of the research also provides an opportunity for
suggesting how the research could proceed in overcoming them. If resources were not
an issue, a piece of research which looked at the overall crowd in terms of different
groups within it, whilst at the same time looking at the police and different groups
within it, might be the ultimate aim. However, because resources are finite, and this is
a logistically massive undertaking, it might be best to work ones way towards this
ultimate goal.
Hence, first of all look at junior and senior officers together through the same
event. This might be in the form of experimental studies combined with field studies.
For the experiments I might look at senior/junior officer differences in perceptions of
danger, the ranking of different concerns by different ranks, and tactical action
preferences to different scenarios.
Building on the lessons learned in this thesis, and if feasible, I would control the
scenarios by using actors (for example at the riot training establishment at Hounslow in
London) to keep everything constant (nature of event, of participants, of physical
context, even the weather!), everything, that is, apart from the phase of the event.
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8.4. What are the wider implications for sociai psychology?
As stated in chapter 1, the aim of the thesis was to look at the police in order to
better understand crowd dynamics as a whole. I want to first address those
implications and then look at the wider implications for social psychology.
As concerns crowd psychology, previous studies suggest that police action
shape crowd action, specifically if crowds are treated as homogeneous and dangerous,
there is a danger of uniting crowds in opposition to the police and escalating conflict.
(Stott & Reicher, 1998).
My research partly replicates that finding. It is true, especially where violence is
incipient and even more when it becomes more intense, that police do indeed treat the
crowd as homogeneous and dangerous. This research reinforces the idea that police
hold theories and perceptions that may contribute to escalating conflict. However,
police actions are nuanced and complex. Police views are richer, more variable and
more understanding of crowd heterogeneity than Stott and Reicher (1998) suggest. In
particular the research shows the importance of accountability in framing perceptions
and actions.
To be more explicit, it will be recalled that in chapter 4 we saw the general
importance of accountability. Chapter 5 confirmed that. Chapter 7, not only illustrated
the significance of accountability in a 'real' life context but also extended its range of
applicability to the explanation of intergroup conflict.
All in all, perhaps the most striking finding to come out of this thesis is the
centrality of accountability to the group processes I have been studying, by contrast to
the almost total silence about accountability in the group literature. As indicated in
chapter 4 this may have to do with methods and types of laboratory groups, no history,
no formal criteria and membership is up to the individual if he/she wishes to identify.
However, the police and many if not most groups in society are different. Thus being
in a formal group like the police entails an element of sanction. In order for group
members to remain part of the group they need to avoid the sanctions that can be
imposed in terms of disciplinary and other measures which would mean removal from
the group.
We can therefore draw two general lessons from the work presented in this
thesis. A social psychology which wishes to understand real groups must, as in this
thesis, study real groups in context. Ethnography, which is underused in social
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psychological research, should perhaps be more widespreadly utilised as a technique in
conducting such research.
Second, and more specifically, group psychology needs to take accountability
more seriously. Ifwe do so we might find that it affects not just the specific processes
outlined here but many others central to social psychology.
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Appendix b: Acronyms and abbreviations
AC. Assistant Commissioner
ACPO. Association ofChiefPolice Officers
APPO. Area Press and Publicity Officer
CMDR. Commander
C.INSP. Chief Inspector
C. SUPT. Chief Superintendent
DSO. Designated Senior Officer
FIT. Forward Intelligence Teams
FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigation
INSP. Police Inspector
MACC. Mutual aid Co-ordinating Centre
NRC. National Reporting Centre
PC. Police Constable
PSU. Police Support Unit
SB. Special Branch
SGT. Police Sergeant
SPG. Special Patrol Group
SUPT. Superintendent
TSG. Territorial Support Group
QPM. Queens Police Medal.
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Appendix c: Experimental studies, order of presentation.
1. Introduction and manipulation questions.
2. Scenarios
a) Scenario 1.
I. Expectation questions
II.Value questions
III.Contagion questions
IV. Dangerous questions
V. Homogeneity questions
b) Scenario 2.
I. Expectation questions
II.Value questions
III.Contagion questions
IV. Dangerous questions
V. Homogeneity questions
c) Scenario 3.
I. Expectation questions
II.Value questions
III.Contagion questions
IV. Dangerous questions
V. Homogeneity questions
3. Experiment 2, manipulation of internal and external accountability conditions, followed
by completion of action measures.
4. Debrief sessions.
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Experimenter Script
Good Morning /Afternoon.
As many of you are aware, I have been conducting research into the decision-making processes
utilised by senior public order commanders. This research has so far, for the most part, been conducted
by looking at senior public order training, a series of'real' events and the interviewing of officers. This
has revealed that public order commanders have to deal with a complex array of information, which is
often presented in an ambiguous format, this leads to concerns being expressed about specific issues.
One of the issues ofmost concern for public order commanders would appear to be the issue of Risk
Assessment/ Public Inquiry/or both.
Now let me explain the nature of the task today. First of all, I will ask you some general
questions then show you three video clips. What I am interested in today, is your immediate reactions
to these clips, which contain a number of hypothetical crowd situations. These are not new and
represent ambiguous situations much like you are faced with during an actual event. You may
recognise these events but I would ask that you imagine yourself at the scene of each, and then answer
a series of questions in relation to the clips. These questions take a number of forms and should be
answered in the order in which they appear, do not turn over the page. There are no right or wrong
answers. Make your judgements in relation to the material you see. Do not change any of your
answers unless you feel that you have made a genuine mistake.
The information supplied by you, will remain confidential and anonymous, and will be used for
the purposes of the psychological research outlined. At the end of each clip I will stop and ask you to
fill in the booklet provided. In the booklets you will come across questions, firstly about your
expectations and the value you place on different outcomes. In relation to expectancies, you will be
asked to rate these in percentage terms. For example, ifyou expected it to rain at this particular
moment you would place a value near to 100%, if you do not expect it to rain the value would be
placed nearer to 0. If you were ambiguous about the likelihood of rain you would place a value in
percentage terms closer to 50.
After you have answered questions about your expectancies, I will ask you to place a value on
a series of outcomes. These questions will require you to fill in a scale. The scale will require you to
place a line according to your perception of the value to you, of the outcome in question. For example,
if you placed a value on the likelihood of rain as very positive you would mark a position on the line
like this
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Very Positive Very Negative.
If however you placed a very negative weighting to such an outcome you would mark a position on
the line like this.
In the last section of the booklet I will ask questions about the perceived nature of the crowd. These
questions require you to respond by giving percentage estimates. All these questions will be repeated
for each scenario.
Are there any questions?
If not, we will begin with the first scenario
Very Positive Very Negative
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Scenario 1: Anti Fascist Demonstration.
A demonstration has been called following the murder of a local Asian youth. Local
opinion has been inflamed following racist comments by the local British National Party
(BNP) Prospective Parliamentary Candidate. A wide section of the local community have
formed a coalition to oppose his views. They have proposed a demonstration ending with
a prayer vigil outside the house of the candidate A large number, approximately 15,000,
are expected to take part in the demonstration and vigiL The candidate has, through the
Local and National media, stated his belief that the police should spend their time
catching criminals rather than allow the demonstration and vigil to take place.
Organisers have been informed that the vigil will not be allowed to take place. The
organisers have also indicated that the presence of police is likely to inflame the protesters.
It is at this point that you are confronted with the following (video clip).
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Scenario one
If you decide not to 'kit' up what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level ofviolence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide to 'kit' up what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide to intervene what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide not to intervene what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level ofviolence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
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Now please evaluate the following outcomes. Place a straight line through the dotted line to
indicate your weighting to the various different outcomes.
1. You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence increases
Very Positive Very Negative.
2.You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence stays the same
Very Positive Very Negative.
3.You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence reduces
Very Positive Very Negative.
4.You decide to intervene and the level of violence stays the same.
Very Positive Very Negative.
5.You decide to intervene and the level of violence reduces.
Very Positive Very Negative.
6.You decide to intervene and the level of violence increases.
Very Positive Very Negative.
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Now I want you to evaluate the following statements. Place a straight line through the
dotted line to indicate your evaluation of the various statements.
1. In a crowd like this everybody has the potential to get carried away and become involved in
violence.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
2. Anyone who remains in a situation like this is out for trouble
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
3. In a situation like this, agitators are liable to whip ordinary people into doing things that they would
not normally do.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
4. Even in this context, non-violent people will remain non-violent.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
5. In the midst of confrontations like this, there are likely to be plenty of decent respectable people.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
6. Even if it is foolish, innocent bystanders are liable to hang around in situations like this.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
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Now I would like you to ask you some questions about the nature of the crowd you have just seen.
Please rate as a percentage estimate for each.
1. What proportion of the people in the crowd are actively involved in throwing missiles? Please give
as a percentage estimate.
2. What proportion of people in the crowd are actively involved in conflict with the police? Please
give as a percentage estimate.
3. What proportion of the crowd are liable to become involved in conflict with the police? Please give
as a percentage estimate.
4. What proportion of people in the crowd are involved in illegal acts? Please give as a percentage
estimate.
5. What proportion of people in the crowd are liable to be involved in illegal acts? Please give as a
percentage estimate.
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Now please estimate the percentage of the crowd who fall into each of the following four categories.
Anti social (percentage estimate)
Violent (percentage estimate)
Anti Police (percentage estimate)
Threat to Public Order (percentage estimate)
Now I want you to estimate the impact on the crowd of deploying the following tactical options.
Please rate as percentage estimate.
Violence will Violence will Violence will
reduce. stay the same. increase.
'Kit' up
Do not 'Kit' up
Withdraw
Do not
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Do not use
mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Do not contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
Do not use
Level one/two
trained officers
to disperse
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Scenario 2 'Police Powers' Demonstration
The government are introducing legislation, which increases Police powers of stop and search.
The legislation has generated considerable opposition and criticism of the ways current powers
are used, and future powers might be used to infringe civil liberties. A coalition against the
legislation has been formed including Church groups, Civil Liberties groups, Trades Unions
and Black groups. This coalition has called a National demonstration, the route of which goes
from Kennington Park, up Whitehall and ends in Trafalgar Square. Parliament is in recess
since it is the summertime and most MP's, including the Prime Minister, are on holiday. Some
15,000 people turn up for the demonstration. They are a wide spectrum, from anarchist and
environmental groups to contingents of clerics. The march sets off and, despite a fair degree of
anti police chants and taunts remains largely good-natured. As the march goes up Whitehall,
however, the front of the march stops in Downing Street. There are lines of uniformed officers
inside Downing Street and also flanking the demonstration in Whitehall. The following video
clip shows what happens next, as demonstrators move towards the gates of Downing Street.
Scenario Two
If you decide not to 'kit' up what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide to 'kit' up what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide to intervene what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide not to intervene what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
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Now please evaluate the following outcomes Place a straight line through the dotted line to
indicate your weighting to the various different outcomes.
1. You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence increases
Very Positive Very Negative.
2. You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence stays the same
Very Positive Very Negative.
3. You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence reduces
Very Positive Very Negative.
4. You decide to intervene and the level of violence stays the same.
Very Positive Very Negative.
5. You decide to intervene and the level of violence reduces.
Very Positive Very Negative.
6. You decide to intervene and the level of violence increases.
Very Positive Very Negative.
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Now I want you to evaluate the following statements. Place a straight line through the
dotted line to indicate your evaluation of the various statements.
1. In a crowd like this everybody has the potential to get carried away and become involved in
violence.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
2. Anyone who remains in a situation like this is out for trouble
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
3. In a situation like this agitators, are liable to whip ordinary people into doing things that they would
not normally do.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
4. Even in this context, non-violent people will remain non-violent.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
5. In the midst of confrontations like this, there are likely to be plenty of decent respectable people.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
6. Even if it is foolish, innocent bystanders are liable to hang around in situations like this.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
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Now I would like you to ask you some questions about the nature of the crowd you have just seen.
Please rate as a percentage estimate for each.
1. What proportion of the people in the crowd are actively involved in throwing missiles? Please give
as a percentage estimate.
2. What proportion of people in the crowd are actively involved in conflict with the police? Please
give as a percentage estimate.
3. What proportion of the crowd are liable to become involved in conflict with the police? Please
give as a percentage estimate.
4. What proportion of people in the crowd are involved in illegal acts? Please give as a percentage
estimate.
5. What proportion of people in the crowd are liable to be involved in illegal acts? Please give as a
percentage estimate.
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Now please estimate the percentage of the crowd who fall into each of the following four categories.
Anti social (percentage estimate)
Violent (percentage estimate)
Anti Police (percentage estimate)
Threat to Public Order (percentage estimate)
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Now I want you to estimate the impact on the crowd of deploying the following tactical options.
Please rate as percentage estimate.
Violence will
reduce.
Violence will
stay the same.
Violence will
increase.
'Kit' up
Do not 'Kit' up
Withdraw
Do not
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Do not use
mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Do not contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
Do not use
Level one/two
trained officers
to disperse
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Scenario 3 Student Demonstration.
Scenario three, is a demonstration which has been organised by the National Union of Students
(NUS) to protest against proposed government legislation to increase the fees to be paid by all
those studying in higher education. The numbers estimated by the organisers, is in the region
of 10,000 demonstrators from various Left wing groups. Several paper sellers are in evidence.
The protest has received a large amount of media comment and has been widely advertised.
The Prime Minster is due to deliver a 'key' note speech at a meeting with a group of interested
parties. The demonstrators have heckled and jostled the police, deployed outside the venue for
the speech, when it was discovered that the Prime Minister had been smuggled through the
back door. The organisers plan, was to disrupt the meeting by getting all the students who were
in the venue to leave as the Minister delivered the speech. It is at this point that you are
confronted by the following scene (video clip).
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Scenario Three.
If you decide not to 'kit' up what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide to 'kit' up what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide to intervene what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
If you do decide not to intervene what is the probability (in percentage terms)
a) the level of violence will reduce
b) the level of violence will stay the same
c) the level of violence will increase
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Now piease evaluate the following outcomes. Place a straight line through the dotted line to
indicate your weighting to the various different outcomes.
1. You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence increases
Very Positive Very Negative.
2.You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence stays the same
Very Positive Very Negative.
3.You decide not to 'kit' up and the level of violence reduces
Very Positive Very Negative.
4.You decide to intervene and the level of violence stays the same.
Very Positive Very Negative.
5.You decide to intervene and the level of violence reduces.
Very Positive Very Negative.
6.You decide to intervene and the level of violence increases.
Very Positive Very Negative.
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Now I want you to evaluate the following statements. Place a straight line through the
dotted line to indicate your evaluation of the various statements.
1. In a crowd like this everybody has the potential to get carried away and become involved in
violence.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
2. Anyone who remains in a situation like this is out for trouble
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
3. In a situation like this agitators, are liable to whip ordinary people into doing things that they would
not normally do.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
4. Even in this context, non-violent people will remain non-violent.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
5. In the midst of confrontations like this, there are likely to be plenty of decent respectable people.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
6. Even if it is foolish, innocent bystanders are liable to hang around in situations like this.
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
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Now I would like you to ask you some questions about the nature of the crowd you have just seen.
Please rate as a percentage estimate for each.
1. What proportion of the people in the crowd are actively involved in throwing missiles? Please give
as a percentage estimate.
2. What proportion of people in the crowd are actively involved in conflict with the police? Please
give as a percentage estimate.
3. What proportion of the crowd are liable to become involved in conflict with the police? Please
give as a percentage estimate.
4. What proportion of people in the crowd are involved in illegal acts? Please give as a percentage
estimate.
5. What proportion of people in the crowd are liable to be involved in illegal acts? Please give as a
percentage estimate.
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Now please estimate the percentage of the crowd who fall into each of the following four categories.
Anti social (percentage estimate)
Violent (percentage estimate)
Anti Police (percentage estimate)
Threat to Public Order (percentage estimate)
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Now I want you to estimate the impact on the crowd of deploying the following tactical options.
Please rate as percentage estimate.
Violence will Violence will Violence will
reduce. stay the same. increase.
'Kit' up
Do not 'Kit' up
Withdraw
Do not
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Do not use
mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Do not contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
Do not use
Level one/two
trained officers
to disperse
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Experiment 2
In this final section I want you to consider the pressure from concerns relating to the Health and
Safety issues relating to officers involved in public order events, and how this would make it
more likely, less likely or there would be no difference in your decisions with regard to the
tactical deployments you would have made in the three scenarios you have seen. Please rate as a
percentage estimate for each.
Scenario 1 More likely No difference Less likely
'Kit' up
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
More likely No difference Less likely
Scenario 2
'Kit' up
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
Scenario 3 More likely No difference Less likely
'Kit' up
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
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Similarly, I want you to consider the pressure from concerns relating to the issue of the
likelihood of a Public Inquiry for officers involved in public order events, and how this would
make it more likely, less likely or there would be no difference in your decisions with regard to
the tactical deployments you would have made in the three scenarios you have seen. Please rate
as a percentage estimate for each.
Scenario 1 More likely No difference Less likely
'Kit' up
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
Scenario 2 More likely No difference Less likely
'Kit' up
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
Scenario 3 More likely No difference Less likely
'Kit' up
Withdraw
Use mounted
officers to
disperse
Contain
Use Level
one/two officers
to disperse
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Demographic Details.
1. What level of Public Order training have you received? Please circle.
Standard
Advanced
2. What Sex are you? Please circle.
Female Male
3. How old are you?
4. What rank do you hold?
5. Have you previously been involved in a Public Order event? If yes, please state
at what level.
• Gold
• Silver
• Bronze
• Subsector bronze.
6.What level of Public Order training do you have at senior level? Please tick
• Recently trained
• Trained for some time (Please give approximate time in years).
7.What level of Public Order experience do you have at senior level
• Previously employed on less than ten events.
• Previously employed on more than ten but less than twenty events.
• Previously employed on more than twenty events.
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Appendix d: Pre event, coding notes and post event interview schedule for 'Carnival against
Capitalism'
Semi structured interview of the gold and silver commander: Pre event.
Theme one: General issues prior to the event (Gold commander).
Sub questions:
a) What are the major issues involved in policing a public order event?
b) How do you assess the risks involved in policing an event?
c) How do you identify signs of danger?
d) How do you identify signs of safety?
e) What do you regard as a successful outcome to a public order event?
f) How would you plan to achieve this?
g) What key things would you use in assessing a positive outcome?
h) What do you regard as a negative outcome to a public order event?
i) How would you plan to avoid this?
j) What key things would you use in assessing a negative outcome?
Specific issues prior to this particular event (Gold commander).
Sub questions:
a) What are the immediate issues for you in policing this particular event?
b) How have you assessed the risks involved in policing this particular event?
c) How will you identify signs of danger?
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d) How will you identify signs of safety?
e) What do you regard as a successful outcome to this particular event?
f) How are you going to achieve this?
g) What do you regard as a negative outcome to a public order event?
h) How are you going to avoid this?
i) How will you identify leadership in the crowd for this particular event?
Theme Two: General Information (Gold commander).
Sub questions:
a) How do see Special Branch (SB)?
b) What role do you see SB fulfilling in policing public order?
c) How do you see Public Order Intelligence System (POIS)?
d) What role do you see (POIS) fulfilling in policing public order?
e) Have you used any other sources of information. Please specify?
f) What role do you see this other information source playing?
Specific Information (Gold commander).
Sub questions:
a) How many people are expected on this march?
b) What information broadly was supplied by Special Branch in relation to their estimate of
numbers, mood and the likelihood of disorder?
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c) Broadly speaking, how many people are identified as being in the following categories
'organisers' (category C), the 'fighters' (category B) and the 'ordinary' demonstrators
(categories A and O)?
d) Is the information supplied by SB, POIS and any other sources in any way contradictory. If
so, please specify the source of the information and in what way the contradiction was dealt
with?
Theme Three : General accountability of (Gold commander).
Sub questions:
a) How do you separate and interpret the roles of gold, silver, and bronze?
b) How are officers selected to perform the roles of silver and bronze?
c) Is there a common structure for setting the strategy for all events. If so what is it?
d) What themes are relevant for you in setting the strategy for an event and preparing the
strategy statement. In what circumstances - if any - would you consider changing the
strategy for an event?
e) In making decisions concerning strategy how much are you influenced by external
accountability considerations. Please specify by whom and how you are influenced?
f) In making decisions concerning strategy how much are you influenced by internal
accountability considerations. Please specify by whom and how you are influenced?
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Specific accountability of (Gold commander).
Sub questions:
h) In what circumstances (if any) would you intervene and direct the silver commander to
make a specific intervention?
i) In what specific circumstances relating to this event would you consider the authorisation of
the following tactical options.
• i.e. 'kitting'
• use of horses into a crowd
• clearing the streets.
• the authorisation to bring forward the 'kestrel' and 'Trojan' units (firearms and baton round
teams).
j) In what specific circumstances relating to this event would you consider the deployment of
the following tactical options.
• Level one officers.
• use of horses into a crowd
• clearing the streets.
• the deployment of the 'kestrel' and 'Trojan' units (firearm and baton round teams)
• the use of CS agent
• the use ofbaton rounds
• the use of firearms.
k) How would you ensure that in using these tactical options only those crowd members
involved in conflict or committing offences were differentiated?
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Semi structured interview of the silver commander: Pre event.
Theme one: General issues prior to the event (Silver commander).
Sub questions:
a) What are the major issues involved in policing a public order event?
b) How do you assess the risks involved in policing an event?
c) How do you identify signs of danger?
d) How do you identify signs of safety?
e) What do you regard as a successful outcome to a public order event?
f) How are you going to achieve this?
g) What key things would you use in assessing a positive outcome?
h) What do you regard as a negative outcome to a public order event?
i) How are you going to avoid this?
j) What key things would you use in assessing a negative outcome?
Specific issues prior to this particular event (Silver commander).
Sub questions:
k) What are the immediate issues for you in policing this particular event?
1) How have you assessed the risks involved in policing this particular event?
m) How will you identify signs of danger?
n) How will you identify signs of safety?
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0) What do you regard as a positive outcome for this event?
p) How are you going to achieve this?
q) What do you regard as a negative outcome to a public order event?
r) How are you going to avoid this?
Theme Two :The use of Information. (Silver commander).
Sub questions:
a) How do see Special Branch (SB)?
b) What role do you see SB fulfilling in policing public order?
c) How do you see Public Order Intelligence System (POIS)?
d) What role do you see (POIS) fulfilling in policing public order?
e) Have you used any other sources of information. Please specify?
f) What role do you see this other information source playing?
Specific Information (Silver commander)
Sub questions:
g) How many people are expected on this march?
h) What information broadly was supplied by Special Branch in relation to their estimate of
numbers, mood and the likelihood of disorder?
1) Broadly speaking, how many people are identified as being in the following categories
'organisers' (category C), the 'fighters' (category B) and the 'ordinary' demonstrators
(categories A and O)?
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k) Is the information supplied by SB, POIS and any other sources in any way contradictory. If
so, please specify the source of the information and in what way the contradiction was dealt
with?
Theme Three :General accountability of (Silver commander).
Sub questions:
a) How do you separate and interpret the roles of gold, silver, and bronze?
b) How are officers selected to perform the roles of bronze?
c) How do you set the tactics for the event in support of the strategy? What themes are
relevant for you in making your tactical plan. In what circumstances would you consider
changing the tactical plan for the event?
d) Is there a common structure for setting the tactical plan for all events?
e) In making decisions concerning tactics how much are you influenced by external
accountability considerations? Please specify by whom and how you are influenced.
f) In making decisions concerning tactics how much are you influenced by internal
accountability considerations? Please specify by whom and how you are influenced
g) In what circumstances (if any) would you intervene and direct a bronze commander to make
a specific intervention?
h) In what circumstances would you consider that the strategy should be altered?
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i) In what circumstances would you consider the authorisation of the following tactical
options?
• i.e. 'kitting'
• use of horses into a crowd
• clearing the streets.
• the authorisation to bring forward the 'kestrel' and 'Trojan' units (the firearm and baton
round teams).
i) In what circumstances would you consider the deployment of the following tactical options?
• i.e. 'kitting'
• use of horses into a crowd
• clearing the streets
• the deployment of the 'kestrel' and 'Trojan' units (the use of firearm and baton round
teams)
• the use of CS agent
• the use ofbaton rounds
• the use of firearms.
j) How would you ensure that in using these tactical options only those crowd members
involved in conflict or committing offences were differentiated?
Participant observation study of the gold and silver commanders during the event:
General themes
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a) What are the concerns of both gold and silver on the day of the event.
Specific coding of gold and silver by use of participant observation looking for the following:
• Accountability concerns and the source i.e. internal/external. What influences are brought to bear
on the gold/silver commander?
• How do the police categorise a public order event in the pre, incipient and conflict phases. How
are these translations made and crucially what cues are used to make the translations?
• What are the concepts of legitimacy at the gold and silver level? Do they accept injuries and
damage to property to avoid being held to account for overreacting? Do these concepts change in
response to the police perception of the phase(s) of the event.
• What are the theories of the crowd? Does this change in response to the change in categorisation
of the event
General theme.
b) What are the general perceptions of danger, safety and models of leadership within the
crowd by gold and silver?
Specific coding of gold and silver by use of participant observation looking for the following:
• What information is used by gold and silver to indicate signs of danger?
• What information is used by them to indicate signs of safety?
• What information is used by them to indicate signs of leadership within the crowd?
• What information is used by them to suggest organisation within the crowd?
• What information do the police prioritise at different phases of the event (pre, incipient and
conflict) with respect to the above?
General theme:
c) Do the police perceive that crowds pose a problem for the social order?
Specific coding of gold and silver by use of participant observation looking for the following:
• How do the police control spatial and temporal decisions made by crowd members? Does this
change in response to phase and accountability concerns?
• What are the criteria for intervention/action? What tactical options are considered appropriate at
the different phases of the event?
277
Post event interview schedule of the gold and silver commander:
General explanation
a) What was your general impression of the event?
b) Was the event good?
c) Why?
d) Was the event bad?
e) Why?
f) How did this differ from your expectations?
g) Why did it differ?
Specific explanation
h) Let's go through the specific incident of?
i) Can you tell me what happened?
j) Why did the crowd act as it did?
k) What was the effect/outcome?
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Appendix e: Semi structured interview schedule for interviews with public order commanders
at gold, silver, bronze and sub bronze level of command
1. What are the background factors prior to the event that influence your decisions?
• Intelligence regarding particular groups, i.e. Special Branch threat assessments
• Probability of counter-demonstrations
• Route of the march
• Location of demonstration
• Strategic considerations :
Political
Organisational
Financial
Societal
• Other? (please specify).
2. What are the immediate factors on the day of the event that influence your decisions?
• Intelligence i.e. regarding the mood and behaviour of particular groups, supplied by FIT teams
• Vulnerability of symbolic locations
• Severity of injuries to officers and support staff
• Severity of injuries to members of the public, including demonstrators
• Crowd safety, i.e. concerns re crushing in confined spaces
• Advice from tactical advisers
• External organisational pressures, e.g. political, community, media
• Other factors? (please specify).
3 Is there a critical point when you would decide to employ particular tactical options?
• Batons - 'show of strength'
• 'Kitting up'
• Withdrawal of non-protected officers
• Vehicle tactics
• Use ofmounted officers
• Specialist weapons and tactics?
Baton rounds
CS agent
Firearms
